Conference Call - Will EU Sanctions be Effective Against Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program? 

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Will EU Sanctions be Effective Against Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program?
Mark Fitzpatrick, Senior Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies (London)
Conference Call with Q & A for journalists
Wednesday 16 June 2010

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REALITE-EU CONFERENCE CALL WITH
MARK FITZPATRICK
ON WEDNESDAY JUNE 16, 2010
AT 9:00 A.M. CENTRAL TIME


GERLINDE GERBER: Hello and welcome, everybody. My name is Gerlinde Gerber and I am a Communication Associate at Realite-EU. I am very pleased that such a prominent group of journalists from across the world could join us in a conversation with Mark Fitzpatrick.

Realite-EU is a website and e-newsletter for journalists, leaders, and key analysts that focuses on developments in and around the Middle East which both affect Europe and beyond. Realite-EU is a non-profit organization not connected to any government. It is supported by individuals concerned with the growing threat that Iran poses to Europe and the Middle East. The information on our website is in 10 languages, such as English, French, German, Russian, Spanish, Arabic, Portuguese, Turkish, and Chinese, and Japanese. Please see www.realite-eu.org for more information about Iran, its nuclear weapons program and peaceful ways to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

Today’s briefing with Mark Fitzpatrick is on the record.

Now it is my pleasure to introduce you to the speaker. Mark Fitzpatrick is a Senior Fellow for Non-proliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. His research focus includes proliferation concerns and preventing nuclear danger in the emerging nuclear renaissance. Fitzpatrick came to IISF in 2005, after a distinguished 26-year career in the US Department of State, where the previous 10 years he focused on non-proliferation issues. In that last—in his last posting, he served as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Non-Proliferation, responsible for policies to address the proliferation problem posed by Iran, North Korea, Libya, Iraq, South Asia, and other regions of concern. Among his duties, he also oversaw the implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative, advanced conventional arms and technology controls, proliferation sanctions, and export control cooperation programs. He is the author of a book called, “The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding the Worst Case Outcome” and has also written articles on non-proliferation in The Financial Times, International Herald Tribune, The Survivor, and other publications.

Mr. Fitzpatrick will give some open remarks and then answer questions by our listeners. Mark Fitzpatrick, you have the floor.

MARK FITZPATRICK: Thank you. As those dialing in will know, the EU Foreign Affairs Council on Monday approved a draft declaration outlining new EU sanctions on Iran, and Thursday, tomorrow, the European Council is expected to approve these sanctions, giving the unanimous political endorsement of the leaders of the EU states. In the next weeks, EU working groups will then flesh out the actual sanctions, which would presumably come to the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU on their next meeting, scheduled on July 26th, for approval. The formal regulations will then follow, putting those sanctions into place.

The EU sanctions give teeth to the UN sanctions adopted earlier this month. The UN sanctions were not toothless; they in important ways extended the sanctions on Iran, particularly the ban on offensive arms. The EU sanctions, however, make—will make mandatory for EU states many of the financial sanctions which the UN sanctions only pose as a request to member states. When it calls on states to do such and such, the EU will make many of those mandatory, although the specifics are to be determined. The big question is will these sanctions have any impact? And I don’t think there’s anyone who is involved in this process who believes that suddenly the leadership in Tehran will change its policies and suspend enrichment and provide full cooperation to the IAEA. But there is a hope, and I think it is a possibility, if not a probability, that this will give Tehran leadership a greater reason to return to the negotiating table that they had left in October.

There are other purposes to the sanctions that I think are valid, and I’m happy to discuss those with the callers. One of the other key purposes is to strengthen the means of limiting Iran’s nuclear and now its missile programs. Already, export controls adopted by all of the nuclear suppliers have prevented Iran from acquiring additional components and materials that it would like to have in order to expand its nuclear program. We’ve seen that Iran’s nuclear program is limited in what it can do. The centrifuges are based on the T1 model are breaking, have not been able to work to the numbers Iran has installed. And the sanctions applied by the UN and now heightened by the EU will further restrict Iran’s ability to produce an unlimited supply of low enriched uranium, which cannot be used right now for civil energy purposes in Iran but could be re-enriched and applied for use in nuclear materials as (inaudible) material.

I’ll stop there and be happy to take questions.

GERLINDE GERBER: Sure. I’ve reviewed some questions that journalists sent to me by e-mail. The first one is the Swedish Foreign Minister has said its government is against Iran’s sanctions. How much say and how much impact does Sweden have?

MARK FITZPATRICK: Well, the Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, had made it known that he had reservations about indiscriminate application of sanctions, and Sweden played an important role in the deliberations. But the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU that met on Monday, including Sweden, did agree without dissent to the application of sanctions by the EU. So the concerns that Sweden had were discussed fully, my understanding is, and met, and Sweden is going along with the application of sanctions.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right. Our next question: German industry has been strongly involved in the energy sector and Berlin, very often posing sanctions, argued that it is simply—it would simply forfeit the business which could go to China instead. Can you comment on that?

MARK FITZPATRICK: That’s a legitimate concern for many German businesses, particularly the small businesses that rely on business with Iran. But overall, Germany’s exposure in Iran is only a small percentage of Germany’s overall exports and its trade. So, as an impact overall on the German economy, I don’t think that these sanctions will be that detrimental to the German economy. It is true that some Chinese and other firms located in other countries have tried to step in when European companies have deserted the field, but many of the kinds of investments and technologically directed trade in which European companies are involved don’t have natural competitors in China. The Chinese firms cannot compete on technology—on a technological basis with European firms. So while Iran might seek investment or technology elsewhere, they won’t be able to replace the Europeans, and particularly in cases where the Europeans provide—have already provided investments and technologies where Iran is seeking replacement parts and so forth only Europeans can provide them.

GERLINDE GERBER: Staying with the European businesses, one more question and then we go to the broader framework. One more question: There are many reports about Dubai and other third countries or shell companies that do business with Iran on behalf of European countries or European businesses. Can EU sanctions end those business ties that go around shell companies and third places?

MARK FITZPATRICK: The propensity of Iran to rely on shell companies and other essentially black market operations to get around sanctions is an ongoing problem that won’t necessarily be solved by the application of EU sanctions. It will be helped by the UN sanctions themselves, which have called for the establishment of a monitoring committee, which will have the power to investigate cases where Iran has set up shell companies in Dubai and places like that. The EU does have its own monitoring capabilities. Member states can provide information that would expose such cases where there are shell companies involved. And this is, you know these—it’s one of the reasons why when the EU working groups sit down to discuss the actual details of the EU sanctions, there will be some states calling for bans not on just specific companies, but bans across an entire sector, so that would include cases where Iranian companies that might otherwise be targeted by name would simply switch names and set up a business under other auspices.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right. And talking about more international things, the G8 will meet soon in Canada, and Iran’s nuclear issue will remain on its agenda. Has it been effective in curbing Iran’s ambitions to develop nuclear weapons or programs that would lead to the production of nuclear weapons? Should Iran’s nuclear issue be handled by the P5 rather than the G8 because the UN Security Council has more authority over nuclear proliferation?

MARK FITZPATRICK: I think it’s clear that no groupings of states and no forms of diplomacy, whether sanctions or engagement or other strategies, have stopped Iran’s desire to attain a capability to produce nuclear weapons should they so decide. The engagement strategy of Obama, the sanctions strategy of the P5, the outreach strategy of the E3+3, they’re all striving to give Iran a clear choice of either international isolation or integration. The question about which grouping of nations might be most effective in clarifying this choice to Iran is—it’s not easy to say, “Well, it should be the P5 or the G8.” I think all of these groupings have a role to play in helping to clarify that choice for Iran. The P5 is important because through the United Nations, the universalization of sanctions provides the strongest legitimacy. But the G8, with its economic reach, also has important leverage.

