



## **REALITE-EU**

**CONFERENCE CALL ON WIKILEAKS & THE IRANIAN THREAT:  
WHAT'S NEW?**

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OPERATOR: This is a recording of the Réalité-EU Project on November 30<sup>th</sup>, 2010, at 9 a.m. Central Time. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your patience in holding. We now have your speakers in conference. Please be aware that each of your lines is in a listen-only mode. At the conclusion of the presentation, the floor will be open for your questions. At that time, instructions will be given as to the procedure to follow if you'd like to ask a question. It is now my pleasure to introduce Ms. Gerlinde Gerber. Ms. Gerber, you may begin, ma'am.

GERLINDE GERBER: Hello and welcome. My name is Gerlinde. I am a communications associate at Réalité-EU. Thanks to all our listeners for joining us today in the conversation with Dr. Sami Alfaraj about WikiLeaks and the Iranian threat and what those revelations mean for the future development of the region.

Let me see a few words about Réalité-EU first, just for the case that some of you are new to our conference calls. Réalité-EU is a website and e-newsletter for journalists, leaders and key analysts that focus on developments in and around the Middle East which pose a threat to Europe and beyond. Réalité-EU is a nonprofit organization not connected to any governments. It is supported by individuals concerned with the growing threat of Iran and extremism in Europe and the Middle East.

The information on our website is in 10 languages, which is English, French, German, Spanish, Arabic, Portuguese, Turkish, Chinese and Japanese. Please visit [www.reality-eu.org](http://www.reality-eu.org) for further information about Iran, its nuclear programs and peaceful ways to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

Now let me introduce you to our speaker today, Dr. Sami Alfaraj. Dr. Alfaraj is the head of Kuwait Center for Strategic Studies, which he established in 1997 as the first private consulting center on strategic issues in the Gulf region. He served as an advisor to the GCC and as a consultant to the Kuwaiti government and to parliamentary organizations, private corporations and government agencies throughout the Gulf region.

He has advised Kuwait's Office for the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Bureau on crisis-management issues. Mr. Alfaraj will say some opening remarks and then your phone lines will be opened up for the question-and-answer session, where you will be able to pose your questions directly to him. Mr. Alfaraj, you have the floor.

SAMI ALFARAJ: Good morning. This morning, I am going to give you a few words about my feeling as somebody from this part of the world, what revelations come through the disclosure of many of the contents of the WikiLeaks documents related to the region, to the Gulf specifically, and the relation to Iran and its nuclear program.

First of all, this comes against the grain of how business is done, the business of politics in this part of the world. This is an area very well-known for discretion that the business of politics is really done behind closed doors. So I'm sure there are different, actually, layers of attitudes vis-à-vis the revelations. One layer I could describe as shocked. This is the layer of the practitioners of politics, people in government, in different governments of the GCC in relation

to what has been revealed about their actual and real attitudes vis-à-vis the case of their relations with Iran.

The second one is the attitude of people who are actually observing the conduct of politics, people like myself, and sometimes there is – such type of people would sometimes be elated that their views that have been discussed in public for years have already been vindicated, that they have already influenced the conduct of politics and the conduct of their government's policies vis-à-vis Iran.

The second are people who feel that they were actually given false information with regard to what they were doing in pursuit of their own research and their assessment with the situation in the Gulf.

A third layer, actually, this is the public layer, and I believe that there will be – it is a positive development, that they see that their down-to-earth attitude vis-à-vis Iran, their concern about Iranian politics, their call for a tougher stand towards Iran have found reflection in the policies of their government, albeit not attitudes that have been revealed in public, and they only came to the light in recent date.

In general, for a person like myself observing the situation and dealing with government circles all over the GCC, I have been aware of such attitudes of many. I am not saying I'm aware of private, for instance, conversation between a head of state and another head of state – not to that level, but I am aware about the real discussion in policy circles. And I am not overwhelmed, actually, about what is being revealed. I am quite surprised at how soon such attitudes came to the fore.

