10.01.2012

Contact: emanuelle.vesely@realite-eu.org

Iran's Strategy in Latin America: Q&A with Security Expert Román D. Ortiz

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad arrived in Venezuela Monday to start a five-day tour of Latin American countries, during which he will also travel to Nicaragua, Cuba and Ecuador. Ties between Tehran and several Latin American states have been growing stronger in recent years, posing new challenges and threats to both Latin America and the United States. Bogota-based security expert Román D. Ortiz talked to Realite-EU about this visit and the implications of Iran's increasing presence in the region.
  

What are the main reasons behind Ahmadinejad's current visit to the region?

There are two main reasons behind the trip of president Ahmadinejad to Latin America. Firstly, Iran is in a very difficult international position. The last IAEA report has demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that its nuclear program has military purposes and is not aimed at developing peaceful nuclear energy. Under these circumstances, the isolation of the Islamic Republic is growing very quickly. In fact, there is an increasing consensus in the international community demanding that something be done to stop Iran’s progress to produce nuclear weapons. Even though China and Russia will probably continue to be reluctant to take effective measures against Iran, it is clear that the international tide is turning against the Ayatollahs. This means not just that there is increasing support in the international community to impose new economic sanctions but also that the military option is beginning to receive less resistance given the open rejection of Iran to abandon its illegal nuclear program. As a consequence, the Iranian president has to try to collect international support from his allies in order to break the isolation of his regime and weaken the emerging international consensus against the Islamic Republic.

Secondly, the visit of Ahmadinejad has to do with the potential catastrophic consequences for Iranian interests in Latin America if President Chavez has to leave office because of his health problems. The fact that the Venezuelan leader suffers from cancer has huge implications for the Islamic Republic’s Latin American strategy. Venezuela has been instrumental for Iran’s penetration into the continent. Caracas has introduced Tehran to all its allies in the region, from Bolivia to Nicaragua. In this sense, a significant part of the ground gained by Iran in Latin America depends on Venezuela. The continuation of Venezuelan support is far from being guaranteed if Chavez leaves office, therefore Ahmadinejad needs to establish a stronger direct relationship with the rest of the Latin American leaders who nominally support Iran. This is the reason why the Iranian President is making such an extended visit to the region.

Why did he choose these specific countries?

The credibility of the Islamic Republic is below zero after the last IAEA report revealed that the Iranian nuclear program has military goals and that Tehran was systematically lying to the international community for years. As a result, Ahmadinejad can expect support only from the regimes which share certain ideological positions with Iran, which include a deep anti-American sentiment and sympathy for radical Islamism. This is the case of the so-called Bolivarian Axis: Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua. However, just as significant as the countries the Iranian president is visiting are the countries which he is not. For instance, it is very interesting that Ahmadinejad has not included Brazil in his Latin American trip, a clear sign of deterioration of the relations between Tehran and Brasilia.

Why are these countries willing to cooperate with the increasingly-isolated Iranian regime?

The openness of certain Latin America governments to collaborate with Iran has much more to do with ideology than the material advantages provided by the cooperation with Tehran. Apart from some specific initiatives in the areas of mining and oil, most of the civilian cooperation projects promoted by Iran in Latin America have not gone beyond the phase of preliminary discussions with the host governments or have produced very poor results. In military affairs, the Iranians have more experience than their Latin American partners and can offer opportunities for cooperation. However, given the UN has banned any security cooperation with the Islamic regime, this option involves legal and political costs which outweigh its potential advantages, whatever they are. As a consequence, the only reason which explains the interest of some Latin American governments to work with Iran is that they share certain common ideological traits with the Islamic regime such as anti-Americanism and hostility to Israel.

Nevertheless, another factor which is important for understanding the fast pace of the Iranian penetration in the region is Venezuela’s unrestricted support of Tehran’s ambitions. Venezuela has provided effective financial aid to other Bolivarian regimes such as Ortega’s Nicaragua or Morales’ Bolivia. It is easy to understand that part of the price demanded by Caracas to provide this economic lifeline to these countries has been to open their doors to Chavez’s Iranian ally. In this sense, a combination of ideological coincidences and Venezuelan support has made it considerably easier for the Islamic Republic to increase its influence in the Latin American countries under Bolivarian-minded governments.

What are Iran's goals in Latin America? What is it trying to achieve?

Beyond getting political support, Iran has three critical goals in Latin America.

First, Tehran is using its allies to circumvent the international sanctions imposed by the UN, US and EU. This is the logic behind the Iranian interest in establishing military cooperation agreements with some Latin American countries such as Venezuela or Ecuador. In general terms, these countries have a very poorly developed defense sector. However, the Islamic Republic wants to involve them in joint military programs in order to break the ban on military sales imposed on Tehran by the UN in 2007. The idea is that Iranian industry produces the equipment and its Latin American allies lend their flag to export them as products made by a third country. This way, Iranian weapons can be exported despite the international sanctions. This type of scheme was used to try to export 18.000 Iranian made assault rifles, disguised as Venezuelan weapons, to Uruguay in 2007.

Second, the Ayatollahs are looking for opportunities to delocalize strategic assets out of the Iranian territory. This is the reason for Tehran’s interest to get involved in joint projects to build refining facilities with its Latin America allies. Iran has a critical lack of refining capabilities which has put it in a permanent state of fuel scarcity. Under these circumstances, a global ban on the sales of refined fuel to Tehran is one of the main vulnerabilities confronted by the Islamic Republic. Therefore, Iran is actively trying to build refineries outside of its national territory.  These new facilities could be used to smuggle fuel if international sanctions were imposed. This is the strategic rationale behind projects such as those discussed with Venezuela and Ecuador.

Finally, Tehran is building clandestine intelligence and terrorist networks in Latin America in order to develop the capability to launch attacks against US and Israeli interests in the region. This is particularly important for Tehran as the Islamic regime believes it is a relevant deterrent capability in order to make Washington think twice about the possibility of launching a military operation to stop Iran's illegal nuclear program. In fact, the Iranians demonstrated their will and capability to launch massive terrorist attacks with the bombing of the Israeli Embassy at Buenos Aires in 1992 and the AMIA Jewish Cultural Center at the same city in 1994. At that time, the Islamic Republic had a much smaller diplomatic presence in the region, reduced intelligence assets, smaller influence on the Latin American Islamic communities as well as poorer connections with radical Latin American governments and political groups. Given the fact that all the tools of Iranian influence have increased over the last years, it is necessary to admit that the present capabilities of the Islamic Republic to execute terrorist attacks have to be much greater than two decades ago.

How does Iran operate in the region?

Iran promotes its presence and influence in Latin America through a three pronged strategy. First, there is a level of government-to-government contacts. This includes not only official economic or cultural cooperation but also much more sensitive issues such as military and joint intelligence projects. Second, Tehran builds bridges to the Islamic communities in the region, supports them and promotes their radicalization. Finally, there is a complete clandestine level where Iranian intelligence operatives work together with Hezbollah assets in Latin America. At this level, the development of connections with Latin American terrorist and criminal organizations is not uncommon. In fact, during the past years, a number of connections between Latin American drug trafficking organization and Hezbollah networks have been exposed.

The Iranian penetration into Latin America is a project which has the personal support of president Ahmadinejad. In this sense, the complete Iranian government bureaucracy has supported this effort. Obviously, the main characters in this strategic adventure have been those connected to the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the Minister himself, Ali Akbar Salehi, and the Vice-minister for the Americas, Behrooz Kamalvandi. Beyond the highest level of the Islamic Republic, a set of individuals have played the role of connectors between Tehran and radical Islamic networks in the region. Among them, it is possible to mention the Iranian citizen Mohsen Rabbani, accused by the Argentinian justice system of being involved in the terrorist attack against the AMIA in 1994 and the Lebanese-Venezuelan, Ghazi Nassereddine, signaled as a connection between Hezbollah and Venezuela.

In October 2011, the United States accused Iran of plotting to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington with help from members of a Mexican drug cartel. How deep is Iran's involvement in terrorist and drug-related activities in the region?

There is clear evidence of connections between the Iranian intelligence apparatus and Latin American terrorist and criminal networks. Of course, the best known case of Iranian involvement in a terrorist attack in the Western Hemisphere is the bombing of the AMIA at Buenos Aires in 1994. In this case, Interpol confirmed the participation of Iranian officials in the attack and circulated a Red Notice demanding the arrest of several of them, including the present Iranian Minister of Defense, Ahmad Vahidi. However, there are much more recent links. This is the case with a cell of Shia Muslims from Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago which was planning a terrorist attack against the John F Kennedy airport in New York in 2007. After their arrest, the participants in the plot admitted they were in contact with the former Iranian diplomat, Mohsen Rabbani, previously accused of participating in the attack against the AMIA. Finally, there is the latest incident regarding the attempt of an Iranian agent connected to the Al-Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to hire Mexican hit-men to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to Washington. The FBI collected enough evidence to demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt the involvement of high ranking Iranian officials in the plot.

Regarding the involvement in drug-trafficking, networks connected to the Iran-backed Lebanese terrorist organization Hezbollah have been detected in Colombia. In fact, in 2008, the so-called “Titan operation” reveled a drug trafficking and money laundering scheme linking a Colombian criminal gang called “Oficina de Envigado” (Envigado Office) with Hezbollah. Before this case, individuals associated with Hezbollah had been linked to the smuggling of drugs from the tri-border area of Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil to the Middle East.

Conference call -  Foiled Iranian Attacks in the U.S.

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Consequences for Iran and the International Community
With Dr. Sami Alfaraj, President of Kuwait Center for Strategic Studies

Conference call - UN : Iran working on nuclear weapons - Consequences for the international community 

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UN : Iran working on nuclear weapons
Consequences for the international community
With Mark Fitzpatrick, Director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

17.08.2011

Contact: info@realite-eu.org

Russia's Plan to Restart Nuclear Talks with Iran and the Expected Launch of Bushehr: Q&A with Non-Proliferation Expert Mark Fitzpatrick  

• Efforts to find an acceptable step-by-step solution have all failed; Russia, which actually has little leverage with Iran, has proposed what to the West may seem like a bad deal
• Economically, Bushehr is a white elephant; It does not justify Iran's uranium enrichment effort
• Fordow facility can only hold 3,000 centrifuges, far fewer than what is needed for industrial-scale fuel production but enough for weapons purposes
• Iran has a weak case for producing any 20% enriched uranium; if it triples production as claimed, it would have close to a weapon’s worth if further enriched

Russia's Security Council chief, Nikolai Patrushev, arrived in Tehran on Monday to discuss Moscow's plan to revive talks between Iran and six world powers on the Islamic Republic's controversial nuclear program. At the same time, Iranian officials stated that the Russian-built Bushehr nuclear power plant would be connected to the national grid -- after repeated delays -- by the end of August.

Mark Fitzpatrick, Director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, spoke with Realite-EU about these latest developments.

Russia is looking to revive the nuclear talks between Iran and world powers under a "step-by-step" approach. What does this mean? How would you assess the plan's chances of success?

A “step-by-step” approach is elementary diplomacy. Each side making staged concessions in exchange for equivalent benefits in theory creates confidence to overcome sticking points. How to structure equivalent compromises is no easy task, however. Repeated efforts over the past ten years to find an acceptable step-by-step solution have all failed over the same conundrum: Iran insists on having an enrichment program to give it a weapons capability and the other side wants it to stop.   In this case, Russia has proposed what to the West may seem like a bad deal: sanctions would be progressively lifted in exchange for Iran answering IAEA questions, yet Iran would continue to produce enriched uranium for which it currently has no civilian purpose.