GERLINDE GERBER: Okay. If sanctions are imposed and do not persuade Iran to stop its drive for nuclear power, Israel may be forced to act in its self defense. If that should happen, what would be the aftermath in terms of reaction from the EU, America, and the UN?

MARK FITZPATRICK: If Israel believes it must take military action, the form of that military action is not exactly clear. It’s just widely assumed that it would take the form of bombing and destructive use of military power, but it could also take other forms of, you know, quarantines for example.
The reaction of other countries to any unilateral application of force by Israel or by any other country, but let’s face it would be most likely to be Israel, would depend upon the circumstances of what triggered the action. If an Israeli military action were triggered by an explicit Iranian transgression of international norms such as the expulsion of IEA inspectors, the declaration of an intention to produce nuclear weapons, the testing of a nuclear device, the withdrawal from the NPT, these would all be very obvious tripwires. And I think under these circumstances, action by Israel would be more supported by other countries.

The countries outside Israel would have different degrees of what they would regard as what would justify military use. I think Washington would have a standard that would not be as high as many of the states of the European Union. And within the European Union, some states would have higher standards still. I think given the concerns that Sweden, for example, had expressed about indiscriminate sanctions, they might have a higher standard of what would trigger legitimate use of force than, say, France, although this question is purely hypothetical at this point. If, however, there was not a clear tripwire of a form that it was obvious that Iran’s intentions were to produce nuclear weapons, then it would be probably harder for an Israeli military action to get support from other nations.

And one could imagine circumstances in which there was intelligence information about an Iranian—a clear-cut Iranian attempt to produce nuclear weapons, but the intelligence was less clear-cut than would be ideal. And let’s face it, intelligence is always less clear-cut than would be ideal. So, you know, I think in these cases European Union countries would probably demand a higher degree of clarity in such intelligence than Israel might determine was necessary before it launched an attack, and Washington would probably be somewhere in between.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right. One question from the Netherlands: As you know, the Arab nations along the Gulf are also against a nuclear Iran. Not only because of the water issue, desalination—this is (inaudible)—but also, the flow of the oil supply is in danger. They do not trust Iran with nuclear weapon. Israel has been voicing the danger and her opposition to these developments in Iran. Is it not necessary for the voice of the Gulf states to be taken into account, and also to be heard more in unison with that of Israel?

MARK FITZPATRICK: My personal view is that, yes, the voices and the concerns of Iran’s neighbors in the Gulf needs to be taken into account. They’re worried not just that Iran will acquire a nuclear weapons capability that will diminish their own sense of security; they’re worried as well that a deal might be struck with Iran in a back room in which their interests were not taken into account. So I think they have a very legitimate reason to say that they should be involved in any international or multinational negotiations over the Iranian nuclear question. How one does that is difficult.

We saw that when one of Iran’s other regional neighbors, Turkey, became involved in its own private negotiations, the outcome was not so universally welcomed. I’m talking about the deal brokered by Turkey and Brazil with Iran that left many questions unresolved.

I think that the interests and the concerns of Gulf states about Iran’s nuclear program don’t necessarily have to be expressed or taken into account in conjunction with Israel, as was expressed in the last part of the question. Their concerns are legitimate in and of themselves and don’t necessarily have to be done in conjunction with Israel; it makes it harder if it has to be done in conjunction with Israel because of their real, additional concerns about the Palestine question that complicates any common front with Israel vis-à-vis Iran.

GERLINDE GERBER: Since you talked about the Palestine question, one question from a reporter: Do you think the sanctions will be really effective, or are they just giving more time to Iran to develop their system? And then in parenthesis, thoughts on Gaza blockade..

MARK FITZPATRICK: Say—what’s the Gaza? Can you say that again? I didn’t understand that part of the question.

GERLINDE GERBER: He just said in parenthesis, “thoughts on Gaza blockade?”

MARK FITZPATRICK: Oh, thoughts on the Gaza blockade. Well, first of all, the question will sanctions be effective? As I stated in my introductory remarks, nobody thinks that they’re going to cause Iran to change its policy overnight. The hope is that they would bring Iran back to the negotiating table. It should be noted that when Iran met with the then EU Foreign Policy Chief, Solana, and representatives from the E3+3 in Geneva on the first of October, there was to have been a follow-on discussion about the nuclear issue with those states, and Iran has refused since then to have that follow-on discussion. So that’s the negotiating table that Iran is being asked to rejoin, and the application of sanctions to clarify the costs to Iran of its policies, I think, could have an effect in bringing it back to that negotiating table. I’m not terribly optimistic about that; I think there’s a possibility. I think, though, even if Iran were not to come back to the negotiating table, sanctions can be effective in other ways. They can be effective in strengthening the controls on Iran’s ability to acquire additional materials and components from overseas sources for its nuclear missile program. Those controls have been effective in limiting Iran’s program, and strict application can continue to limit Iran’s program. Tighter controls will be necessary, however, particularly in the missile area, which has seen some very important, significant strides forward by Iran.

The questioner asked about thoughts about the Gaza issue, and as I said in response to the previous question, this enormously complicates any efforts to try to form a regional front vis-à-vis Iran. It’s very difficult any Arab state to make common cause officially or publicly with Israel when the misery of the people living in the Gaza Strip has been so exposed and when the efforts to supply relief, you know, outside the bounds of the blockade, and the questions about why the ships were sent in that fashion and the response to that makes it very difficult. I am not in a position right now to be exploring too deeply this question. It’s not my area of expertise other than the complications it presents to trying to martial a collective response to the nuclear problem.

GERLINDE GERBER: Let me throw in a personal question on the Iranian sanctions. And the most common heard argument is that they will hurt—sanctions will hurt the ordinary Iranians who have nothing to do with the nuclear program. What is your response?

MARK FITZPATRICK: This is a legitimate concern that is always raised with regard to sanctions. I think, though, that anyone looking at the nature of the sanctions that have been applied by the Security Council and now the sanctions being considered by the European Union will notice that they have been very strictly targeted at entities that have a relationship with the nuclear or missile programs. There are no across the board sanctions imposed in ways designed to undermine the Iranian economy or to impose hardships on the people. Now, it’s impossible to target sanctions so precisely that they hurt only the leadership and not the people, but over the last decade and more, sanctions policy has evolved to a point where smart sanctions—the word smart sanctions really does have a meaning—and I think that what we see so far is smart sanctions that are targeted.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right. And one more question from a consultant group: Why can’t we get more countries to give material and moral support to the Iranian dissidents and youth of Iran?

MARK FITZPATRICK: Providing material support in particular to groups in Iran that oppose the regime can be very counterproductive in reinforcing the claims that the leadership makes that such groups are pawns of the West. Most of these groups don’t want any aid precisely because they don’t want to be seen as anything other than a legitimate, indigenous, independent, unbiased—well, unattached group opposing the—promoting democratic reforms. There are ways for outsiders to provide moral support, to provide support, for example, in enabling Iranian reformist groups to overcome the technological controls that the leadership has imposed on their means to communicate. I’m talking about the kinds of cutouts that Google and other Internet companies can make available that would enable Iranian citizens to be able to get around blocks on Internet and other electronic communications.

I think it’s very—getting back to the main question. Outside provision of materials to support to groups in Iran can be counterproductive, and it’s very tricky to—for outsiders to be able to know how best to affect developments internally in Iran. You know, outsiders have gotten it wrong in other countries, including in Iraq, and they’ve gotten it wrong in Iran as well. Outside interference that led to the toppling of the Mossadegh government in 1953 has created a lingering suspicion and distrust in the Gulf for 50 years on now. I think outside groups have to have an element of humility and modesty in what they really can achieve by interfering domestically.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right, thank you. As a German, I want to ask you another question: The German government is undergoing a crisis. In case of a political change, do you think this could have any implication on the Iran sanctions?