One element for me that really caught my attention is that – and caught the attention of all of the people – is that – how the front quarters in different layers in different countries of the GCC, as well as the region, whether in Jordan or in Israel, for instance, were thinking the same way about what was the best way to stop the Iranian nuclear program in its tracks, whether diplomacy was going to work, and if it wasn't going to work, whether war was something to be contemplated.

And for somebody who has been in the area and who has seen stability, revolution, wars, neighbors attacking each other, religion wars and three times – two times in this part of the world, as well as two nations, Iran and Iraq, fighting for eight years, insurgency inside Iraq itself between '88 and 1990, invasion of Kuwait, 1990, and so on and so forth – it is important to see how we look at, for instance, look at the relations about the discourse attributed to King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, and that he actually advised the American government to take a military action against Iran.

This indicates the willingness of Gulf leader at the time, 2008, to be as ready as to enter another war in this region after 28 years of instability and war, which indicates that the malaise of this discourse between us, as regional and as international powers with Iran was reaching nowhere, and that we reached this stage of despair to the level that we were ready to actually accommodate another destructive war in this part of the world.

This is quite an interesting point, and it's attracted the attention of many in the Gulf, the preparedness of the largest member of the GCC to go once again to war in order to settle another problem that could not be settled by recourse to diplomacy. It is going to be interesting for a person – myself and probably for the Iranians, in the sense that I don't think there is lost love between us and the Iranians, and I don't think that they had actually accommodated diplomatic statements coming from the centers of the GCC in the past advocating the recourse to diplomacy.

I believe the Iranians have always suspected there was something else and another – (audio break) – as being a friendly nation and nations that have taken different stands vis-à-vis Iran and have understood Iran's "needs", quote-unquote, for its historic right to acquire nuclear capabilities.

And here in this point, I am referring to the attitude of nations like Qatar, for instance, or perhaps Turkey. We still haven't had anything related to the attitude of these nations or the attitude of other nations in North Africa, Arab nations, vis-à-vis Iran, because the attitudes of the GCC as a whole, with the exception of Qatar and Oman, and the attitudes of Egypt and Jordan and Israel are very well-known – and Yemen – are very well-known to the Iranians. And the Iranians have never really taken the declared attitudes to be the right attitudes. They always, as I said, suspected there was something sinister being done, being plotted behind closed doors.

So we are – actually, I think if we are to wait a couple more days, we are in for perhaps the greatest surprises about such attitudes I am referring to. I would like to stop here and leave it to your question to really instigate, hopefully, a greater discussion on this issue, which is quite interesting, and it is being totally unprecedented to the question of politics and the grand strategy in this part of the world. And I thank you for your being there.

MS. GERBER: We will open it up for your questions right now.

OPERATOR: (Gives queuing instructions.) Ms. Gerber, at this time, we have one question from Michael Snyder (ph).

Q: Given the position that Israel has, at times, alluded to the fact that it might take military action against Iran and given the fact that a number of countries in the region have expressed positions similar to Israel, what do you think the effect of this will be in terms of Israel taking military action?

MR. ALFARAJ: As a person who have alluded to this possibility as early as January, 1996, I believe we reached, actually, a clear state of affinity of interest, that interests in that, you know, we have to stop the development of nuclear capabilities in Iran because we know that they are destined towards the military path, not just the civilian path, and that we have already taken a stand with regard to the efficacy of conducting diplomacy with Iran and what diplomacy could take us to.

And the third stage of this affinitive interest that we have already come to the conclusion that, you know, everything else in the region has to be postponed until this issue is going to be settled. I think we reached now the force elemental this affinity of interests, and we believe that, you know, only military action could basically address this situation.