Some analysts say that Russia's capacity to provide technical help for Iran's nuclear program gives it unmatched leverage, while others argue that Moscow's influence is very limited when it comes to curbing Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions. How do you see this?

Russia actually has little leverage with Iran. Russia is not among Iran’s top five trading partners. The countries are not allies and they have little cultural or historical affinity.   Nuclear power technology is the only thing Russia sells that Iran can’t get anywhere else, but during the 16 years since Russia took over Bushehr construction (including the many years of delayed completion) I cannot think of a single case when Russia was able to exploit this monopoly for purposes of leverage. 

What is Bushehr's role in Iran's nuclear program? What would its launch tell us about the advancement of the program?

The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant is the centerpiece of the peaceful part of Iran’s dual-purpose nuclear program. When it is fully operational, Bushehr’s 1,000 megawatt electrical output will represent about 2% of Iran’s total production of electricity. Economically, it’s a white elephant, but the symbolism is what is important to Iran.   It will become the 31^st country in the world to produce nuclear power and the first in the Middle East. Iranians will take pride in the accomplishment – even though Bushehr was built by Germans, Russians and Ukrainians and will be operated by Russians for several years. Iranians will also breathe a sigh of relief when, 35 years after the project began, Bushehr is finally up and running. 

The launch does not say much at all about the rest of Iran’s nuclear program. It demonstrates that yes, there is a peaceful purpose to the nuclear program, but no country denies this. More to the point, Bushehr does not justify the worrisome dual-use aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, particularly the uranium enrichment effort. Iran has no need to enrich uranium for Bushehr since Russia has promised to supply enriched fuel for the lifetime of the reactor and several international initiatives will ensure fuel supply.     

Is Bushehr a purely peaceful facility as claimed?

In theory, if run at low burn-up, the Bushehr reactor could also be used to produce plutonium for perhaps 30 nuclear weapons a year. But no nuclear power plant has ever been used for this purpose, and if Bushehr was misused this way, monitoring by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would quickly blow the whistle. Weapons-usable plutonium could also be harvested from the spent fuel from normal reactor operation. But Russia has contracted to take back the spent fuel when it has cooled enough to be transported, and in any case Iran does not today have the reprocessing technology to be able to separate the plutonium from other waste products. From a proliferation perspective there are other nuclear facilities in Iran that are much more worrisome than Bushehr

Tehran announced in June that it would triple its production of higher grade uranium and shift the work to an underground site. What do we know about that site?

The IAEA has never been given good answers about when the Fordow facility was started and what its original purpose was to be. The facility can only hold 3,000 centrifuges, far fewer than what is needed for industrial-scale fuel production but enough for weapons purposes. Iran has said that it will use part of the facility for production of 20% enriched uranium. As of the IAEA’s last reported visit on May 21, no centrifuges had been installed. The IAEA’s next report, expected at the end of August, will tell us how far along Iran has gotten with its plans for Fordow.

Why is the Fordow plant of concern?

Iran’s announcement that it will shift production of 20% enriched uranium to the Fordow facility near Qom shows why revelation of the plant in September 2009 heightened global concern. Iran has a weak case for producing any 20% enriched uranium at all, since it cannot produce fuel from this product that will be safe to use and since 20% is so close to being weapons-usable. Even if Iran finds a way to safely produce the fuel, it already has enough 20% enriched uranium to last for several years. If it triples production by the end of the year as claimed, it would have close to a weapon’s worth if further enriched. It would take only 12 weeks to further enrich that amount to weapons’ grade if the centrifuges are configured properly and there is no wastage.  

The Fordow facility was built inside a mountain, making it nearly impenetrable to a conventional military strike. Entrances, air vents, electrical lines and the like will be vulnerable, but centrifuges inside the facility and the stockpile of 20% enriched uranium will be well protected.

What are the other key facilities in Iran's suspected nuclear weapons program?

Iran’s nuclear program is spread over dozens of sites. Of the known sites, four are particularly problematic from a proliferation point of view:

1.      Natanz, where Iran conducts most of its uranium enrichment, mostly in an underground industrial-sized facility but also at an above-ground pilot plant;

2.      Fordow, where, as noted above, Iran intends to move its 20% enrichment operation;

3.      Esfahan, where uranium concentrate (known as yellowcake) is converted into a gaseous form (although it has been idle for the past two years) and where other forms of uranium conversion are planned; and

4.      Arak, where Iran is constructing a heavy-water moderated research reactor that has an ostensible civilian purpose but which will also be ideal for producing weapons-grade plutonium. Arak is also the site of a plant to produce the heavy water to be used by the reactor, which will not become operational as scheduled in 2012 because of Iran’s inability to produce or procure all the necessary components.

 Are they all under international inspection? Is there a possibility that other secret nuclear sites exist?

Most of the declared sites listed above, and some other smaller research facilities, are under minimal IAEA inspection, albeit not fully in accordance with IAEA safeguards rules or best practices. The problem is that in Iran, which has not granted access rights agreed to by most other countries, the IAEA cannot inspect what has not been declared. Iran’s history -- and indeed its stated policy – makes clear that Tehran has no intention of declaring any new facilities under construction. 

Fortunately, Iran does not have good “Opsec”. Operational security failures have repeatedly enabled Western intelligence agencies to discover clandestine nuclear facilities in Iran. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that new facilities will be discovered before they become operational.

13.07.2011

Contact: info@realite-eu.org

Iran expert Mark Fitzpatrick: "More and tougher sanctions are inevitable if Iran continues on its current path" 

• Sanctions designed to be a fetter, not a fine; they do not target the entire Iranian economy
• Collateral damage comes from Tehran's intermingling of legitimate civilian imports with illicit ones
• Sanctions on Iran’s access to international financing services, transportation and trade insurance are the best way to disrupt its black market trade
• Iran is producing more enriched uranium each month this year than it was last year, even though it has no civil use for the stockpile
• Sanctions have restricted Iran’s ability to employ more advanced centrifuges in larger numbers

Iran has been slapped with four rounds of UN sanctions and additional measures from the US, the EU and other countries over its suspected nuclear weapons program.

In this special interview, Mark Fitzpatrick, Director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, speaks to Realite-EU about the sanctions and their impact.

The sanctions on Iran are aimed at hampering its suspected nuclear arms program and ballistic missile program. How do they work? Who do they target?

The sanctions on Iran, particularly those adopted by the UN and the European Union are designed to be a fetter, not a fine. The sanctions do not target the entire Iranian economy. They are aimed at restricting Iran’s ability to procure and import materials from other countries that contribute to the programs in the nuclear and missile area that the UN has mandated be suspended. Individuals and companies involved in these illicit programs or that assist them directly or indirectly, by offering transportation, insurance and financial services also fall under sanctions. They do penalize Iran, of course – the hope is that Iran will realize that the price it is paying for enrichment is too rich. But once the illicit activity stops, the reason for the sanctions will also end.

In what sense are these activities “illicit”? What international law forbids uranium enrichment or ballistic missile development?

Although enrichment is not prohibited by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and nor is work on ballistic missiles banned by any treaty, six UN Security Council resolutions have created a new international legal framework. Every day that Iran continues activities that are prohibited by the UN is another day of illegality on Iran’s part. The UN resolutions followed on from a finding by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran had violated its safeguards obligations and that there was a resulting lack of confidence that Iran’s nuclear program was exclusively for peaceful purposes.

What is the idea and logic behind targeting Iran's access to international banking, insurers and transportation companies?

Iran seeks to avoid the UN ban on cooperation with its sensitive nuclear and missile programs by buying materials through the black market. But it still has to pay for these goods and to transport then home. Sanctions targeted on Iran’s access to international financing services, transportation and trade insurance are the best way for concerned countries to disrupt this illegal black market trade.

Some media reports said recently that large container firms suspending operations at several Iranian ports might disrupt also legal shipments to Iran. What measures are taken – or what kinds of sanctions are avoided – in order not to hurt ordinary Iranians?

Sanctions obviously are a blunt tool; nobody pretends that they only affect the targeted individuals and entities. In this case, it was the recent US government sanctioning of Tidewater Ports – the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-controlled enterprises that handle nearly 90% of all Iranian imports – that led some freightliners to shed their Iranian business. The reason for the collateral damage comes from the Iranian government’s intermingling of legitimate civilian imports with illicit ones. According to the U.S. Government, the sanction came about largely due to Iran’s use of the Tidewater ports to export arms and related material in violation of UN Security Council resolutions.

Governments that apply sanctions have two broad tools to ameliorate their impact: greater accuracy regarding the targets, so as to leave innocent entities unmolested, and judicious use of licenses to allow exemptions. For example, even the US sanctions, which are the most comprehensive prohibitions, have humanitarian exceptions which can allow the licensed importation of U.S. food and medicine into Iran. The EU and UN regimes also have licensing regimes.

What are the main differences between the sanctions imposed by the UN and those imposed unilaterally by the US, the EU and other countries?

The UN sanctions specifically target activities related to Iran’s sensitive nuclear and missile programs and authorize states to restrict a number of financial services that contribute to these programs but do not make such restrictions mandatory. The EU sanctions adopted last year apply more broadly, prohibiting new investment and technology transfer in key parts of the gas and oil industry and pose mandatory sanctions on trade insurance, banking and transport. Australia, Canada, Japan and South Korea have also passed autonomous measures that go beyond UN sanctions. US measures are the most broad. They increasingly target sectors of the Iranian economy that contribute even indirectly to the nuclear and missile programs in question – such as Iran’s energy and financial sectors – and they increasingly have an extraterritorial reach.

There are conflicting reports about the effectiveness of the sanctions. A UN expert panel has said recently that sanctions succeeded in slowing Iran's nuclear and missile programs. However, other experts say that these programs are moving forward and have in fact been accelerated lately. What is your assessment?

Sanctions obviously have not stopped Iran’s sensitive nuclear and missile development programs. Iran defiantly is producing more enriched uranium each month this year than it was last year, even though it has no current civil use for the stockpile. But the sanctions have restricted Iran’s ability to employ more advanced centrifuges in larger numbers. Last year the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization himself acknowledged that the sanctions were affecting the enrichment program. But to put a brake on the illicit activities will require a more persuasive way of convincing Iran to take a different path.

What are the "weak links" in the current sanctions regime and what would it take to make sanctions work?

The sanctions that are having the most impact are those that restrict Iran’s ability to use the international financial system in support of illicit trade. The US and EU sanctions covering financial services are comprehensive. Iran has increasingly turned to other countries, such as Turkey, which recently was specifically warned by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) about the proliferation risks of taking up this business. If UN sanctions met the EU standard of making restrictions on financial, insurance and transportation services mandatory, then it would be much harder for Iran to exploit weak links. Universality is the key to making sanctions work.

Where are the sanctions heading? IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said last month that he had received new evidence of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear work. Can this latest IAEA report result in new sanctions?

More and tougher sanctions are inevitable if Iran continues on its current path. The enrichment work that triggered most of the sanctions on Iran is worrisome enough, because it gives Iran a means of producing the fissile material for nuclear weapons. But the increasing evidence of actual development work on nuclear weapons should spur even greater concern. Iran’s refusal to answer the IAEA’s questions about apparent weapons-related nuclear activity is reason for the IAEA Board of Governors to make another finding of Iranian non-compliance with its safeguards obligations.

Such a finding will likely spur further sanctions by various countries, although it may be hard to find consensus in the UN for tougher measures. 