MARK FITZPATRICK: I don’t see it myself. It looks to me as though the German political parties are fairly united in their policy vis-à-vis Iran. So far, at least, Germany has continued to be a stalwart member of the so-called E3 in concert with Paris and London, and I myself, from my vantage point, don’t see that changing.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right. I think we touched a lot of issues, and I will open up the lines now to all the listeners. I think the Operator will explain how that would work.

OPERATOR: Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, at this time the floor is open for your questions. If you would like to ask a question, you may do so by pressing star, one now. We will take all questions in the order that they are received, and if at any time you would like to remove yourself from the questioning queue, you may do so by pressing star, two. Again, if you’d like to make a question or comment, press star, one now.

Ms. Gerber, at this time we have no questions.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right. Then let me ask another question that is slightly not focused on Iran, but it came sent in by a journalist to you, Mr. Patrick—Fitzpatrick. It is: Should North Korea’s nuclear issue be on the G8 agenda, or should it be dealt with by the Six-Party Talks under Chinese mediation? Do you think the P5 and the G8 have been relying too much on China to solve the North Korean problem? China is not even one of the G8.

MARK FITZPATRICK: I think that the North Korean nuclear issue is an example of a problem that has really proven beyond the ability of outside states to solve. And to date, the solutions have centered on China and others involving China, trying to persuade Iran. They’ve done so outside the UN system because China has not wanted the UN to take a role. China has wanted it to be done through the Six-Party Talks. The Six-Party Talks have been ineffective and are a possible vehicle solution. But the process is not the question, it’s really how to get to a solution. I think the G8 group of countries and the G20 group of countries who will be meeting in Seoul later this year certainly have a role in expressing condemnation for North Korea’s unprovoked attack on the South Korean vessel and condemnation as well of North Korea’s nuclear testing and nuclear and missile programs.

The G20, the G8, and other groups of nations can apply their economic leverage to strengthen the enforcement efforts vis-à-vis North Korea. I don’t think the Six-Party Talks need to be the exclusive vehicle for multilateral diplomacy in this regard.

GERLINDE GERBER: Do we have any questions from our listeners?

OPERATOR: Yes, Ma’am, we have a question from Allen Kieswetter from C and O (sp?) Resources.

ALLEN KIESWETTER: My question is: What about stricter sanctions by other countries than the EU? For example, US—the Congress is now considering a bill to be put out probably by the end of the month. What do you think the impact will be? And similarly, what do you think about Russia and China to the degree that they comply with sanctions or perhaps that they will enact their own, more stringent measures?

MARK FITZPATRICK: There’s three good—there’s two good questions in there, not three. Let me do the last one first because it’s a very interesting piece of information that just came to me today.
The question is: Will Russia and China implement the sanctions adopted by the Security Council or—and will they go beyond it in any way? Today, you know, there are many examples of where Russia and China, and other nations, let’s be fair, have not implemented in full measure sanctions adopted by the Security Council. In the case of North Korea, this is readily apparent, China being unwilling, and it even said so, that it was unwilling to fully implement the interdiction requirements of sanctions on North Korea. But in this case on Iran, it’s interesting that one of the measures that the Security Council adopted that was not voluntary, it was mandatory, was the ban on heavy offensive equipment, military arms sales to—with this sanctions measure. And it’s not the kind of sanction that is easily avoided by setting up front companies; large offensive arms are not so easy to hide. So I think Russia and China will be following the strict requirements of the Security Council resolution. The question is will they be going beyond that?

And it’s interesting that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization recently met and adopted a new rule about membership. And the rule is that countries are under UN sanctions are not eligible for membership. It’s very interesting. This applies directly to Iran, which has been applying for membership in the SCO for several years now. It has been an observer; it wants to be a member. This is a group of nations, Russia, China, and Central Asian nations. Iran is now excluded from this. Now, was this in reaction to the Security Council call on states to, you know, adopt a vigilance and so forth in dealing with Iran? Not explicitly, but a coincidence of timing was notable, so I think many people are skeptical about how far Iran and China—Russia and China will go; but here’s an example of where they’ve done something.

I think other nations besides the European Union are likely to adopt measures on their own, now that they have a Security Council legal basis for doing so. This is one reason why countries like Japan and South Korea are always reluctant to adopt sanctions unless they have a legal basis, and the UN gave them that. Australia, for example, was, I think, the first out of the gate to adopt unilateral sanctions.
Now, the United States application of unilateral sanctions is a trickier matter, because the United States, having no trade to speak of with Iran, no investments there, has nothing really that it can sanction other than the application of US law in an extraterritorial fashion. That provides grave difficulties for the Europeans, who don’t think it’s fair or legal for the United States to be sanctioning their firms, who violate laws imposed not by Europeans, but by the Americans. And this is—this effort to avoid the extraterritorial application of US law was one of the driving forces for the Europeans to back both the UN sanctions and now their own additional sanctions, to show that they are willing and able to take tough measures.

There is probably one area of US sanctions that is, you know, that is being considered by Congress that does not fallen into this category of extraterritorial application of laws. It’s the divestment campaign, providing a legal backing for US states to divest state pension funds from companies that are investing in Iran. And I expect that will go forward, and that is one way that United States, you know, individuals and politicians and states can exercise American financial muscle.

GERLINDE GERBER: Do we have any more questions?

OPERATOR: Our next question comes from Jonathan Schick with the University of Brussels.

JONATHAN SCHICK: Mr. Fitzpatrick, you spoke about the caution outsiders need to take about supplying resistant groups within Iran. And I’d like to ask: What is your opinion on these groups? Do you believe they could form an eventual change or maybe overthrow the Iranian regime? And if so, will it make place for an eventual democracy?

MARK FITZPATRICK: In the long term, I have no doubt that demographics will eventually kick in. The overwhelming demographic youth bulge in Iran and the, you know, the apolitical nature of this youthful demographic, their desire to be integrated with the international community, their lack of interest in the Islamic fundamentalist nature of the regime, you know, will eventually see Iran with a different government leadership that is more reflective of the will of the Iranian people. But I don’t see that happening in the near future.

The short-lived strength of the Green Movement, I think, is important to take into account. The expectations and anticipation that prevailed in the second half of last year petered out this year. And that doesn’t mean the Green Movement is dead, but anticipation that the Green Movement or other reformist-minded groups will be able to topple the government, that really is not in the cards today.

Iran is led by a very powerful group of well-connected Iranian Revolutionary Guard core veterans and clerics, and they have all—they exercise all the levers of power in the regime, of total control over communications, and the judiciary, and the military, and the police, and so forth and so on. I don’t see any prospect for an uprising to overthrow them. But eventually, I think they will be challenged because Iran does have a very imperfect, but still a democratic system, and people eventually can be—come into power. And we saw Katani there; he was not able to do much, but it was reflective of the desire for reforms in Iran. And I am hopeful that eventually we’ll see that happen.

JONATHAN SCHICK: Okay. Thank you.

OPERATOR: At this time, we have no further audio questions.

GERLINDE GERBER: Okay. I actually got two more questions by e-mail. One is: Do you think military actions will be the only way to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon?

MARK FITZPATRICK: No, I don’t think military actions are the only way. I think Iran will actually be dissuaded from actually acquiring nuclear weapons by the threat of military force. The threat of military force expressed in the form of deterrents I think is already causing Iran to exercise caution in not crossing the line from capability to weapons production. And I think this line, invisible though it may be, can be strengthened if Iran knows that if it crosses the line, it will face military action. I don’t think this means states need to make threatening noises. I think Iran knows the situation. And I think that there can be other ways to make it clear to them, through informal, quiet channels, that deterrence is a fundamental policy. Combined with containment of their ability to expand their military missile program, I think this is probably the best way—well, it’s not the best way; the best way would be a negotiated solution in which Iran stops producing these technologies of concern. But the more likely way is going to be deterrence and containment policies.

I think we’re in for a kind of a long Cold War-type situation in which there’s not a negotiation solution, there’s not military action to stop the program, but there is a containment and deterrence policy so that will keep it from crossing the line to actual weapons production.