Now, in that, we have differences with regard to how this is going to be done, whether it's preferable to be done on coalition manner or it could be done on the same mode of the 2003 coalition intervention in Iraq, the coalition of the willing. I believe that eventually, we will find ourselves in a stage where it is going to be a coalition of the willing, and because the United States is not in a position today to really lead a move inside the Security Council to take a military action against Iran in the same mode that it did in 1990 vis-à-vis the case of Kuwait.

And therefore, also, the membership of the United States as part of this coalition is going to be basically in doubt, because the United States is still in Iraq, still in Afghanistan increasing its presence, and now it has this North Korean issue.

So there is a conclusion. The statements coming from the Gulf and revealed in these documents is that even if the United States was willing to take action against Iran, it could not do it, actually, in these circumstances. So what do we do here as regional states? I think today, the time has arrived, and it has already been a – it is more conducive today that this affinitive interest has come to the public's knowledge, that there will be a greater debate on that, that Gulf states especially, because of their geographic position, they are in the way of any military action that is contemplated by Israel.

So they have two options: One option is to really plan it, or talk about the planning it, in order to force the Iranians to take a different action, to change their course. And the second one is – and the second stage of that is basically to conduct it together, and to conduct it together meaning to allow the Israelis the corridor for them to really pass in order to have a real military strike that has potential in stopping the program.

What is important about us in the region is that we are satisfied with the so-called – the objective of, you know, curtailing Iranian actions for a few years, or delaying their actions for a few years. This is not considered to be enough objective, military or strategic objective, for the United States policymakers, but for the region at large, it is enough credible military objective.

So as you can see, there is kind of consensus developing over the policy, over how to define the interest and the state of affinity among these interests and what the actions are to be taken. And now, we are talking about basically – hopefully, we will be talking about bringing this as a credible scenario in the future – not necessarily tomorrow or the next month or even the beginning of 2011 or mid-2011, but I believe there is – today, there is a different climate of politics in the area with regard to the urgency.

We see the development of the Iranian program and the urgency – (audio break) – if we are left, I know from what is engrained in my brain as the Gulf Arabs is that in the final analysis, if we are left to our own devices to deal with the Iranian threat, we are going to work with whoever is going to really address that threat, including the use of military means.

Until today, you see that even if you look at how we conduct ourselves with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, you can see that we are only giving lip service to the settlement of the conflict, in that we encourage negotiations but we are not pushing for that. We are not saying anything about the Arab formula – that is to say that in the back of our – (audio break).

MR. ALFARAJ: I believe that I was cut from the last portion of my answer. I believe that we are in a situation today where the issues are much clearer than yesterday and that today is a decision – we are in decision mode much more than we were a few days ago, that it is very obvious for us that the issue has become more crystal clear. I was in Riyadh myself four months ago, and we discussed the possibility of an action taken by Israel, what role we could play with regard to this action.

And I could see that in the room, everybody kind of not disputed my thesis, which was that we could either play as – (audio break) – as coalition members in such strike conducted by Israeli if the United States could not do that. And the other option for us is to play stupid, like 1981, trying to act as if we didn't know about it, and that as a person in policy circles and as an advisor, that I was recommending the first course in order to really develop a regional solution for regional issues.

I do not recall a great dispute or a dispute at all coming from that forum, which included more than 60 people present. And therefore, I believe what was released in the press, and especially in the U.K., about secret negotiations taking place between Israel and the Saudis over fly-bys for Israeli aircraft, to conduct that – (audio break) – they could have been quite a fantastic idea four months ago. They are no longer a fantastic idea. They are more realistic in the wake of the WikiLeaks revelations of recent days.

I believe that the public today are more in tune with this sentiment. The public – in the discourse I have with the public in programs is that the majority of people are quite – have already accommodated themselves with the idea of a great war taking place in this region. There is no such dispute with Israel being the candidate for such operation to be conducted against Iran.

If all fails, I believe that the majority of the public in the region already assess that all other solutions have failed and that they are fully aware of the engagement of the United States in three situations now, in Iraq, Afghanistan and most recently in North Korea to the level that they could not see a real positive participation of the United States in the first stage of confrontation with Iran.