29.06.2011

Contact: emanuelle.vesely@realite-eu.org

Realite-EU Expert, Bruno Tertrais: "Iran's Missile Program Has Hidden Nuclear Ambitions"

• Silos may give Iran “second-strike” retaliatory capability and lay the ground for installing longer-range missiles
• Iran mastered stage separation, allowing for ranges greater than 2000 km
• Program to make Iran capable of covering all of Europe in a few years
• Iran's space program allows for further experimentation with missile technology
• Missile program benefits from North Korean, Russian and Chinese aid
• Iran has become an exporter of missiles

This week Iran opened a new round of war games, during which it test-fired several types of missiles and unveiled underground ballistic missile silos. Simultaneous to its suspected nuclear weapons program, Iran is developing ballistic missiles, with constantly increasing ranges, which could potentially be used to deliver nuclear warheads. Some Iranian missiles are already capable of striking parts of Europe. In this special Realite-EU report, Dr. Bruno Tertrais, a senior research fellow at the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), sheds more light on the Islamic Republic's ambitious ballistic missile program:

Iran has one of the most active and diversified missiles program in the world, under the control of the Revolutionary Guards. One can say that this program has three main goals.

One is war-fighting and deterrence. Tehran has already a large and diversified arsenal of operational missiles of short-and medium-range of about 20 different types, which are regularly used during well-publicized exercises and maneuvers. These include in particular the liquid-fuelled Shahab-3, with a range of at least 1000-1200 km, and the solid-fuelled Sejil-2 with a range of at least 2000-2200 km.

A few days ago, Tehran unveiled a subterranean complex in which missiles are placed in silos. This may give Iran a form of “second-strike” retaliatory capability, and/or lay the groundwork for installing heavier, longer-range missiles. Most of Iran’s missiles are not very accurate and would likely be used primarily in salvos as terror weapons, rather than to destroy a pinpoint target. They are a de facto replacement for an almost non-existent air force.           

Hidden behind this visible goal of Iran’s program is the ambition to have missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Tehran has been working for several years on adapting a nuclear-type warhead to such missiles, as shown by tests initiated in 2004 of a tri-conic or “baby-bottle” re-entry vehicle design (which can be seen on Iranian TV footage) and by evidence received later by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

There is controversy and uncertainty over the fact that Iran may already possess a longer-range, nuclear-capable missile named BM-25 of North Korean origin (itself based on the Soviet SS-N-6). From what is publicly known about its capabilities, Iran does not yet seem to have the ability to carry a crude nuclear warhead - for instance based on the old Chinese design that may have been provided by the Khan network, weighing about one ton - to ranges beyond 1000 km; it already has, however, the ability to launch a lighter payload to a distance of at least 2000 km.

Finally, just like its nuclear counterpart, Iran’s missile program includes a “peaceful” component: a space launch capability, in particular the Safir-2 rocket, which is probably aimed at presenting the country as a world-class emerging power, while at the same time allowing for further experimentation with missile technology. Tehran now seems to have an actual satellite launch capability and it claims to have sent two satellites into space, in 2009 and 2011, though it is only able at this point to send small and light objects into orbit.

Where is the program heading? In recent years, Iran has learned how to master two key technologies. One is stage separation, which allows for ranges greater than 2000 kilometers. The other is solid propulsion, which allows for more reliable missiles with better operational capabilities.

Iran is now a mature “ballistic power”. But Tehran’s program involves much experimentation. Iran is trying multiple formulas and designs, with often different names given to the same missile, probably as an attempt to impress the world with the diversity of its arsenal and research. When a new missile or variant of a missile has been successfully tested, it does not go immediately and automatically into production.

The priority for Iranian missiles is clearly regional. By its own admission, Tehran wants to be able to target US bases in the Middle East, in particular in the Gulf, as well as Israel’s territory. There is no indication so far that Tehran is working on an intercontinental-range ballistic missile, and Iran claims that it has no intention to build missiles of a range higher than 2000 km.

However, there is no reason to take Tehran’s claims at face value and the logic of the program takes it towards the capability to cover all of the Middle East and all of Europe in a few years. Not unlike the nuclear program, the ballistic program advances in rather slow, incremental steps – but nonetheless in a steady and determined fashion.

It is important to note that despite the Iranian leadership’s boasting of a fully national effort, Iran’s missiles have benefitted, and continue to benefit, from foreign assistance. North Korea has been a key provider of technology for liquid-propelled systems. Russian firms and engineers have also been involved. China has sold Iran short-range, solid-propellant ballistic missiles as well as cruise missile technology.

And just like North Korea, Iran has become an exporter of missiles, including, of course, rockets of various types to Hezbollah in Lebanon, with persistent rumors of a Scud-type system having been provided to the group.

There are thus many reasons to monitor and contain Iran’s missile program, which is explicitly targeted by UN Security Council sanctions.

08.06.2011
Contact: info@realite-eu.org  

Q & A With Realite-EU Expert Bruno Tertrais:

"Iran's 20%-Enriched Uranium Brings It Very Close To Military Threshold" 

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Yukiya Amano stated earlier this week that he had received new evidence of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear work. In a defiant response to these accusations, Iran said today it would shift its production of higher grade uranium to an underground bunker and triple its production capacity.

Dr. Bruno Tertrais, an expert on nuclear proliferation and a senior research fellow at the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), talked with Realite-EU about these latest developments.

This is not the first time that the IAEA has obtained evidence indicating that Iran is pursuing a military nuclear program. What is different this time?

Indeed, the IAEA has had evidence of Iranian military-oriented activities for years, and some damning information was already in the possession of the Agency in 2008. What has changed is that between February and May of 2011, the IAEA obtained new evidence related to some of these activities, which it does not detail in its May 24 report. It says that it is now assessing this evidence.

We know that Iran is working on a nuclear device because of a combination of elements which includes, inter alia, the possession of documentation indicating how to mould uranium metal into a hemispheric shape, and work on multipoint explosive initiation, which is a technique used to rapidly compress a sphere of enriched uranium to initiate the fission reaction.

A particularly intriguing part of Iran’s bomb design activities is the fact that it has been working on a neutron initiator using uranium deuteride. A neutron initiator helps the fission reaction to begin. What is interesting is that using uranium deuteride for that purpose is a very rare and original method. There is public evidence that Abdul Qadeer Khan, the chief of the Pakistani uranium enrichment program for 25 years, was working on this peculiar technique, which happens to be of Chinese origin. One is led to the conclusion that this method, which the Chinese taught the Pakistanis in the 1980s, is now in the possession of Iran. This would not be particularly surprising given the scope and depth of Pakistani transfers to Iran in the 1980s and 1990s. What we do not know is whether or not Khan and Pakistan gave Iran full designs of nuclear warheads, including the two sophisticated Pakistani weapon designs that the Khan network was in possession of. If Iran had one of these two sophisticated designs, it would not need to test a device, and it would also be able to build a warhead small enough to be carried by a medium-range ballistic missile.

What is Iran's present uranium enrichment capacity?

It is crucial to understand that the probable sabotage of Iran’s centrifugation program through covert actions – in particular the so-called “Stuxnet” virus – has not led to a diminution of the quantity of enriched uranium produced by Iran.

According to the latest IAEA report, the main plant at Natanz now includes nearly 6000 operational centrifuges organized in 35 cascades. The number of installed centrifuges has not increased, but the number of operating centrifuges has.

Iran’s monthly production rate of low-enriched uranium (LEU), currently 156 kilos, is the highest ever recorded by the IAEA. Tehran now has a stockpile of more than 4000 kilos of low-enriched uranium, which would allow it to build two atomic bombs if further enriched.

In addition, Iran has produced nearly 60 kilos of 20% enriched uranium in the pilot plant at Natanz. This 20% enriched uranium is allegedly produced to fuel the Tehran Research Reactor. In fact, it brings Iran very close to the military threshold, because once you have enriched to 20%, you are very close to 90%: it is a nearly-exponential process.

Even though it claims that its intentions are purely peaceful, Iran continues to reject the implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol, which would allow for more intrusive verification, and also of a legal provision called Code 3.1 which, if implemented - which is what all countries do except Iran - would compel Tehran to declare new nuclear facilities well in advance. Given this lack of an adequate verification regime, the IAEA’s knowledge of the Iranian program is diminishing, as stated in its latest report. Thus one cannot exclude the possibility of other enrichment facilities being built in secret.

Simultaneous to its nuclear program, Iran is developing ballistic missiles which could potentially be used to deliver nuclear weapons. Where does this effort stand?

Iran has one of the most active and diversified ballistic missiles program in the world, on par with those of North Korea and Pakistan. Tehran has already a number of operational Shahab missiles which could reach Saudi Arabia and Israel.

In recent years, Iran mastered two key technologies: stage separation, which allows for ranges greater than 2000 km, and solid propulsion, which allows for more reliable missiles.

It has been working for several years on adapting a nuclear-type warhead to such missiles, as shown by tests of a “baby-bottle” missile design and by evidence received by the IAEA. The logic of the program takes Iran towards the capability to cover all of the Middle East and all of Europe in a few years.

IAEA chief Amano wrote a letter to the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization urging him to answer the Agency's queries and grant inspectors access to officials and sites. What is the significance of this letter?

There are precedents for such a letter, but clearly Director General Amano has broken with the mild manners of his predecessor Mohammed El-Baradei, and has decided to confront Iran head-on.

Given the lack of Iranian cooperation and Tehran’s years of procrastination, it is the right choice and it is also perfectly allowed – if not requested – by the IAEA’s mandate. Iran’s angry reaction at Amano’s letter shows that it understands it can no longer count on the patience of the IAEA Director General, as it thought it could when El-Baradei was in charge.

Iran has already rejected the latest IAEA report saying it is based on "fabricated documents". In light of Iran's continued refusal to cooperate with the UN watchdog, what should be the Agency's next step? Will it report the new evidence to the UN Security Council?

All the evidence produced by inspections, defections and intelligence that points to the military dimension of Iran’s nuclear program has been called “fabrication” by Iran. Tehran has been declared twice in non-compliance with its safeguard agreements – the only country in the world in this category. Expect Amano to continue pressing for more cooperation by Iran.

However, given that the IAEA will almost certainly, for the first time, bring the issue of Syrian non-compliance to the Security Council, one should expect the Board of Governors to focus on the Syrian question for now.

Can this report result in new international sanctions?

Not necessarily. It would be very difficult right now to have the UN Security Council pass a new sanctions resolution, especially since the Syrian case is now almost certainly going to be tackled by the Council. But what matters most is the actual implementation of existing sanctions. In addition, the United States and Europe can also enhance sanctions on their own. So-called “unilateral” sanctions have proven more efficient than United Nations ones.

Conference call - Iran's role in South America: What does it mean for Latin America and U.S. security? 

Listen to the Audio

Iran's role in South America
What does it mean for Latin America and U.S. security?
With Roman D. Ortiz, Director of Decisive Point

Read transcript in PDF 

CONFERENCE CALL: IRAN’S ROLE IN SOUTH AMERICA: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR LATIN AMERICA AND SECURITY?

WELCOME AND MODERATOR:
GERLINDE GERBER,
COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATE,
REALITE-EU

SPEAKER:
ROMAN ORTIZ,
PARTNER AND DIRECTOR,
DECISIVE POINT

THURSDAY, MARCH 17, 2011
9:00 A.M. ET

GERLINDE GERBER: Hello and welcome. I am the communications associate at Realite-EU and I thank everybody to join us in today’s conversation with Mr. Roman Ortiz. Realite-EU is a website and e-newsletter for journalists, leaders and key analysts that focus on developments in and around the Middle East.

The information on our website is in 10 languages and I invite you to come to www.realite-eu.org for more information about Iran, its nuclear weapons program and peaceful ways to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

Now it is my pleasure to introduce you to our speaker today. Mr. Roman Ortiz is the director of Decisive Point, a consulting company specializing in security and defense. He is also a professor at the Department of Economics at the Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, where he focuses on the analysis of political violence and terrorism in Latin America.