GERLINDE GERBER: And the second one is: If sanctions are not preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, will other Gulf states try to get their own? And will we see a nuclear arms race in the region, and what are the consequences of those?

MARK FITZPATRICK: It certainly is not axiomatic that Iranian acquisition of nuclear arms will lead to a proliferation cascade in the region, in which other countries develop their own nuclear weapons capabilities. But I think it is likely that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons capability that other countries will reconsider their security options, and some of them will give greater weight in these internal deliberations to keeping their nuclear weapons options open for the future. You already see today some states keeping their options open. Egypt is a prime example. I’m not saying that Egypt is seeking nuclear weapons; no, it’s not, but it’s keeping its options open for the future. And certainly if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Egypt will all—be all the more determined to keep its option open and maybe start to pursue some dual use technologies that will make it easier to go the weapons route. I think the same could be the case for Turkey, which has had a very good track record in maintaining its obligations to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty; it’s been transparent. But it feels in a power balance with Iran, and if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Turkey’s relative power in the region will decrease and it, I think, will give at least some consideration to pursuing this path.

In the Gulf region, most of the Gulf countries have no basis in technology or facilities to embark on a nuclear weapons program, except possibly for Saudi Arabia, which has some missiles sitting in the desert. Saudi Arabia is one of the countries, though, that will feel exposed and vulnerable if Iran acquires nuclear weapons. I think there are much better choices for Saudi and other countries who feel so exposed. They would be better off strengthening their alliance, their defense cooperation with the United States, and in fact, that’s what they’re doing today. So they won’t have any need to seek nuclear weapons of their own. They’ll be well-protected by the United States, by Great Britain, by their own conventional capabilities, which in most cases are better than Iran’s.

So I don’t—just to reiterate, a proliferation cascade is not at all inevitable. But it is likely that states will at least give some consideration to other options if Iran continues on this path and is not unchecked.

GERLINDE GERBER: One more question: How do you evaluate the Turkey-Brazil fuel swap deal? And in that do you see, like, a possible solution or, like, a breakthrough to Iran come back to the negotiation table? And how do you see the role of Turkey in all this?

MARK FITZPATRICK: The joint declaration that was agreed to by Turkey, Brazil and Iran is not a breakthrough to a solution. It deals only with one issue of the supply of the Tehran research reactor. Dealing with that issue, it had some positive elements, the positive elements being Iran’s expressed willingness to ship out of its country a sizable amount of its low enriched uranium. That could be an important confidence building measure if it led to an agreement in which Iran continues to ship out significant portions of an LEU stockpile so that it didn’t have a stockpile that could be quickly turned to weapons purposes. Iran had also agreed in that deal to allow for a lag between the export of its stockpile of low enriched uranium and the receipt of fuel for the Tehran research reactor.

So there were positive elements in that agreement, and I don’t think it should be quickly cast aside. But there are some real problematic elements to it, including that Iran was not willing to go back to the negotiating table. One of—paragraph nine of that agreement explicitly said that there would only be negotiations on areas of common agreement, and Iran has not agreed to talk about the nuclear issue with the E3+3. So that’s one of the reasons why there was skepticism in much of the rest of the world, at least in the Western world, about this agreement. And of course, Iran’s continued production of 20% enriched uranium was not dealt with in the agreement at all. That’s probably, you know, it was the biggest gap in the agreement that led to it not being received well at all in Western capitals. Is there any future to the deal? Possibly. It hasn’t been declared dead by either side. But what really needs to happen is Iran needs to negotiate with E3+3, which has a proposal on the table and, I think, can be the basis for a solution. Iran shows no interest in that solution, unfortunately.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right. Operator, do we have any other questions?

OPERATOR: No, ma’am. No audio questions at this time.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right. Then I will give Mr. Fitzpatrick the opportunity to give us some final remarks on sanctions and why we should enforce sanctions or not and if they could be effective. And yes, you have [talk over].

MARK FITZPATRICK: Okay. Just saying in final that I’m not speaking as—it may sound like I’m speaking as an advocate of sanctions. I am trying to speak more as an analyst assessing the purpose and the utility of sanctions. And from my perspective as an analyst, I think there is a—several useful purposes and a possible good that could come out of it, and that’s my position. I’m speaking to those journalists on the line as an independent resource, and I hope that I’ve been clear in my questions and my answers to questions.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right. Thank you so much, Mr. Fitzpatrick, for joining us today and briefing us about the threat of the nuclear Iran just prior to the EU Foreign Ministers’ debate on Iran sanctions.
Realite-EU will provide the latest thinking on breaking news and long-term trends on these and other issues, as well as give reporters lists of experts to interview. Please visit our website at www.realite-eu.org and thank you very much for listening. Good bye.

Dr. Sami Alfaraj for Bloomberg Istanbul, May 12, 2010

Conference Call - Nuclear Security Summit 

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Nuclear Security Summit
International implications of Iranian's nuclear weapons program and its ties to terror organizations
Sami Alfaraj, President of Kuwait Center for Strategic Studies

Conference Call - Nuclear Security Summit 

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Nuclear Security Summit
International implications of Iranian's nuclear weapons program and its ties to terror organizations
Sami Alfaraj, President of Kuwait Center for Strategic Studies

Operator: This is a recording for the teleconference, Thursday, April 8, 2010, scheduled for 10:00AM Eastern Time. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your patience in holding. We now have our speakers in conference. Please be aware that each of your lines is in a listen only mode. At the conclusion of our speakers' presentations, we will open the floor for questions. Instructions will be given at that time on the procedure to follow if you would like to ask a question. It is now my pleasure to turn this morning's conference over to Ms. Gerber. You may begin.

Gerlinde Gerber: Hello and welcome. My name is Gerlinde Gerber and I'm the Communications Associate with Réalité-EU. I'm very pleased that such a prominent group of journalists from across the globe could join us in the conversation with Sami Alfaraj. Réalité-EU is a Web site and newsletter for journalists, leaders, and key analysts that focuses on the development in and around the Middle East, which pose a threat to Europe and beyond. 

Réalité-EU is a non-profit organization not connected to any government. Réalité-EU is supported by individuals concerned with the growing threat of Iran, across Europe, and the Middle East. Information on our Web site is in five languages, such as English, French, German, Spanish, and Arabic. We are also sending out material in Portuguese, Turkish, Chinese, and Japanese and they will be soon on our Web site. See www.realite-eu.org for further information about Iran, its nuclear program and peaceful ways to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapon in the Middle East. For this briefing with Mr. Alfaraj is on the record.

Now, it is my pleasure to introduce our speaker today. Sami Alfaraj is the head of Kuwait Center for Strategic Studies, which he established in 1997, as the first private consulting center on strategic issues in the Gulf region. He serves as an advisor to the JCC and is a consultant for the Kuwaiti government and for parliamentary organizations, private corporations, and government agencies throughout out the Gulf region. He has advised Kuwait's Office of Prime Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National Security Bureau of Crisis of Management Issues. At this time, he participates in Kuwait's contingency planning for the Iranian nuclear crisis and the situation in Iraq and also contributes to the quarterly strategic assessment of Kuwait. Mr. Alfaraj will say some opening remarks and then answer questions, which were submitted by our listeners. Mr. Alfaraj, you have the way.

Dr. Sami Alfaraj: Okay. Thank you. Good morning or good evening, whatever the case, wherever you are. I'm speaking from Kuwait, from very close to Iran, across to Iran, which has been very much in crisis for the last year. That's to say, we have not actually had any escalations in this crisis. We see that developments are already going up, culminated today by the threat of Mr. Ahmadinejad to Mr. Obama as he does, a threat to Iran with the nuclear capabilities that Iran would really make the United States suffer the consequences. Here in the Gulf, we take the Iranians quite seriously because of an historic view of this situation. That's to say, we in the Gulf, and not only in the Gulf, but all regional states; that is to say, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Turkey, look at Iran differently than the way the world looks at Iran. Iran is probably a nuisance for a big power like the United States or Russia or China or even to Britain or France or even Germany and Japan. But, for us, it's a part of the balance of power in the region and here when we consider the Iranian crisis, we consider the grand strategic level of it. We look here in the Gulf at strategy; we do not look at modality. To explain modality, we look at what Iran is doing at the symmetric level and what Iran is doing on the conventional military force level and even on the nuclear lever as being the modalities for a grand strategic vision of Iran with regard to control in the region. Iran has said it more than once that is aspires to a different rule commensurate with regard to be the real weight of Iran. Iran and the statements of its policy makers talks about that it is high time for Iran to work to change the status quo. So, to explain, Iran looks at the nuclear factor or the nuclear capability as being a modality and, therefore, here we are not very much concerned with the modalities; although, it is a subject of concern for us and the tactical level and operation level as well as strategic levels. But it's not on the grand strategic level. The grand strategic level, what is important for us is that Iran wants to push the boundaries of its influence. Today, Iran is pushing such boundaries in Iraq and Lebanon, in Syria, in Palestine, in Yemen, in Sudan, and even in the Nile Valley. When you look at this, it represents to us in the Gulf as a full circle around us. We, therefore, look at a way to address such a challenge in different layers, not just the nuclear level. The nuclear level is now being addressed by great powers, like the United States and Russia, the south plus one. It is also addressed under regional level by Israel having the capability. It is addressed by a nation like Turkey, which has the conventional capabilities to meet it. But for us, we have started a kind of an embrace with Iran in order to be able to address it at the beginning of the conventional level. There is no doubt in my mind that Iran really gets away with developing the military capabilities in the future and nuclear capabilities in the future that looks a lot of regional power will follow suit. This is not a threat by regional powers; it's just a kind of what they regard as something related to their own survival. When you look at the situation today in Iraq, we have conventionally armed Iran intervening in the politics of one block of the balance of power in the Gulf. That is to say, the balance of power in the Gulf, what I mean by that is that the old balance of power that existed between street locks, that is Persia, that is Mesopotamia, and  Arabia. We have maintained that balance of power until 1980 when Saddam invaded Iran. That balance of power now has been shattered. It needs to be rectified, but it could be rectified by only one block, that is Iran, for the time being, then it's going to be a state of imbalance for the others. The others would seek to find capabilities to address that state of imbalance and, therefore, this is the explanation for the argument by the Gulf states, by Egypt, by Jordan, and by Israel, just to name a few in the region. When we talk tomorrow about Iran being found to be in possession of military capabilities or delivery systems, that can bring such capabilities into this field of adversity, what Iran considers to be the adversity, then we would be entering another layer of the argument and this is going to be in a very unconventional way. It's going to be, if one considers the limits today to be quite unsafe, unstable. Just imagine a nuclear armed Ahmadinejad in the future. People will come to us, especially our colleagues and brethren and the other ones and they say, what about Israel possessing also some nuclear capabilities? The fact of the matter is Israel has possessed nuclear capabilities and has maintained that mysterious times with regard to nuclear capabilities which has addressed actually in a very funny way the Middle East balance of power. First of all, this has made it quite impossible for any participants in past nuclear and past Middle East war to really think about the dissemination under adversity. The second is that this layer of Israeli deterrence has not been addressed to us in the Gulf. Third, this layer has not been spoken of at all and the field of deterrence. It is not being spelled out as a measure of a state policy. It's the 13th hour when you talk detailed strategic exposé about some Israeli commentator to international commentators. Now, what we in the Gulf have to, we address such issues raised by our colleagues in the area by saying that when you talk about parity, strategic parity in the Middle East and the nuclear level, you are talking about if we have Israel kind of on the western side, specifically the nuclear capabilities, then we are having Iran possessing nuclear capabilities in our east. This is going to put us in the middle, so no matter what trouble or escalation happening between nations in the future. Even if it's going to be in the conventional level, not in the nuclear level, we'll going to suffer from such competition between the two. We would rather have Israel today as the only nation possessing nuclear capabilities and working with it after region settlement and the general conflict between the Arabs and Israelis to reach, hopefully in the future, a nuclear free zone in the Middle East. But when we have two nations possessing nuclear capabilities, it's going to be more difficult to reach such a thing. Today, we look at Iran thinking on actually expansion. This is not an Iran versus the new world. This is the same old Persia. Persia has always sought to have an outlet on the Mediterranean and the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea and in the Gulf. And in that manner, Iran does not really have today the economic capability that warrants it to have such an influential position. Iran is not contributory to the development in the area. Iran is just seeking to reach such a stature and that is an example of a nation having access to force by way of intimidation. Intimidation that has been exercised by Iran today on the symmetric level, on the conventional level, and Iran wishes to reach it even on the nuclear level one day. So, no matter what the Iranians are going to go in regard to their "peaceful intentions" with regard to the nuclear program, we don't really detect what we see, what we think we take it from history. A lesson learned from history like Iran would pursue the utmost it could reach. Iran has also been so Iran never stops from expanding in the Middle East throughout history, except when Iran was stopped. The question for us today in the region and in the world: Can we actually work together to stop Iran or not? If we don't, then we will reach actually such calamities in the Middle East in the form of imbalance of power, which would encourage nations in the area to really enter new war. Thank you very much.

Gerlinde Gerber: Thank you, Sami. Let me start with the questions that were handed in by email. The first question is: What sanctions could influence the Iranian regime without hurting the Iranian people?

Dr. Sami Alfaraj: I think the most important thing for us to think about with regard to sanctions is that you have a nation that's been under one form of other sanctions. They were the U.S. incurred sanctions for the past 31 years and now you have one layer and second layer and, when you talk about sanctions, I don't think sanctions have been on the minds of the Iranian nation. The first important thing in that, we didn't have to tread into this part with them as in the question of not hurting the Iranian people. I think it is going to be quite helpful to the Iranian people to know that there is a difference between this area of expansion, the coming layer of sanction, and this regime of sanction. As I said, these sanctions have been around for 31 years, so the first thing is not to have the Iranian people materially, we have to make a sacrilegious impact, different between the two. That is one argument that could really measure the sanction. The second is that we have to look at the enforcements measured. Enforcement measured in place now do not really clear to our sacrilegious impact on the side of the Iranian nation. What I believe and no matter what type of sanction you agree upon tomorrow, whether it is a fuel guzzling sanctions or the bond from trouble from Iranian for the Iranian official, these things could not be enforced without some form of blockade. When you say blockade, blockade is quite, it's a word I chose with full knowledge of its connotation. A blockade in international law is an act of war, but it is an act short of the use of military men. That is to say you really deploy the capabilities, whether they are on the sea, in the air, or on land; in order to just really call them a region around Iran to stop the goods from getting in and out of Iran. The fact that when the Iranian nation today hears about a certain level of a military presence over the horizon that's going to stop certain goods from reaching Iran, this is still going to really mess up psychological impacts we are seeking. Here we can see that they are much closer to really fully confrontation with international communities, but it is not a full confrontation. But they feel that they are closer to it and here, in my view, we are going to create a situation where the Iranian, especially the Iranian occupation will have a choice between sitting idle as they are today or taking a side. If they take a side and that is to really stop the course of this, pressured by this Iranian leadership leading to war and leading to confrontation with the world, then they would be of use to us, but if they take side with the leadership against the war, then we should not really worry about them. We should not count on them or pursue international agenda without attention being paid to their stand.

Gerlinde Gerber: Okay. The second question is: How would a military action against Iran's nuclear capacities influence the Gulf region if it comes to a war? 