Ortiz has worked as an external advisor on counter-narcotics strategy and counterterrorism for the Colombian navy commander and the commander-in-chief of the Colombian military forces. He has taught and researched topics related to political and criminal violence at Spanish academic institutions such as the – (inaudible) – Institute and the Ortega y Gasset Institute – sorry for my – (chuckles).

Ortiz is a member of the editorial board on the Journal of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, published by Taylor & Francis in Philadelphia and frequently publishes articles in El Comercio de Lima, El Tiempo and semana.com.

This briefing with Mr. Roman Ortiz is on the record. Now Mr. Ortiz will say a few opening remarks and then answer questions by our listeners. Mr. Ortiz, you have the floor.

ROMAN ORTIZ: Thank you, thank you very much. Good morning to everybody. I would like to start this discussion just trying to (teach ?) to the attendancy (ph) some ideas about which is the rationale for the Iranian behavior in the region, in Latin America first, and second, to try to explain how they are trying to get their goals, okay?

First, I would like to explain that Iran is looking for key critical goals: First, the expansion of Iran is connected with the goal of, break the tensions which the country is suffering after the decision of the United Nations to press Iran in order to get they abandon their illegal nuclear program.

In this sense, the Iranians have been trying to use Venezuela – particularly Venezuela, but also other countries in the region – to try to break these tensions. This goal has been tried to get through isolated strategies.

One of them has been to use some of the – some Latin American countries as intermediaries to continue selling Iranian weapons to said countries. This was the case, for instance, in an operation which was rebuilt just three years ago when Venezuela was trying to sell a package of assault rifles to the Uruguayan government and the Uruguayans thought that the assault rifles were Venezuela-made. In fact, they were Iranian made. This is a typical example of some of the strategies which have been used by Iran in order to use some of their Latin American allies to break the UN tensions.

The second goal is to develop an infrastructure in the region in order to be able to respond, to retaliate to a potential U.S. or Israeli attack against the Iranian nuclear infrastructure in order to stop the development of nuclear weapons by Iran.

In this sense, the Iranian government has tried to increase its infrastructure all along the region and increase the presence of not just diplomatic personnel but also personnel connected to the al-Quds Force, which is, as you know, the international branch of the Iranian revolutionary guard – also, personnel connected with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, which is the intelligence branch of the Iranian government, and finally to support the building and the deployment of Hezbollah cells all along the region.

The newest step in this strategy is the Iranian government apparently has reached an agreement with the Venezuelan government in order to build a base to deploy some (face-to-face ?) missiles on Venezuelan territory. There is no clarity in this moment now regarding where this base could be located in Venezuela, but it’s clear that there are conversations in this sense.

This would be a newest step in order to develop capability for retaliation in order to allow the Tehran government to respond with attacks against U.S. interest or even U.S. soil in the case of a crisis regarding the Iranian nuclear program.

The third goal is connected to the attempt – the Iranian attempt to delocalize – I mean, to move its strategic assets from Iranian territory to other countries. The idea behind this strategy is to try to get safe locations for assets which could be attacked by the U.S. or by Israel in the case there is a crisis regarding the Iranian nuclear program.

Then, what they are trying to do is to, for instance, to find uranium mines or even to build refineries in other countries. But this infrastructure could be under the control of the Iranian government in order to be able to continue using this infrastructure in the case of a crisis or in the case of even an aerial campaign against the Iranian strategic infrastructure inside Iran.

And finally, the third goal is connected with the permanent interest of Iran of isolate Israel and to promote anti-Israeli positions all over the world. In this case, in the case of Latin America, there are a couple of particularly interesting developments in the last year. One of them is Bolivia, for instance, and their – I mean, after a suggestion coming from the Iranian government, the Bolivian government broke relations – diplomatic relations with Israel after the Israeli operations – the Israeli campaign in Gaza in 2009.

And also, the Tehran government has been an intermediary between the Venezuelan government and Hamas in order to increase the recognitions – the acceptancy (ph) of Hamas in Latin America. In fact, there was a meeting between the Venezuelan government and Hamas representatives in Tehran in 2007. This is particularly relevant basically because Hamas, as you know, is an organization which has been – I mean, has been included in the least of terrorist organizations, not just of the U.S. but also of the European Union, in the sense that what Iran is trying to do is to strengthen and to strengthen the international reach of Hamas going over the international tensions against their organization.

Just to talk a little bit about which could be the consequence of these Iranian policies, not just for the Latin American countries but also for the U.S., regarding the consequence for the U.S., I think we can talk about four key potential consequences. One is, it’s clear Iran is getting a way to break the international tensions through Latin America and particularly through Venezuela, which means the effectiveness of these tensions is going to be reduced because of the efforts of Iran to get more influence in Latin America.

The second consequence is connected with an increase in the risks of attacks against the U.S. interests in Latin America and also against – the possibility, of course, of an increase of the risk of an attack against Israeli interests in Latin America. If this happen, it would not be the first time. As you know, there were two dramatic attacks against Israeli interests in Argentina in 2000 – excuse me, 2000, no, in 1994 and 1996, 1994 against the Israeli embassy and 1996 against the AMIA, the Argentinian Israeli social center in Buenos Aires.

The third consequence this Iranian penetration in Latin America could have is the creation of safe havens for Islamist terrorism in Latin America. We have had the experience with the Triple Frontier, the region between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, where there has been an increase in the presence of dissident Islamist and Arab terrorist organizations. And we could have a similar development in other parts of the region.

In fact, the cooperation between the Venezuelan government and the Iranian government has created a very, very easy environment for Islamists and radical Middle East organizations in Venezuela. There has been different cases in the last years when people involved in a terrorist operation have been captured with Venezuelan passports in their hands.

And finally, the fourth and last consequence is, in general terms, the presence of Iran in Latin America is reducing the influence of the U.S. in the region. Basically, there are some governments, for instance the Nicaraguan government, which had a tremendous dependency on the U.S. because they needed and they need them, even now, the U.S. aid in order to have – I mean, to support the national budget.

And they are looking – and they are looking for other sources of economic aid in order to cut their dependency with the U.S. One of the key – or, if you want, it’s two key examples in this sense is the Nicaraguan government I mentioned but also the case of the Bolivian government, which is trying to find other potential allies in order to reduce the dependency on the Western aid, in particular the U.S. economic support.

Regarding – but also, I think it’s important, and I am talking to you from Latin America, that it’s very important to understand, the Iranian penetration in the region is not just a problem for the U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere, but also it’s a problem for the Latin American countries. And I would like to finish my remarks with mentioning to you which are, in my view, the consequences of these – of the increase of the Iranian presence in Latin America for the Latin American countries.

And I would like to mention four key consequences. One is an increase in the reach of terrorist attacks in some countries of the region, okay? I mentioned before the case of the AMIA, the attack against the Jewish center in Buenos Aires. We could see in the future similar cases in other countries of the region, basically because the infrastructure, which Islamist terrorist organizations could use in the region, is now much stronger than before.

The second problem, the second challenge, in my understanding, regarding the increase of the Iranian penetration in the region is the radicalization of the Latin American Muslim communities. In this sense, I think in Latin America, we have seen a development not so different from the situation in places such as Europe. I mean, we have a small, not so big Muslim communities in most of the countries of the region.

But however, we have seen an increase in the radicalization of these communities, of some of them. Even if these communities are not so big in demographic terms, I think it’s important to have into account, this could become a challenge for the security of the Latin American countries, basically because they don’t have the tradition to deal with this type of problems in the region, okay? In the case of Europe, for instance, countries such as the U.K., for instance, has a clear view about which is the problem they are trying to develop measures in order to deal with this process of radicalization.

But in the case of Latin America, this is a really very new problem and the governments are – there is not the political awareness necessary to deal with this problem. And even more, most of the governments don’t have the proper tools in terms of intelligence and also in terms of promotion of democratic values in this type of closed communities to deal with this problem.

Just to mention a couple of examples of this, we have had cases of indigenous communities which have been converted to Islam in places such as the Southern Mexico or the Colombian-Venezuelan border.

The third problem is the introduction in the region of very destabilizing weapon systems. Okay? I mentioned before the case of the Iranian-Venezuelan conversations regarding the creation of – the building of a base where Iranian missiles could be deployed. This is just an example of the type of development which could have a dramatic impact in the strategic stability of the region.

And finally, just to finish, I think that the fourth consequence is of course the involvement of some Latin American countries, in some case with they’re aware, without – I mean, the involvement of these governments, of Latin American governments in networks which are connected with the smuggling of military technology at global levels.

I would – example of that is how the Iranians are trying to – excuse me – to develop joint ventures to build joint military equipment with some Latin American governments, particularly Venezuela and also Ecuador. This idea, from the Iranian point of view, is an attempt to try to keep the arms exports of the Islamic Republic breaching the international sanctions.

In this way, of course, the Latin American countries which develop this type of ties with the Islamic Republic, which, of course – excuse me – could become involved in international networks which are moving illegally weapons systems and weapon technology all around the globe. That’s all and I am open to your questions. Thank you.

MS. GERBER: Thank you very much. Operator, we will open the floor at this moment.

OPERATOR: Thank you very much. At this time, we will open the floor for questions. (Gives queuing instructions.) Our first question comes from J. Scott Brown (ph).

Q: Yes, Dr. Thank you very much for a very interesting presentation. I wonder if you could address, please, the issue of the secret flight – or not-so-secret flight – that operates on Conviasa airlines or Conviasa did operate it – between Caracas and Tehran and with stops in Damascus, whether that has indeed fully stopped or whether it’s being replaced and whether you have any further intelligence about what exactly was going on with that flight.

MR. ORTIZ: Well, the flight is working in this moment. It is a flight which is developed under (specific political ?) conditions and in fact, in the case of Venezuela, the flight lands in the military side of the Maiquetia airport, which means people who are traveling in this flight don’t cross the normal customs and passport control procedures.

But they come into Venezuela and get out from Venezuela without the official control of the – I mean without the ordinary control of the Venezuelan government. And the cargo plane transports not just people, but also materials. I mean there are not clear – there are no clear information. There is no clear information regarding what type of materials the plane transport.

Now, apparently, what is clear is these – these flight is use not so much to move things from Iran – from Iran to other countries, but to introduce people and also materials – I mean physical cargo in the cargo in Iran. I think it’s important to put these flights in the context of the cooperation – of the technological cooperation between Iran and Venezuela and also in the role – in the context of the role played by Venezuela, that kind of huge breach to break the U.N. sanctions against Iran.

Look, the Venezuelans and the Iranians – Iran has developed cooperation with Venezuela in order – in terms of weapons manufacturing during the last years in some significant arenas. For instance, the Iranians have transferred UAVs – I mean drones – to Venezuela. Also, there is agreements between the Venezuelan government and the Iranian government in order to send military officers to the Sharif University in Tehran, which is, as you know, the most important technological center under – in the Islamic Republic.

And finally, as you know, there was a recent – there was recently an agreement signed by the Venezuelan and the Iranian government which was focused on the development of something called a “nuclear village” in Venezuela territory. Basically, Venezuela the help of the Iranian government to develop its own nuclear technology.

I mean after the Japan earthquake, just yesterday, President Hugo Chavez made a statement saying he understood nuclear technology is too dangerous and he’s going to cancel the Venezuelan nuclear program because he thinks it is too dangerous to go along this path. But really, if you want my opinion, I don’t believe at all they are going to cancel, really, the program.

I think this is just kind of reaction for the public, but the Venezuelans are committed to cooperate with the Iranians in order to develop this program. Even more, the Iranians have got a critical control on assets which could be connected with – not with nuclear developments in Venezuela as well as in Iran.

There have been – in 2005, an Iranian company called – (inaudible) – received a contract from Venezuela, was contracted by the Venezuelan government in order to develop a complete mineral census of the mineral resources of Venezuela, which means all the minerals in Venezuelan territory are going to be known – all the mineral resources are going to be located and known by the Iranian government. This includes, of course, uranium.

Q: Of course, yes.

MS. GERBER: Operator, further questions?

OPERATOR: (Gives queuing instructions.) We are holding for questions.

MS. GERBER: Okay, then let me pose a few questions that came in from our listeners from before. So Sheryl Silver is asking – she’s American and she’s asking about the U.S. president and the American media. I’ll just read what she sent to me by e-mail.

“Thus far, the American media has done little coverage regarding Iran’s frequent visits to South America. In fact, I believe I’ve only seen a single segment on CNN and another one on Fox News regarding the trip to Venezuela. Can you make a guess why the American media is not more concerned about the relationship of Iran’s leaders with America’s South American neighbors and the danger it presents to us here in the U.S.?” So the question is about the media presence in America.

Should I – I will pose the second question and so you can answer both. “Since President Obama hasn’t raised the issue either, do you have any idea why the president doesn’t seem concerned about this?”

MR. ORTIZ: Okay, okay. You’re asking – I come into – I mean in a way that the U.S. internal politics and I am going to do it. First, I think there is a problem – there are two problems, if you want, in order to understand why this type of developments have not been mentioned by the U.S. president.

First, everything is very new and the information is very fragmented, okay? I mean if you look at the – at the evolution of the relations and the presence of the – the Iranian presence in Latin America during the last years. It’s so huge and so quick and it’s so new that it is very difficult for a common observer to take into account the relevance of these – of these events.

In fact, I think that the natural tendency of a lot of people is to think – look, this is just a curious event without real strategic meaning. Of course, it is not, but this is a tendency in a lot of – in a lot of sectors of the public opinion and also in the media. This is the context.

But also, I think we have to take into account, particularly from the U.S. government point of view, it is – for Obama administration, probably it’s much more comfortable not to increase the level of awareness regarding this problem basically because if this could be the case, they would have to do something.

Basically, if you don’t mention a problem in political terms, this problem doesn’t exist, you know? This is the case, for instance, with Venezuela. Look at the – look at the evolution of the Chavez government. First, they have – it has been critical in order to open the region, in order to open Latin America to the – to the Iranian influence.

If you look at how the Iranians come into the – into the Latin American countries, you see how first Chavez travels and then a few months after this, the Iranian delegation comes into the country. And also, you know, we have heard these developments in terms of the – of the creation of how Venezuelan nuclear program and (the partner ?) the Venezuelan government has looked for in order to develop this program.

I mean I am talking about basically the Iranians, which are under U.N. sanctions because of – because of – their nuclear program is illegal and the Russians, which have been supporting a (nuclear legal ?) programs all over the world for very long. Just think about the involvement in their own Iranian nuclear program of the Russian Federation, okay? As you know very well, the official Iranian nuclear reactor is a reactor – is a Russian-made reactor.

Now, the problem is if you – if you could pay more attention on these issues, the problem is you have to give a response to these issues, okay? And then you have to do something. Then the only – the only possibility and really, in my opinion, Obama administration doesn’t want to increase the awareness of these type of problems, basically because they are more focused on the internal – on the U.S. internal politics, first and also because they want to reduce the international commitments of the U.S.

Basically, what they want to do is to reduce the involvement of the U.S. in places such as the Middle East or Afghanistan. And they don’t want to open a new front, even if this front is so close to home that it could be very (very urgent ?) to increase the level of awareness and to put pressure on Venezuela, particularly in order to reduce its commitment with Iran.

Then, I think this is the reason, basically you have one hand – on the on hand, a problem with the phenomena in the sense this phenomena – the Iranian presence in the region is very – is very new and is – and the information is not so open, of course and then it’s much more difficult to get relevant information for the media about this problem.

But also, you have this political interest coming from the U.S. administration in order to reduce the relevance of the problem in order to – in order not to have to do something regarding the – regarding Venezuela and Iran in Latin America.

Of course, the real problem is this policy – in my understanding – is a huge mistake and sooner or later, the U.S. is going to have to cope with the – with the Iranian presence in the region, basically because their most important strategic interests are going to be affected by the increase of the influence of Tehran in Latin America.

But in the present moment, I think President Obama prefers to reduce the relevant – the relevance of this issue. In general terms, if you look at the behavior – in my opinion – the behavior of the Obama administration in global terms, you can see how they are ready to suffer long-term losses in order not to have to make difficult decisions in this moment.

And I don’t want to change the focus of my presentation, but if you see how this administration has behaved in the case of the – of Libya, it’s a good example of how they have preferred not to take risks, now, in political terms and to be more effective in order to stop the violence provoked by Moammar Gadhafi and then probably to suffer in terms of political prestige, not just in the Middle East, but all over the world.

MS. GERBER: Okay. Do we have more questions?

OPERATOR: I’m showing no questions in the queue at this time.

MS. GERBER: Okay, let me give you another question that was submitted before. It’s also about the U.S. They are currently looking into the case of Venezuela as breaking international sanctions or U.S. sanctions? Now, my question is: Do you have more details on – results from this or consequences? What would be the consequence for Venezuela if the U.S. finds them breaking U.S. sanctions?

MR. ORTIZ: Well, the fascinating thing is the consequence for Venezuela till now has been nothing. And it’s very clear they are – they are breaking – they are breaking the U.N. sanctions. Just I am going to give – and also the U.N. – the U.N. sanctions – excuse me the U.N. sanctions and also the U.S. sanctions against Iran.

Let me give you an example. In 2008, the Department of State sanctioned an Iranian bank which had presence in Venezuela. The name of the bank was Export Development Bank of Iran. And it was involved in financial operations to support the – to support the smuggling of technology, to support the Iranian weapons of mass destruction program.

And just one year after this, Venezuela and Iran signed an agreement to create another bank, which now is called the Iran-Venezuela Joint Bank. And of course, it’s involved exactly in the same type of mismanagement and illegal – illegal activities as the previous bank. Then if you see this case, the point is Venezuela is not suffering any cost for this cooperation with Iran.

And then they are continuing with this behavior, passing over the sanctions and the condemns of the U.S. and of the international community in general terms. I mentioned before the case of the – of the – of the case of the – of the – their attempt to sell Iranian assault rifles to the Uruguayan government, saying to the Uruguayans the rifles were Venezuelan rifles. And we have – we have other similar cases.

Now, the point is, in general terms, not just the U.S., but also the United Nations and of course, the Latin American countries surrounding Venezuela are doing nothing to express – to send a message to President Chavez that this behavior is very, very, very dangerous for the region and they are not going to tolerate this behavior.

The consequence of this is Chavez has all the room to continue doing this type of things with its Venezuelan allies, you know? Then on one hand, the answer is we have a lot of evidence of the Venezuelans breaching the United Nations sanctions against Iran and on the other hand, the answer is the consequences for this behavior is nothing till this moment.

The problem is if we could do something in order to increase the awareness, to increase the political pressure on these issues and then to get an increase in the pressure on Venezuela in order to get the Venezuelans change their policy on this problem.

MS. GERBER: Very interesting. Do we have more questions?

OPERATOR: I’m showing no more questions. (Gives queuing instructions.)

MS. GERBER: I will read a question submitted by Jonathan Schick. It’s a slightly different topic. “Do you see the recent unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state by various Latin American countries as a part of the Iranian influence on the continent? And if so, what is your opinion on that matter?”

MR. ORTIZ: Well, I think – I think the Iranian influence on this issue – or the Iranian activities are more connected to try to get recognitions for Hamas, for the radical – the Islamist radicals – the Palestinian Islamist radicals. Now, I think that of course, the Iranians are trying to promote the recognition of the Palestinian state by the Latin American countries. But they – I think the forces which are promoting these recognitions – this recognition are much more complex than Iran.

I think there are two types of questions here. One is, which is the narrative – the narrative which are dominating, which are, in a way, yeah, dominating the understanding of the Latin American government and mass media about the Middle East conflict. And the narrative which is dominant in Latin America is a pro-Arab, pro-Palestinian narrative.

Then the problem is, there has not been, in my understanding, an effort – enough effective effort in order to explain the Israeli point of view to the Latin American government and also to the Latin American public opinion.

Even more, I think Israel has developed good relationships and very important esoteric cooperation with some Latin American governments. But for some reason, recent Israel has not been able to translate this level of cooperation into a more effective and more – a closer support from its Latin American allies in the case of the conflict with the Palestinians.

Just, I want to give you an example: One of the key providers of weapon systems to the Colombian government, and not just to the Colombian government but also to the Chilean government and other governments in the region, is Israel. Israel is a very attractive weapon supplier to the Latin American countries, basically because it is very reliable. And of course, the systems are high-quality systems.

Now, even when Israel has developed these relationships, and these relations of course, as you know, to transfer weapons is not as any other trade. It involves, of course, a level of political cooperation and political understanding. Well, but even if Israel has developed this close strategic relationship with some Latin American countries, the Israeli governments have not been able to translate this cooperation into a more supportive political position from its – excuse me, from their Latin American allies.

Then I think we have on the one hand the problem of public relations, a problem of public information; on the other hand we have a problem of how to translate the cooperation between Israel and Latin America in some areas into political support when the Palestinian question comes to full (face ?) in the international arena.

I think these are the two key factors which are in a way reducing or damaging the relationship – I mean, in a way which are weakening the political position of Israel in Latin America regarding the approval – I mean, the recognition of the Palestinian state.

I think this recognition is not – I mean, this tendency could reverse, could be reversed, but it is going to be necessary a strategic effort in the region by Israel – I mean, in the sectors, the political and social sectors which support Israel.

MS. GERBER: Very well. Do we have more questions?

OPERATOR: There are no questions in the queue.

MS. GERBER: Okay, so for the end, I wanted to ask you – I understand you live in Bogota, so I wanted to ask you about the country Colombia. As far as I know, Colombia is right now a nonpermanent member of the Security Council and it chairs the Iranian Sanction Committee. And what I also see is that when Obama travels to the region, he doesn’t necessarily go to Colombia while the Iranian deputy foreign minister, Behrouz Kamalvandi, he is going to Colombia. How do you see the role of Colombia in all this?

MR. ORTIZ: Okay, I think the reason because Obama doesn’t come to Colombia is more connected with – I mean, with the view of this administration of the role of Colombia in the region. Colombia was a close ally of the Bush administration and the new Democrat – and the new Democrat administration, the Obama administration, has tried to change the way of dealing with Latin America.

And in this change, one of the losers has been Colombia, in the sense that the Obama administration, just because we were quite close to the Bush administration, decided – if you want my personal opinion – decided to punish us and to talk to other countries which they think they were less connected with the previous U.S. administration.

On the other hand, we are very attractive To the Iranians. In this moment, we are very attractive basically because it’s clear – and I suppose the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry has a clear idea about this – the relationship between Colombia and the new – between Colombia and the Obama administration is not so close as it was with the Bush administration, which means there is a kind of a strategic – there is a kind of a strategic vacuum which the Iranians could try to profit from in order to get more influence in this country.

Then, I think both events – I mean, the Iranian visit to Colombia and the no visit of President Obama to Colombia, are connected, but no so much from the U.S. point of view but from the Iranian point of view. President Obama decided not to come to Colombia just because of a kind of decision of, make clear Colombia is no longer the clear ally of the U.S., as it was when Bush administration was in the White House.

But the Iranians have taken this evolution as an opportunity to increase the influence of – on Colombia, and particularly, of course, when, as you said, Colombia is in the UN Security Council in this moment and is going to have a relevant influence on the process regarding the tensions against Iran.