Dr. Sami Alfaraj: If it comes to a war, we have no doubt it would be quite terrible of them in the short term. That is to say, we are expecting retaliation by Iran against us, no matter what the Iranian leaders say today. The fact of the matter is that even when we talk today about possible confrontation, military confrontations, in the area between Israel and Iran, the fact of the matter I would say is that the Iranians believe that we are going to be quite helpful in such a scenario because to me the roots between Israel and Arab, fight against Iran, coming from Israel as it happens has to be to pass over Gulf states and influence all Iraq. Possibilities have to really be utilized probably in the area they would think. Possibilities would be utilized by Israel to relate to, that belongs to the United States and the region. So, Iran puts us all in one tent and, therefore, we have to be ready for such a psychological view taken by the Iranian leaders. We believe that retaliation would be probably against us from the moment they fire against Israel, no matter whether we are with Israel in the scenario or against Israel in the scenario. The fact of the matter also is the proximity of Gulf targets to Iran and the fragility of such parties to make Iran very tempted to really give first fireball to the Gulf region, not to mention the oil terminations, exporting oil terminals, talking about the United States' fragilities, great fragilities, in the region, especially in Kuwait, which is around 140 kilometers away from Iranian shore and the capabilities in the Gulf. We're talking about some Iranian seashore capabilities and, for it to become reaching even the shores of the Gulf; we're talking now about service to service in this side of the region, population in the Gulf. So, in the short term, as I said, it's going to be stabilizing, but in the long term, we have to really come to terms with the fact that by hook or by crook we have to really stop Iran one day. We have to stop this by diplomacy. We have to stop it through concerted actions. We have to stop it through concerted sanctions and regime taken by the whole international community, but all said we would have to address Iran by other means. As the United States leader, you may say all the options are out on the table. The Israelis say all the options are not on the table and, even for us in this region, if Iran is not going to be  topped, as I said earlier, it has to be stopped somehow; otherwise, you will risk that nuclear arms and nuclear Middle East and we don't want to reach that. So, anything short of that is going to be something that we have to come to term with. That is to say we are not really advocating war. We think war is a last resort and we hope we are not going to reach that last resort. But in the final analysis, if there is a war and Iran was met on that challenge and that level and Iran was stopped, then the impact and ability would be positive then, but we want to rectify the balance of power once again to this region and each nation will not export that and to remain secure in its border without intervention by the Arabs.  

Gerlinde Gerber: And do you think Iran could channel nuclear material with the terrorist groups it supports around the world?

Dr. Sami Alfaraj: Well, Iran, I don't think, the fact that a nation that has nuclear capabilities would seek to really share that with its proxies; however today it is quite difficult for us when we take situations like south of Lebanon and Iraq to really draw a line between revolutionary guard and the so-called subversive cell or terrorist cell or what is that force called? The army there in Iraq or Lebanon or Hamas in Gulf district. This difficulty of drawing the line between conventional forces, that's to say, Iranian forces, and proxies, of course, that's to say, individual organizations in Iraq or Lebanon or all of that, in Yemen, in Gulf district, because Iraq difficulties, we would ignore the official of the people who are going to the organizations are going to be using some WMD, some form of WMD, and I don't mean necessarily nuclear, but it could have the form of kind of an old model or a cake model or model of dirty bomb, which would  generate the same sacrilegious impact, but without producing the same material explosive effect as it was inserting Taliban, inserting kind and a certain condition. I believe that such a thing would mean for the Iranian an escalation process would have to be really approved from high up and so, when it is approved from high up in the Iranian leadership as a form probably we could expect one form of retaliation, then it has to be done with the comprehension of what that it will be followed by adversity that has been targeted by such form of capability. So, I would say that probably it is going to be done by revolutionary guard acting in a territory of the adversity, but having the guard being terrorists, which they're not really going to change the whole impact that is out for the targeted nations.  

Gerlinde Gerber: Thank you. The next question: Due to the growing tension between Sunni and Shia in the Middle East, could an Iranian bomb strengthen or weaken the Shia communities within Iran, or outside Iran, in the Middle East?

Dr. Sami Alfaraj: We have seen a case in front of us which is to the so-called projected between "Hezbollah victory over Israel." This situation really added fuel to the fire to the nationalistic side of the Gulf on the part of not only reeling in a nation, but also sympathize with Iran; whereas, in the measure, if you're Shias, but some of them are of an Islamist or Pan-Arabic or anti-American or anti-Israel elements here in the Middle East and especially in the Gulf. Nations in the Gulf, like these nations, have components in their nation throughout history who are Shias, but who are Arab. There are components in areas like Kuwait and Dubai where the Shias are actually, some of them or a great part of them, who migrated from Iran and, therefore, would Iran, the acquisition of nuclear capabilities tomorrow, add to this nationalistic framework, I would say. Would that cause a problem to us in the Gulf? I would say, yes, for sure. Would that direct attention of all Shia communities in the Gulf toward a militaristic approach to us and the world? Yes. Would it divert their attention from development of their communities and playing the part in their communities as they do today, for instance? I think in Kuwait or Bahrain to militaristic approach to the so-called slogan that the solution for Israel to come to a test would be "resistant" or "military action." Well, yes. And so we could say that in Iran the acquisition of nuclear capabilities and the fall of military means would ignite that dream of the "Shia and Muslim" and nuclear bomb that is to say we are considering the Pakistani one as some new Muslim bomb. Yes, it's going in general and to some of us, yes, it's going to cause some problems for us here.  

Gerlinde Gerber: Talking again about the proximity of Iran and Kuwait, how dangerous is a nuclear Iran to Kuwait and if you have taken any precautions for a probably earthquake that could detect Boushari plans, which is right across from Kuwait? Do you think you might face a second general blow in your country in case of a war?

Dr. Sami Alfaraj: Well, we look at Boushari from many dimensions. It is dimensions ofnational doctrine dimension. The second is the human accident dimension and the third, the incident of war. I don't think there is anything to argue taken by the United States or Israel or being trained or discussed that has those kind really seem okay about such military scenario before it is contained, touching some nuclear capabilities, nuclear facilities in Iran. With regard to Boushari, Boushari could be omitted as many say, but when we talk about this counts, there was a scenario and looked at the national disasters in our view and the accidents in our view, Boushari remains a flashpoint for us. Boushari must consider what we share as a city. It's much closer to the first Gulf city, which is Kuwait City, than any other city in Iran, major city in Iran. Kuwait City is the first major city to Boushari, if we take into consideration two actors. One factor is that the direction of the length, which goes from east to west and north/south in the Gulf, especially on Iran and the direction of the seashore. And the second is the direction of the currents in the Gulf which called current, clock-wise; that is to say, if there is a contamination of the sea, the sea current offers next to Boushari, then it's going to reach us by the current. Now, if it's going to reach us counter clock-wise, it will hit the first dissemination plants and then would go with the current into seven other dissemination plants in the JCC region, because we are all in this JCC, depends on dissemination plants to get our work so we don't have major rebuild in the Gulf, you would know. And so if it's going to hit the most sensitive, I expect our security, which in held and wants security. Then there is the concentration of population. It's the largest any day, Kuwait City, it is going to touch the seven regions, southern/western regions of Iran, like the advise programs in West Iran. It's going to touch some of the fallout in Iraq in the farreaching Gulf. But the Kuwait region is the most populated in comparison with just the region. The dense population is another factor because here in Kuwait, we live on 13 percent of the whole Kuwaiti territory and the density in Kuwait City is very high. It also creates  different problems, difficulties in the JCC zone to respond to the three scenarios and that is a national disaster, accident, and war because we in the JCC have more than 200 nationalities within, residing and living with the JCC, so the question of directing them through emergency measures is going to be very difficult. How many languages we ought to use? What type of direction? What type of sign? What type of signal? What type of siren? What type of forces? And then we have density, also the traffic, traffic mode, and the Gulf cities because they were designed 40 years ago for a certain type, certain number of population, and now we have almost tripled into it, we have more than tripled in other areas of the Gulf; they have much more than in Kuwait. And, when you look at all of these as one as different as the crisis, many picture in the future, there's a person or persons or agencies assigned to deal with such crisis. It's going to be really difficult for him or her and the other thing is that these areas, not only have water decontamination plants, now they also have not only do they have population centers, they also have the oil industries and the oil exploring facilities. So, nationally we've got an accident or a war that could create contamination in the region, which is going to really shut down the oil facilities as well. It's going to endanger the 200 nationalities from all over the world, which resides in the region. However, that doesn't mean that we have not been really putting measure in place. We have been consulting the international economic agency. We have direct advise. We have a crisis management center linked to Vienna directly to get instant advice in case of scenarios. We have equipment all over to measure the type of radiation in the region. We have mapped out all the region. These are new developments in the region. Iran started the program, so we mapped out the whole area in order to put benchmarks in order to measure the radiation. We have hosted, assembled, and now trained. We have just last week, two weeks ago, we had the United States here helping in crisis management for any contamination, the crisis in the future. We have all parts of expertise being invited from all over the world. We have East Europeans, we have Russia, we have French, we have British, and, of course, the Untied States because the coalition power here, is here. So, we are working on that, but it is going to be enough in time, when time comes for a national disaster, for an accident, or for a war. I really have to say probably 50/50.

Gerlinde Gerber: Thank you. The next question aims more at America. If Iran is really attempting to expire nuclear weapons, to what degree is America's behavior in the Middle East to blame? After all, before the Iraq War broke, Iran was led by Mohammed Khomeini, a liberal reformer and a leader who the West could deal with. Would Iran be attempting to deliver up a nuclear weapon program had Ahmadinejad never come to power?  

Dr. Sami Alfaraj: We must take into consideration that dealing with Mohammed Khomeini era development of a nuclear capability was not the policy in Iran. 1985, according to Iranian admissions in 2003, May, June, and August, 2003, the Iranians admitted that we have revitalized their project in 1985, but since 1996, nobody knew about the expanse of that project. So, the expanse of that project, at least kind of crescendoed in 1996. The expansion happened under the Israeli leader, a leader called Mohammed Khatimi. But it was Ahmadinejad who I heard personally in a presentation done by the Iranians in Tehran who really wanted to be given the credit of being the father of the nuclear problem in Iran, Ahmadinejad. And so today two prominent leaders positioned in Iran basically are the leaders of Iran and who's really the Iranian nuclear capabilities develop. So, Ahmadinejad is certainly not the first; he's not the champion of this. Let me say that today we would like to highjack the issue and make himself appear in the eye of the Iranian nation as being the father of the nuclear bomb in order to be different from the others. That's why the guard is in military. The United States policy, I believe that, until now there are people in Washington who see Iranian's intentions and behaviors. We must take into consideration the Iranians see and American policy more than the United States proclaims, it is going to do. For instance, in 1988, Iran accepted the huge follow on the assumption at the time by Khomeini that the bombing of civilian air bursts by the United Sates was considered to be a signal that the United States was going to join the fray on the side of Iraq against Iran and they accepted the ceasefire. In 2003, the national intelligence estimates of the United States of 2007, said the Iranians felt their military program in September of 2003. But for us here in region, we say this is quite natural because next to them there was a big coalition force numbering 150,000 plus troops sitting idle, not doing their job. So, the Iranians thought at the time thankfully that they were going to come and just like they finished Saddam Hussein, they would finish the Iranian regime and, therefore, they had to stop any excuse of the United States and the excuse would be that they were pursuing a military problem. So, Iran actually basically gets to fight and, even as the United States does not really intend to fight in Iran. When you see today that Iran is basically talking about somewhat a cake form of mid-size on a daily basis about experiments or other experiments, they want to create a form of deterrent, some form of deterrent addressed at the Americans and the Israelis, but we have some type of efficient capability called, szene 1 missile, szene 2 missile because shahab-3 is no longer involved. It is quite redundant now in comparison with these. But when you look at the capability of such missile, although they are different in quality, they do not really present a major threat as the Iranians would like us to believe. The only explanation of that is the Iranians on a daily basis actually expecting a war, expecting a confrontation with the world because they know they are doing something really they are misbehaving with the international community. So, they are expecting all the worst case scenarios again. So, what I would like to say to sum up my response to this question is that the United States need only just to show that they are serious about addressing the Iranian nuclear threat and get on with it. 

Gerline Gerber: And the next question is a little bit more general and then I have two more questions. So, the general question: How disastrous would it be for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons? After all, even Pakistan has them. 

Dr. Sami Alfaraj: You see in Pakistan, India, the balance of power in all the sub-Indian Continent, there are things that dates back to the creation of India, modern India, modern Pakistan, and the balance of power between two; one Hindu nation and one Moslem nation due to the fact there are two more modern in India than in Pakistan. But then there is the general balance of power in Asia as a whole between India and China. So, for Iran, it was natural even if it was expected in 1954, national intelligence estimates in the Untied States that under the Shah, it would be a matter of time before the Shah would turn the so-called peaceful and nuclear trouble on his administration into a military one and the Shah would have basically sort of, sorry in 1974, not 1954, national intelligence estimated in the United States. So, the Shah found himself probably pushed in a wrong direction when India detonated its first device in 1975. And then we have that chain reaction by Pakistan in 1998 after the second Indian detonation. Iran never looked at that part of the world as being an area of interest or really have an impact on the balance of power and Ahmadinejad of Iran saw himself as a player. Iran looks at this part of the world and looks at the situation vis a vis Israel, for instance, vis a vis the Untied States and the Gulf, and then if one were to put himself or herself in the shoes of the Iranians, he would consider that sometimes they would find themselves pushed into considering such measures and that is developing nuclear devices for their own defense. But what they forget about is the general balance of power in the area. So, if they were to seem frightened from the capability, conventional capabilities and non-conventional capabilities of the United States in the region, that they could really be targeting Iran in the future, just like  they did with Saddam Hussein. They have the cause to hear actually. If they look at Israel having the nuclear capabilities, they don't have a cause to hear. Why? Because there has never been a case, animosity between Iran and Israel and, therefore, to take today to be more royal than the king and to locate positions more stable than the Palestinian's position; some of the Israeli see the position in order to create the case of them to acquire nuclear weapons, to face up to Israel, this is quite a fallacy that we really do not take seriously. We consider Iran today as just like I explained in my introduction, as intent on expanding its influence in the region and would try to acquire certain capabilities to advance that. Now, this is the point where we really are opposed to Iran. Not only us in the Gulf, but also when I say the Gulf, it's not only the JCC, but also Iraq and Yemen and then we say also Turkey and we say even Syria and we say even Israel, of course, Israel and Egypt and Jordan. We all have the same position we will lead on that when Iran says I would like to have more role in the Middle East, in the full of the Middle East, that they say I would like to have Iran more stature, more influence upon the full of the Middle East, there is a certain sum of influence exercised by the nation. And, if Iran wants to take that by hook or by crook by intimidation, this is going to be taken from either the like of us in the Gulf, the JCC, from Iraq, from Yemen, or from Israel, or from Egypt, or Jordan, or Turkey. And, of course, we have to have a different stand in international community against the Iranian nuclear capability and that is why I explained at the beginning that we're got to have a level head with Iran, no matter what the international community thinks. This is going to require that certain diligent state would address acquiring nuclear capabilities, many capabilities, I think they would go as far as that in order to stop Iran from attempting to expand its influence. And, therefore, so the component between the situation in the sub-continent is Islam and the situation in the Gulf and the general balance of power in the Middle East. 

Gerlinde Gerber: Speaking about the international community, let's look into the upcoming events and development. Can you comment on the Nuclear Summit in Washington on April 12 and 13? And where does Iran sit and what do we have to expect?  