Then I think again, in this particular point, the U.S. administration is not taking into account, the Iranians are now a global player and they are going to take any opportunity they can find in order to increase the influence on relevant issues regarding the evolution of its nuclear program, you know?

MS. GERBER: All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Ortiz, for these extremely interesting and informative comments about Iran’s role in South America. I want to recommend again the website www.realite-eu.org for background information, analysis and breaking news. On the website, we also provide a list of experts that are available for interviews on Iran, security in the Middle East, nonproliferation and human rights issues. Thank you very much for everybody on the call. Have a great day. Bye-bye.

(END)

Conference call - Will China Continue to Support Iran in the Aftermath of Hu Jintao’s Visit to U.S.? 

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Will China Continue to Support Iran in the Aftermath of Hu Jintao’s Visit to U.S.?
With Prof. John W. Garver, Professor, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology
Thursday, 27 January 2011

Conference call - Wikileaks And The Iranian Threat 

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Wikileaks and its consequensed for the Middle East region and Iran
With Dr. Sami Alfaraj, President of Kuwait Center for Strategic Studies
Tuesday, November 30, 2010

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REALITE-EU

CONFERENCE CALL ON WIKILEAKS & THE IRANIAN THREAT: WHAT’S NEW?

WELCOME AND MODERATOR:
GERLINDE GERBER

SPEAKER:
SAMI ALFARAJ,

OPERATOR: This is a recording of the Réalité-EU Project on November 30th, 2010, at 9 a.m. Central Time. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your patience in holding. We now have your speakers in conference. Please be aware that each of your lines is in a listen-only mode. At the conclusion of the presentation, the floor will be open for your questions. At that time, instructions will be given as to the procedure to follow if you’d like to ask a question. It is now my pleasure to introduce Ms. Gerlinde Gerber. Ms. Gerber, you may begin, ma’am.

GERLINDE GERBER: Hello and welcome. My name is Gerlinde. I am a communications associate at Réalité-EU. Thanks to all our listeners for joining us today in the conversation with Dr. Sami Alfaraj about WikiLeaks and the Iranian threat and what those revelations mean for the future development of the region.

Let me see a few words about Réalité-EU first, just for the case that some of you are new to our conference calls. Réalité-EU is a website and e-newsletter for journalists, leaders and key analysts that focus on developments in and around the Middle East which pose a threat to Europe and beyond. Réalité-EU is a nonprofit organization not connected to any governments. It is supported by individuals concerned with the growing threat of Iran and extremism in Europe and the Middle East.

The information on our website is in 10 languages, which is English, French, German, Spanish, Arabic, Portuguese, Turkish, Chinese and Japanese. Please visit www.reality-eu.org for further information about Iran, its nuclear programs and peaceful ways to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

Now let me introduce you to our speaker today, Dr. Sami Alfaraj. Dr. Alfaraj is the head of Kuwait Center for Strategic Studies, which he established in 1997 as the first private consulting center on strategic issues in the Gulf region. He served as an advisor to the GCC and as a consultant to the Kuwaiti government and to parliamentary organizations, private corporations and government agencies throughout the Gulf region.

He has advised Kuwait’s Office for the Prime Minster, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Bureau on crisis-management issues. Mr. Alfaraj will say some opening remarks and then your phone lines will be opened up for the question-and-answer session, where you will be able to pose your questions directly to him. Mr. Alfaraj, you have the floor.

SAMI ALFARAJ: Good morning. This morning, I am going to give you a few words about my feeling as somebody from this part of the world, what revelations come through the disclosure of many of the contents of the WikiLeaks documents related to the region, to the Gulf specifically, and the relation to Iran and its nuclear program.

First of all, this comes against the grain of how business is done, the business of politics in this part of the world. This is an area very well-known for discretion that the business of politics is really done behind closed doors. So I’m sure there are different, actually, layers of attitudes vis-à-vis the revelations. One layer I could describe as shocked. This is the layer of the practitioners of politics, people in government, in different governments of the GCC in relation to what has been revealed about their actual and real attitudes vis-à-vis the case of their relations with Iran.

The second one is the attitude of people who are actually observing the conduct of politics, people like myself, and sometimes there is – such type of people would sometimes be elated that their views that have been discussed in public for years have already been vindicated, that they have already influenced the conduct of politics and the conduct of their government’s policies vis-à-vis Iran.

The second are people who feel that they were actually given false information with regard to what they were doing in pursuit of their own research and their assessment with the situation in the Gulf.

A third layer, actually, this is the public layer, and I believe that there will be – it is a positive development, that they see that their down-to-earth attitude vis-à-vis Iran, their concern about Iranian politics, their call for a tougher stand towards Iran have found reflection in the policies of their government, albeit not attitudes that have been revealed in public, and they only came to the light in recent date.

In general, for a person like myself observing the situation and dealing with government circles all over the GCC, I have been aware of such attitudes of many. I am not saying I’m aware of private, for instance, conversation between a head of state and another head of state – not to that level, but I am aware about the real discussion in policy circles. And I am not overwhelmed, actually, about what is being revealed. I am quite surprised at how soon such attitudes came to the fore.

One element for me that really caught my attention is that – and caught the attention of all of the people – is that – how the front quarters in different layers in different countries of the GCC, as well as the region, whether in Jordan or in Israel, for instance, were thinking the same way about what was the best way to stop the Iranian nuclear program in its tracks, whether diplomacy was going to work, and if it wasn’t going to work, whether war was something to be contemplated.

And for somebody who has been in the area and who has seen stability, revolution, wars, neighbors attacking each other, religion wars and three times – two times in this part of the world, as well as two nations, Iran and Iraq, fighting for eight years, insurgency inside Iraq itself between ’88 and 1990, invasion of Kuwait, 1990, and so on and so forth – it is important to see how we look at, for instance, look at the relations about the discourse attributed to King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, and that he actually advised the American government to take a military action against Iran.

This indicates the willingness of Gulf leader at the time, 2008, to be as ready as to enter another war in this region after 28 years of instability and war, which indicates that the malaise of this discourse between us, as regional and as international powers with Iran was reaching nowhere, and that we reached this stage of despair to the level that we were ready to actually accommodate another destructive war in this part of the world.

This is quite an interesting point, and it’s attracted the attention of many in the Gulf, the preparedness of the largest member of the GCC to go once again to war in order to settle another problem that could not be settled by recourse to diplomacy. It is going to be interesting for a person – myself and probably for the Iranians, in the sense that I don’t think there is lost love between us and the Iranians, and I don’t think that they had actually accommodated diplomatic statements coming from the centers of the GCC in the past advocating the recourse to diplomacy.

I believe the Iranians have always suspected there was something else and another – (audio break) – as being a friendly nation and nations that have taken different stands vis-à-vis Iran and have understood Iran’s “needs”, quote-unquote, for its historic right to acquire nuclear capabilities.

And here in this point, I am referring to the attitude of nations like Qatar, for instance, or perhaps Turkey. We still haven’t had anything related to the attitude of these nations or the attitude of other nations in North Africa, Arab nations, vis-à-vis Iran, because the attitudes of the GCC as a whole, with the exception of Qatar and Oman, and the attitudes of Egypt and Jordan and Israel are very well-known – and Yemen – are very well-known to the Iranians. And the Iranians have never really taken the declared attitudes to be the right attitudes. They always, as I said, suspected there was something sinister being done, being plotted behind closed doors.

So we are – actually, I think if we are to wait a couple more days, we are in for perhaps the greatest surprises about such attitudes I am referring to. I would like to stop here and leave it to your question to really instigate, hopefully, a greater discussion on this issue, which is quite interesting, and it is being totally unprecedented to the question of politics and the grand strategy in this part of the world. And I thank you for your being there.

MS. GERBER: We will open it up for your questions right now.

OPERATOR: (Gives queuing instructions.) Ms. Gerber, at this time, we have one question from Michael Snyder (ph).


Q: Given the position that Israel has, at times, alluded to the fact that it might take military action against Iran and given the fact that a number of countries in the region have expressed positions similar to Israel, what do you think the effect of this will be in terms of Israel taking military action?

MR. ALFARAJ: As a person who have alluded to this possibility as early as January, 1996, I believe we reached, actually, a clear state of affinity of interest, that interests in that, you know, we have to stop the development of nuclear capabilities in Iran because we know that they are destined towards the military path, not just the civilian path, and that we have already taken a stand with regard to the efficacy of conducting diplomacy with Iran and what diplomacy could take us to.

And the third stage of this affinitive interest that we have already come to the conclusion that, you know, everything else in the region has to be postponed until this issue is going to be settled. I think we reached now the force elemental this affinity of interests, and we believe that, you know, only military action could basically address this situation.

Now, in that, we have differences with regard to how this is going to be done, whether it’s preferable to be done on coalition manner or it could be done on the same mode of the 2003 coalition intervention in Iraq, the coalition of the willing. I believe that eventually, we will find ourselves in a stage where it is going to be a coalition of the willing, and because the United States is not in a position today to really lead a move inside the Security Council to take a military action against Iran in the same mode that it did in 1990 vis-à-vis the case of Kuwait.

And therefore, also, the membership of the United States as part of this coalition is going to be basically in doubt, because the United States is still in Iraq, still in Afghanistan increasing its presence, and now it has this North Korean issue.

So there is a conclusion. The statements coming from the Gulf and revealed in these documents is that even if the United States was willing to take action against Iran, it could not do it, actually, in these circumstances. So what do we do here as regional states? I think today, the time has arrived, and it has already been a – it is more conductive today that this affinitive interest has come to the public’s knowledge, that there will be a greater debate on that, that Gulf states especially, because of their geographic position, they are in the way of any military action that is contemplated by Israel.

So they have two options: One option is to really plan it, or talk about the planning it, in order to force the Iranians to take a different action, to change their course. And the second one is – and the second stage of that is basically to conduct it together, and to conduct it together meaning to allow the Israelis the corridor for them to really pass in order to have a real military strike that has potential in stopping the program.

What is important about us in the region is that we are satisfied with the so-called – the objective of, you know, curtailing Iranian actions for a few years, or delaying their actions for a few years. This is not considered to be enough objective, military or strategic objective, for the United States policymakers, but for the region at large, it is enough credible military objective.

So as you can see, there is kind of consensus developing over the policy, over how to define the interest and the state of affinity among these interests and what the actions are to be taken. And now, we are talking about basically – hopefully, we will be talking about bringing this as a credible scenario in the future – not necessarily tomorrow or the next month or even the beginning of 2011 or mid-2011, but I believe there is – today, there is a different climate of politics in the area with regard to the urgency.

We see the development of the Iranian program and the urgency – (audio break) – if we are left, I know from what is engrained in my brain as the Gulf Arabs is that in the final analysis, if we are left to our own devices to deal with the Iranian threat, we are going to work with whoever is going to really address that threat, including the use of military means.

Until today, you see that even if you look at how we conduct ourselves with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, you can see that we are only giving lip service to the settlement of the conflict, in that we encourage negotiations but we are not pushing for that. We are not saying anything about the Arab formula – that is to say that in the back of our – (audio break).


MR. ALFARAJ: I believe that I was cut from the last portion of my answer. I believe that we are in a situation today where the issues are much clearer than yesterday and that today is a decision – we are in decision mode much more than we were a few days ago, that it is very obvious for us that the issue has become more crystal clear. I was in Riyadh myself four months ago, and we discussed the possibility of an action taken by Israel, what role we could play with regard to this action.

And I could see that in the room, everybody kind of not disputed my thesis, which was that we could either play as – (audio break) – as coalition members in such strike conducted by Israeli if the United States could not do that. And the other option for us is to play stupid, like 1981, trying to act as if we didn’t know about it, and that as a person in policy circles and as an advisor, that I was recommending the first course in order to really develop a regional solution for regional issues.