Dr. Sami Alfaraj: For us here, we cannot imagine honestly in spite of the fact that President Obama spoke in his campaign, promises about addressing the nuclear issue on the general scale, on the threat of global threat, not only Iran. But we say we believe here in the Gulf and in the region as a whole, that without the developments and the Iranian pursuit of nuclear capability, we could not imagine such a conflict taking place in Washington, DC addressing that. The second thing is that, as is evident, you would see that there has been a change in the declared nuclear policy of the United States addressed by President Obama a few days ago and there was no change with regard to two regional powers and that is North Korea and Asia and Iran, again in Asia and the Middle East. So, Iran is, we say, the absent present. So, even if Iran were not to be in Washington, DC, it is the present factor that is in their minds and about the head of any participant and that's different. I think measures are going to be take there. People would find a rationale for stronger measures taken there to address the shortcomings of the MPT and that's because that influence would really trigger the world response to the MPT as a whole and to Iran and North Korea. So, if the conference in Washington succeeds, not only in the language, but also in the measures addressed and agreed upon at least by the majority of nations there, then it would be the right signal for Iran. If the United States wastes time addressing Chinese concerns, this is an issue that is going to be more addressed probably in the Gulf and direct relations with China and substituting oil for China and free trade zone in China, then the administration of Mr. Obama would be able to do for the Chinese at present, to present, I mean present financial crisis. I think what we need to say: Does the [inaudible 00:49:08] accept one, which is China, would expect that China, even if it doesn't change position after really going through the certain expansion, at least by the United States, at least by the European community, and even if Russia and China could be addressed by other rapprochements in oil and trade and the Gulf more than anywhere else in the world, if the international would succumb to really Chinese stubbornness, then we're not going to get through with certain areas of sanction and this is going to really be a bad signal for the Iranian leadership.

Gerlinde Gerber: Thank you very much. I want now to open up for the Operator for other journalists to ask questions in case you didn't cover everything yet.

Operator: Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, at this time, we would like to open the floor for questions. If you would like to ask a question, please press the "star" key followed by the "one" key on your Touchtone phone now. Questions will be taken in the order in which they are received. If at any time you would like to remove yourself from the questioning queue, please press "star two." Once again, to ask a question, "star one" on your Touchtone phone now. Our first question will come from Sammy Samuels.  

Sammy Samuels: Thank you. I've been very impressed with everything you've said, Mr. Alfaraj. One question, which is being raised, is known as EMP, electro-magnetic pulse, which Iran could have the capability without going much further to destroy the electric grids of its fablers and even further afield by their flares. I don't know how much of a technology you know about this, but do you have any thoughts on it?

Dr. Sami Alfaraj: This is one of the issues being addressed here with regard to the [skips 00:51:25]. We have, of course, the expertise coming from NATO, expertise comes physically from the United States. It is addressed here and it is their preparation for that. It is addressed, but we haven't actually made a decision for preparation of that yet, but something is being taken to consider Russia and it is going to be really a big, big fiasco if they succeed in doing that, by having the capabilities to grant.  

Sammy Samuels: Thank you.  

Operator: Thank you. Once again, to ask a question, it's "star one" on your Touchtone phone now. Our next question will come from Hoda Hosseini.

Hoda Hosseini: Yeah. Hello. I want to ask Mr. Alfaraj about Qatar. All the Gulf regions are worried from Iran. We know that from Qatar they have very good relations with Iran and even Muscat, Oman and Muscat. First, I want to ask you, if you have enough weapons, but in the Gulf do you have enough personnel or do you need some more help from the West, from the Americans, and from the Europeans? And what can Europe do for you?

Dr. Sami Alfaraj: First of all, I want to say something, that you in the face of it to see the difference in position, that from my experience with the JCC and about the modern decade and security agencies here in the Gulf, I would know something that in the foreign policy level, there are different levels of stance and there are differences of statement and statements by policymakers address something even certain times in the relationship with Iran. We must understand one thing that the hand extended to Iran is not just extended by Oman or Qatar, but it is extended months ago by Kuwait. Although, we do not defer from position of Saudi Arabia until April last year, the hand of Saudi Arabia was also extended to Iran and until now. So, there are differences in the prepared statement, but with regard to planning, with regard to we all in the peninsula and there are incidents of that and it is something that we would love to have in the future, to have Yemen and Iraq to join. We are planning for on the same position that I presented to balance power between this side, inside the Arabian peninsula and Mesopotamia and Persia. So, there is the strategic mindset dominates the thinking her that we have to look at this as Arabia, not as Arabs, but as Arabia as one block in the balance of power. That's one thing. Whether we have the personnel capable of doing that, we have with regard to the military main, we have always construed a leverage over Iran and the qualitative edge to have more, much better weapons. And why? Because we have less personnel than they do and, therefore, we actually to have more far-reaching weapons, more devastating weapons, but if you look at them, you would see that they all are, they fit into the so-called rubric of descent.

Hoda Hosseini: But we see war between Al-Hossein and the Saudi army and the Al-Hussein and they were backed by Iran, almost on the Saudi arm.

Dr. Sami Alfaraj; Yes. Here I do not disagree with you. It is not as simple as that, but I do not disagree with you. But, however, you have to look at the Iranian points to support their whole team is the question I pose to you is: What made the Al-Hossein start their war? Because the south, although, not as "serious challenge" to them on the land corridor between one, they put the real challenge in the seafront and that is south of, on the western side of the Arabian Sea, by the numbers when they deployed their flotilla, their navy. They were terrible with the American Navy to integrate and to evict supplies. So, basically you could have a direct strategy and that is to face the Hossein where they are and you could have a direct imbalanced approach and that is what you need to cut their supplies. So, here is a no win situation actually. The fact the matter the Hossein would press at the end to really seek peace or seek accommodation in the country. Whether we need capabilities of personnel, we have treaties, not only with what's in power, but also with Egypt, with Jordan, and we will have treaties with Turkey soon. And also to have NATO standards, especially in Turkey, but without having personnel that presents lack of cultural class with the Gulf setting; in spite of the fact that we've fallen troops [skips 00:57:32] since the time of Alexander the Great. Do you hear me? Yeah, so we have capabilities in the form of personnel and, with consistent

Hoda Hosseini: Excuse me. You go to sign a treaty with Turkey very soon?

Dr. Sami Alfaraj: Of course there will be a treaty soon. No, just to see how they got in the Arab Summit, then the first meeting would be Turkey and the nations neighboring the Arab world, so Turkey is, and then the rest of the Arab world.

Hoda Hosseini: Well, at the Summit, did you invite Ahmadinejad to Qatar, not so?

Dr. Sami Alfaraj: Well, they invited as a last measure, but to speak to him, but they didn't invite him since. So, it was quite a significance he did not take up that initiative and that's why we have a situation generated between us and Iran, generated to this level. And I go back to the question of personnel and where we're consistently at. But we have all the positions in weapon systems and region and I don't mean on the ground or on the shore, but on the naval front, on the systems could reach us very soon in case of war, so this would be our position.

Hoda Hosseini: Are you waiting for a war, sir?

Dr. Sami Alfaraj: We are planning to address a war scenario as a worst case scenario. It doesn't mean it's going to happen, but we have to plan as small states, we have to plan on a worst case scenario all the time in order to be ready because we won't have time when war really erupts in the region.

Hoda Hosseini: Thank you.

Dr. Sami Alfaraj: Thank you.

Gerlinde Gerber: Are there more questions from journalists?

Operator: At this time, we have no further questions in the queue.

Gerlinde Gerber: All right. Then that closes the call. Thank you so much, Mr. Alfaraj, for joining us today.

Dr. Sami Alfaraj: My pleasure.

Gerlinde Gerber: And I also wanted to invite you to our Web site, www.realite-eu.org. We provide the latest thinking on breaking news and long term trends on these and other issues as well as give reporters list of expert intellio. Thank you so much. It was a pleasure to have you all. Thank you.

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David Oman, Director of Communications, IMPACT-SE and
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