I do not recall a great dispute or a dispute at all coming from that forum, which included more than 60 people present. And therefore, I believe what was released in the press, and especially in the U.K., about secret negotiations taking place between Israel and the Saudis over fly-bys for Israeli aircraft, to conduct that – (audio break) – they could have been quite a fantastic idea four months ago. They are no longer a fantastic idea. They are more realistic in the wake of the WikiLeaks revelations of recent days.

I believe that the public today are more in tune with this sentiment. The public – in the discourse I have with the public in programs is that the majority of people are quite – have already accommodated themselves with the idea of a great war taking place in this region. There is no such dispute with Israel being the candidate for such operation to be conducted against Iran.

If all fails, I believe that the majority of the public in the region already assess that all other solutions have failed and that they are fully aware of the engagement of the United States in three situations now, in Iraq, Afghanistan and most recently in North Korea to the level that they could not see a real positive participation of the United States in the first stage of confrontation with Iran.

Now, since the only obstacles to such operations being taken by Israel against Iran are only geographic, in order to shorten the passages between Israel and Iran, I believe this is going to be the hurdle. But this hurdle, in my view, and this view has developed since 1996 – I think it is in the last stages of its being the hurdle.

With regard to the WikiLeaks and their impact upon the relationship between us, especially the Gulf Arabs, and Iran, as I said in my opening remarks, I don’t think there is lost love between us and the Iranians. The Iranians have got – Iranian strategic mind is quite a suspicious mind. It is a mind that only trusts itself. It reaches the stages where it cannot even trust some elements in the makeup of its mind.

As we can see today, there is a division in opinion in the Iranian strategic mind and how Iran conducts its international politics to acquire more influence. Some of the more clever ones advocate a policy based on, you know, the role of economics and international politics, Iran being a producer of oil, and that Iran can have a greater say in the region based on economic and civilizational role as a whole.

There is another part of that Persian strategic mind which advocates simple solutions to grand problems, the grand problem being, you know, the extent – how to extend the hegemony of Iran, or historic Persia, in the Middle East to reach as far as the Mediterranean and the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea and to have a greater say in Africa, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and in the third world.

This mind advocates the development of the nuclear capabilities and conventional capabilities and to have sleeper cells, asymmetric mode of action, financing plots here and there. Here, Iran in the first mode is welcome, has always been welcome, not just by the Gulf Arabs but original powers include Israel if Iran were to reconduct its pursuit of influence on the economic path, on the civilizational path, on what Iran represents to this region and this spirit of civilization as a modern civilization and the culture and the arts and – (audio break) – trade and how to do business.

But on the other model, Iran is in opposition to all regional states, and regional states basically have been addressing this problem in different choice of words and languages. You have the Turkish choice of words; you have the Qatari choice of words. You have the Omani choice of words. And then you have the rest of the GCC plus Jordan, Egypt and Yemen and Israel.

I believe that the WikiLeaks have already – they can play to – they play influence on the Iranian strategic mind. In one sense, the positive sense is that it would really alarm the reasonable ones in the Iranian decision-making apparatus, and would show them the degree of animosity between Iran and between its – between Iran and its neighbors. That it is against what Ahmadinejad’s administration has been alluding to – that Iran is enjoying a great status and it is welcome everywhere, just as Mr. Nejad was welcome in his recent visit to Beirut.

The other side is that, you know, the fundamental side of the Iranian strategic mind is presented by the administration of Mr. Nejad and his colleagues in the – in parliament and in the judiciary and in the religious establishment, which would say, look, look what we have said to you. These guys are conspiratorial; they have been plotting against us. They have saying – they have been saying things that are quite reasonable and diplomatic in public but they’ve been plotting to the extent of plotting wars against us, and this would – should encourage us to really continue our path in subjecting these elements within the – (inaudible).

So there is room for those two impacts to take place in Iran, and the choice is the Iranians’ to make. It’s not ours. I think what we have – there is no more on this side of the Gulf to really say that we have a different solution.

I think the solutions are already on the table. As I was saying when we were discussing as, you know, Gulf Arab – with the help of many of our, you know, our – many of our advisors and many of our friends came from the United States or South Korea or Russia or other (parts ?) of the world. We are – four months ago, we were talking about all the policy choices open to us, and the policy choices open to us, really, are uncertain. And they come from a choice of doing nothing, which is something that is – that our people in the Middle East are used to. And you could see us in some of the patterns of our policies vis-à-vis Iran and vis-à-vis other issues.

And the other one is to go as far as acquiring nuclear weapons ourselves. Nobody’s going to be in the position to understand what our policy drives and what really push us towards even coursing to war.

Below that is basically to join – to join others in conducting that choice against Iran. That’s conducting as under coalition, international coalition like 1991, or, you know, selective choice of coalition like 2003 where Kuwait was on the forefront of the party of the willing.

And this, we have a model today that’s going to be, hopefully, to be – you know, materialized – and that is an action of the willing represented by the state of Israel. And I believe that the choice for us today is that we cannot sit still because this is going to have a long-term impact on the balance of power in the region. And we cannot accept a change of the balance of the power in the region – of Persia because we never accepted that for two millennia. So what makes us today accept the change of balance of power in the region, you know, forced upon us by Iran?

We would rather face up to Iran with whoever is ready to face up to Iran. And the choice here is, as I said, it’s either international coalition or it’s coalition of the willing. I myself as a person and observing events in this region, believe that a coalition of the willing is actually under development and it’s going to be the only measure that’s going to either stop Iran in its tracks by its own volition or bring Iran to the confrontation with the coalition of the willing.

OPERATOR: Our next question comes from Bruce Conover (ph).

Q: Do you think the WikiLeaks publication will result in a willingness on the part of Gulf and Arab states to openly express their policy and their concerns towards Iran? Obviously, public expression of what has been said behind closed doors would have a real effective unifying policy towards Iran.

MR. ALFARAJ: I think, you know, what you have suggested is what I believe personal to become true, to be happening because the public mood in the Gulf was amazed of the lack of really concerted action vis-à-vis the statements of Iran and the actions of the Iran, the conduct of maneuvers, the revelations about sleeping cells, the subversive cells on the GCC soil.

I believe the public today is kind of more content with the revelation that their governments have been actually taking, you know, positions on serious and serious stance vis-à-vis Iran, including the entry into war – to tell the Gulf Arabs that, you know, we may get involved in a war and we may get actually bitten by this action, you know, in one form or another.

It’s not just our strategic locations like the oil facilities and the harbor but also the population centers. And in general, what I have – as I’ve been canvassing views and polling people in, you know, different quarters in the Gulf in the past few months, I could hear the change of mood – of mood by the Gulf Arabs.

These ordinary people think, well, we’ve already been in two – in two major wars, and if it’s – if it’s – if the situation requires that we really enter into another one in order to really finish this instability caused by the current Iranian regime and we reach another way of, you know, addressing the security situation between us and Iran, so let’s go for it.

And so this changes now – now, there is an open format for the governments of the Gulf and the public of the Gulf. The public of the Gulf used to be saying these things and nobody responding to them; or the response they could get was from a – you know, a diplomatic response saying, you know, we are actually dealing with these issues, but trust in us that we are going to really come to the right choice.

I think that statement is no longer there. Gulf officials can no longer play this statement to their public. They have to really come clean and talk about how to prepare them for any eventuality. What we have witnessed since 2006 – and I’ve been actually party in the planning to this – is that there have been preparation of the Gulf societies for a climate of war – one day, war breaking out in the Gulf in the form of, you know, emergency situation planning and the steps taken. You know, systems being bought, emergency situations being prepared, facilities being built – recruitment, training all over.

And the discussion all over is about preparation for a nuclear environmental disaster in the Gulf because of the operation of Bushehr. Today, you know, policymakers and officials cannot say we are just preparing for an environmental disaster. It has going to happen in three, four years in the Gulf. They can no longer say that. They have to come clean and say, we have to be ready for all situations.

I believe that they’re going to camouflage their statements still. But I believe that this camouflage is not going to be – no war is going to take place in this region. I think it’s going to say, we are preparing for all scenarios.

MS. GERBER: Is there any other question?

OPERATOR: At this time, we have no further audio questions.

MS. GERBER: Let me ask one that was submitted by email from Maxine Bovere (ph). Will the leaks and their revelations have any effect on the progress of peace and regional cooperation in the Middle East? What is the best catalyst to progress a workable peace agreement among all the countries of the region?

MR. ALFARAJ: In Kuwait and in – and especially in United Arab Emirates, but most – and Qatar – but most notably in Kuwait – the strategic vision charted by the governments of these nations as late – as early as the late 1990s basically allocate a position of great importance to Iran, to Iraq and to the Yemen. We look at those three societies to be, you know, the biggest in population, the largest in size and the three most afflicted by war and the wars they have been through in the past two, three decades.

We still cannot pinpoint a point where we can see that reconstruction of Iran or Iraq or Yemen has started. These are – what is being conducted there is small projects here and there, but there is no move at reconstructing those societies.

We look at reconstructing Iran, Iraq and Yemen as the most important issues for the Gulf Arabs – for all the members of the Gulf community. And when I say Gulf community, I mean the GCC of six nations plus Iran, Iraq and Yemen, as well as the region surrounding us. And therefore, it is important to note that in all our strategic plans, we put as the grand strategic objective to get these nations to accept cooperation between us on this side of the Gulf as GCC, as nations that are building, you know, building a model for development for the region.

And as host to more than 200 nationalities from all over the world that have – that already live in the Gulf and travel in the Gulf to the extent that as Gulf Arabs, we are a minority in our own countries. But this community of development we’d like to enlarge not only to include Iran, Iraq and Yemen, but also to include the Horn of Africa, the Sudan, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinians, the Syrians, Lebanese and the Jordanians – and hopefully, also, the Turks.

We have relations and we have – given with the nation that we do not have diplomatic relations like Israel, we have commercial relations and we want to build on that. And not to have Iran, Iraq and Yemen as prime objective of our strategic development plans will be the greatest mistake of this junction of history because if we miss that, we are actually preparing the ground for another war over, you know, economic resources.

Let’s not forget that we are not doing that as a charity work. We are doing that because it is in our interests. It is – our interest is to create the economic and social hub in this part of the world, and to have the right environment and the right technological tools. And here we have invited all our neighbors of the world. And this space is all neighbors of the Gulf. We don’t have to have geographic boundaries, you know, common geographic boundaries.

Now, we are all neighbors in this, you know, global village. And as I said, more than 200 nations work with us either on the – on the GCC soil or in the form of, you know, companies and their own – in those specific countries or in the companies that are in the form of their governments, the type of relations we have.

Now we have – we have a skeleton of corporations between us and Iran, Iraq and Yemen. But we need to really consolidate this skeleton of work and really continue to build because the other option, if we do not create the environment for the youth of this era, people in their, you know, teens, prepare the jobs for them, for the future, to be part of the international community and to be part of this Gulf community. They are – they going to be, in three years’ time, in the right – in the right age for military service.

And we have enough of military services and armies. We cannot really grasp their attention through the projects we can create from now for them. They will be left with no other recourse but to go to the military service or to work in the armed forces. And you know what this is going to create. That’s what really going to foil this climate of animosity and difference over regional issues. We’d rather them have discourse today about all such issues in their spare time over, you know, the chat – the chat rooms. They ought to discuss all what divides us in this civilized way.

We do not want them to fight over what divides us in this uncivilized way which we have been used to for centuries. We need to change this mode of action. And this mode of action cannot be really reached or charted except by a course to the common sense of the ordinary man, no matter where this ordinary man or woman exists in this – in this planet. Every person would love to have – to have, you know, clean water, would have the shelter, would have clean food, would have security, the services that, that person needs whether in the medical, educational, environmental protection, the right to acquire knowledge.

These are the elements that exist in the mind of every Gulf Arab, every Iraqi, every Yemeni, every Iranian, every Israeli, every Palestinian and therefore I just continue as a person who drafted the strategic region for Kuwait in 1998, continue with this logic because the only other logic that is available here as a substitute for this humanistically, logically, you know, to really purge the opposite member is to go into war against that opposite member.

And as a person, I would not want the party of war in this region to really triumph. I want the party of the peace to triumph and the party of peace must triumph only by basically executing as such that I have already enumerated that we really have to look at each other as members and of the same region, as members of the same hub, as the members of the same destiny.

We are obviously divided over – you know, men and women, over Arabs and non-Arabs, over, you know, Muslims and non-Muslims, but it should not be that the divide. The divide should be over how to pursue this development problem, how to reach it.

And if we look at one problem that is going to be our concern, it is going to be from 2011, it’s going to be water. And if you look at two regions of the Middle East that are strewn by war and conflict and you look at the Arab-Israeli conflict region and the Gulf conflict region, you would see that both regions are really in dire need for water.

So here this is something that should bind us on how to create, you know, better water resources and enough water resources for the generations to come. I think this – if we identify that as just one problem this is going to actually occupy our minds for the next two decades.

MS. GERBER: Thank you, Sami. Are there other questions?

OPERATOR: No, ma’am. No other questions at this time.

MS. GERBER: I have a personal one, also. Sami, if you think yourself into the position of a Saudi or other Gulf leader, how did this WikiLeaks change your position that your people have towards you – I mean, Gulf people have towards the Gulf leaders? Is it embarrassing? Do you have to save your face now? Are the people going to push the government to go into war or to avoid war? How did it change the relationship between the people and their governments?

MR. ALFARAJ: Now, as I said, I just alluded to the fact that, you know, in discussions being done between – you know, in a haphazard discussion between me and – (inaudible). And the – (inaudible) – I don’t mean just Kuwaitis in Kuwait that I meet in public places. But people stop me after TV interview or after statement in the press and they ask me the usual question: What do you think is the end of the Iranian nuclear program? What solutions do you see and insights? What do you think the attitude of our government vis-à-vis opinion like yours and others?

I’ll find myself and other, you know, intellectuals speaking on talk shows and to the press as closer to the public more than what the statements of governments. I think one – what I see is a positive relationship now that, you know, people in the past kind of underestimated the comprehension of their governments of the real issues surrounding the – surrounding the resolution of the Iranian leadership with regard to what it wants as regional objectives.

The question posed to me was – in the forum – don’t they understand what the end result for this game? Don’t they understand that one day we will wake up and we will see Iran overrunning us in different – you know, in different layers of this confrontation. Don’t they understand that if we do not move now we are not going to be able to do that?

Don’t they understand that, for instance, Israel is actually promoting the only solution that’s going to stop those warmongering, you know, cliques in Iran. Don’t they understand that we have to fail this war party in Iran in order for the reasonable ones in Iran for triumph and to bring Iran to the same level of development that we are enjoying in this part of the world? Don’t they understand that the delay by their inaction, meaning the Gulf policymakers, their inaction, they actually allow Iran to meddle in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in the Lebanese case, in the Iraqis situation, in the Yemenis situation and therefore they fail our policies in this region.

And now I think the Gulf Arabs – I mean, the public in the Gulf and the GCC – understand that if they were in line with their policymakers, this would bring them closer to their policymaker. This would make them actually more confident that their policymakers have already been seeing the issues the same way they were seeing them; that have been identifying the right responses through them; that they have already been planning in a long-term pace to prepare the society.

Now they can understand why this society has been actually in a war or not. Does it mean, you know, building bunkers and establishing hospitals and training security forces and buying arms and shoring up defenses and preparing for a nuclear, environmental disaster in the area? And doing lots of things but without mentioning that, you know, taboo word, which is, perhaps, war. And now it has kind of an open ticket. Now all of this is understandable. What they have been doing as our government, they have been preparing us on a – on a slow pace to be ready for that scenario if that scenario were to come.

I must admit that, basically, I would have preferred WikiLeaks to take place, perhaps, after two more years because, hopefully, in two more years we will be have – we will have basically shored up our defenses in a better way, in a better fashion than we have it today.

But the positive side of the leaks is that, you know, it gives – it puts the Iranians on notice. That what you are seeing there is actually – you ought to believe what you see on the Gulf shore, that these people on the other side are preparing for the eventuality of war, for war to break in the region. And if war were to break in the region they understand now there are two scenarios and they have been dealing with – in preparation, as the Iranians, for two scenarios. That is, a scenario of war conducted by the United States and its coalition partners and the other one is conducted by Israel and whoever is going to join Israel, and perhaps the United States joining the – joining the flock in a later stage to defend Israel and the GCC soil once they become overwhelmed by, you know, for instance, if it ever happens, by Iranian missiles or Iranian terrorist acts.

Here, the Iranians are put on notice three years earlier for that eventuality because in three years, everybody would believe in academia and intelligence services – believe that in two years, we would have something quite concrete about the result for the Iranian and nuclear pursuit.

Perhaps the Iranians would be, in two years’ time, 2012, would have – definitely have a device that they could toy with just like the North Koreans. North Koreans today are not with the capabilities – the delivery capabilities that could put their nuclear devices, to give their nuclear devices the menacing posture that they would like to have vis-à-vis in Japan, vis-à-vis South Korea, vis-à-vis the United States. But it’s a question of time for them to develop, you know, delivery systems – I mean missiles.

With regards to the Iranians, perhaps, in 2012 we will be in the same Korean – North Korean position of today, of 2010. And again, it is going to be a scary posture, you know, coming from a state that has not been on, you know – conducts its business in the normal way. It conducts its business by, you know, a blend of, you know, rhetoric: diplomatic rhetoric, macho rhetoric, asymmetric warfare, you know, fueling of espionage circles, drugs and arms smuggling. It spans all over as far as Nigeria in Africa.

Here, when you have such a – such posture which is a nuclear device without a delivery system in the hands of such a government presented by the government of Ahmadinejad and his Revolutionary Guard it is going to be enough menace for Middle East and, therefore, I believe that today in light of, you know, the wake of the grandest arms purchases from the United States by the Gulf Arabs, by Israel, Jordan and Egypt, they ought to understand that the other course of action open to them as Iranians would be war.

This realization would put them in the same realization of the Gulf Arabs in the GCC soil and the other people living on the GCC soil, as well as in Egypt; as well as in Egypt and Jordan and Israeli – that there is, today, uniformity of opinion among all these nations. They are not divided by any other conflict; they are not divided by any other problem. They are united by one problem and that is the rise of the Iran, of a nuclear Iran, and the new Middle East as a negative development, not as a positive development – balancing Turkey or balancing Israel – no, as a negative development that is actually delaying the resolution of, you know, history-old problems like the Arab-Israeli conflict, like the divide between Sunnis and Shiites. Iran is not helping solving these problems.

And, here, when we go back to the – (audio break – in that sense of the question I think, you know, the divide among, between the Gulf populace in general and their leaders is narrowing. There is more trust that, you know, they can see eye to eye to the same problem; they can see the context in which they find themselves; they can see that the solutions are getting fewer and fewer by the passage of time; that the solutions, the window of opportunity is getting narrower and that there has to be an urgency, a greater urgency. Today, they can see that there is that type of urgency in the minds of their government and their policymakers.

And I believe in the final analysis it will be an opportunity for all for a better – actually exchange views in public today on talk shows, in open forums, in the press, in discussion. Perhaps, you know, the question – that taboo, the question of war with Iran, is no longer a taboo; that it has to be addressed positively in order for us to either pass the right message to the Iranian people or to really, you know, decide on a course that we, a person like myself, and many, find that it is the only solution if all other solutions like diplomacy and sanctions fail.

MS. GERBER: Now, are there any other questions?

OPERATOR: Yes ma’am. We have a question from Michael Snyder.

Q: Do you believe that this will result in a realignment between the Arab states and Israel?

MR. ALFARAJ: In short, yes. In short, I have talked for 14 years about affinitive interest. In short, I can say that, you know, I believe that in Israel they will feel that, you know, they are not alone in assessing the threat to themselves as being, you know, an existential threat. We look at here in the Gulf; it is obviously here that Gulf governments have looked at it in the same manner.

I think when – the way we ought to read that – the minutes of a meeting of the Saudi monarch that he encouraged the United States to cut, you know, the head of the serpent before it’s too late and that he, as the head of the state, head of the biggest state in the GCC, was willing to contemplate to be a subject of retaliation by Iran if war were to be declared against it, against Iran.

I think the question of Gulf Arabs today with regards to the issue on the table which is if a war scenario developed, not being contemplated by the United States, for obvious reasons – for the United States’ involvement in three regions of the world already – for the United States being in the midst of an international crisis.

Do you we wait for this international crisis to evaporate? Do we wait until the situation in Afghanistan or Iraq or North Korea is going to be settled? Nobody in the Gulf in his right mind feels that we ought to wait. So we have, kind of, a synergy and we have the same way we think about the urgency of the situation and how we ought to look at it. We have, always, a person like myself have always advocated a regional look at this situation, not an international look.

And today, I can see that there has been – what has been exposed in the document is a regional look at the situation; a regional look that goes as far as, you know, to invite war if war was the only solution we have. And here, we have the uniformity of, you know, conclusion between us and Israel. And therefore, would we see more dynamics in this relationship that is going to put the Arab-Israeli settlement in the back burner? My answer is yes. Would the issues that have been actually discussed in secrecy be more open today? I guess, yes.

What form this is going to take place? It’s going to take place in the public debate; the debates will not today be limited to talking about Palestinians and Israelis. I think we’ll be talking about – all of us, including Israel and the Iranians – it’s going to be a shift. I think people would be much freer today to talk about the scenario of war against Iran and that it is going to involve all of us; not just us, the Arabs of the Gulf, but also the other Arabs like, you know, Jordanians and Egyptians and as well as Israelis that we feel the same way they feel.

I think the public in Israel will also see with this energy that there are people who understand their grievances; that they understand what is – what is – they understand the situation when, you know, you have Katyusha rockets, you know, falling on your head. At least here in Kuwait we understand what is the – what it means to have, you know, Scud missiles falling over your head; we experienced that in 2003; the Saudis in 1991.

And therefore, here, you have an experience, an experience among the ordinary people; an experience in that they all are basically looking at the same problem, an experience and they really are going to be more energetic to push their governments to have more resolute action vis-à-vis Iran, not to put Iran on notice.

It’s either you really cooperate with the international, you know, approach to negotiations and really come clean with regards to the real objectives of your program or else we are all ready to really contemplate, you know, the issue of war, the solution through military means.

The Iranians understand that they cannot face up to the whole region. They understand. But we ought to say today, since we have reached this stage of openness, to give it as one warning coming from one bloc not from different blocs – not to be wishy-washy over that.

Now we have to be more resolute and we have to repeat the same statement – that our security, the security of our population is similar to the security of the state of Israel and to the Israel public, themselves. So we share a lot, and I hope that we will be discussing that over the Internet between, you know, Gulf Arabs and the Israelis more today than yesterday.

MS. GERBER: All right. At that point of the time, I want to thank for Mr. Alfaraj for joining us today and briefing us about the WikiLeaks and Iran, and also, thanks, to all of our listeners who joined the call. Please don’t forget to check out our website at www.realite-eu.org for more information about Iran. Thank you very much and have a great day.