Now, since the only obstacles to such operations being taken by Israel against Iran are only geographic, in order to shorten the passages between Israel and Iran, I believe this is going to be the hurdle. But this hurdle, in my view, and this view has developed since 1996 – I think it is in the last stages of its being the hurdle.

With regard to the WikiLeaks and their impact upon the relationship between us, especially the Gulf Arabs, and Iran, as I said in my opening remarks, I don't think there is lost

love between us and the Iranians. The Iranians have got – Iranian strategic mind is quite a suspicious mind. It is a mind that only trusts itself. It reaches the stages where it cannot even trust some elements in the makeup of its mind.

As we can see today, there is a division in opinion in the Iranian strategic mind and how Iran conducts its international politics to acquire more influence. Some of the more clever ones advocate a policy based on, you know, the role of economics and international politics, Iran being a producer of oil, and that Iran can have a greater say in the region based on economic and civilizational role as a whole.

There is another part of that Persian strategic mind which advocates simple solutions to grand problems, the grand problem being, you know, the extent – how to extend the hegemony of Iran, or historic Persia, in the Middle East to reach as far as the Mediterranean and the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea and to have a greater say in Africa, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and in the third world.

This mind advocates the development of the nuclear capabilities and conventional capabilities and to have sleeper cells, asymmetric mode of action, financing plots here and there. Here, Iran in the first mode is welcome, has always been welcome, not just by the Gulf Arabs but original powers include Israel if Iran were to reconduct its pursuit of influence on the economic path, on the civilizational path, on what Iran represents to this region and this spirit of civilization as a modern civilization and the culture and the arts and – (audio break) – trade and how to do business.

But on the other model, Iran is in opposition to all regional states, and regional states basically have been addressing this problem in different choice of words and languages. You have the Turkish choice of words; you have the Qatari choice of words. You have the Omani choice of words. And then you have the rest of the GCC plus Jordan, Egypt and Yemen and Israel.

I believe that the WikiLeaks have already – they can play to – they play influence on the Iranian strategic mind. In one sense, the positive sense is that it would really alarm the reasonable ones in the Iranian decision-making apparatus, and would show them the degree of animosity between Iran and between its – between Iran and its neighbors. That it is against what Ahmadinejad's administration has been alluding to – that Iran is enjoying a great status and it is welcome everywhere, just as Mr. Nejad was welcome in his recent visit to Beirut.

The other side is that, you know, the fundamental side of the Iranian strategic mind is presented by the administration of Mr. Nejad and his colleagues in the – in parliament and in the judiciary and in the religious establishment, which would say, look, look what we have said to you. These guys are conspiratorial; they have been plotting against us. They have saying – they have been saying things that are quite reasonable and diplomatic in public but they've been plotting to the extent of plotting wars against us, and this would – should encourage us to really continue our path in subjecting these elements within the – (inaudible).

So there is room for those two impacts to take place in Iran, and the choice is the Iranians' to make. It's not ours. I think what we have – there is no more on this side of the Gulf to really say that we have a different solution.

I think the solutions are already on the table. As I was saying when we were discussing as, you know, Gulf Arab – with the help of many of our, you know, our – many of our advisors and many of our friends came from the United States or South Korea or Russia or other (parts ?) of the world. We are – four months ago, we were talking about all the policy choices open to us, and the policy choices open to us, really, are uncertain. And they come from a choice of doing nothing, which is something that is – that our people in the Middle East are used to. And you could see us in some of the patterns of our policies vis-à-vis Iran and vis-à-vis other issues.

And the other one is to go as far as acquiring nuclear weapons ourselves. Nobody's going to be in the position to understand what our policy drives and what really push us towards even courting to war.

Below that is basically to join – to join others in conducting that choice against Iran. That's conducting as under coalition, international coalition like 1991, or, you know, selective choice of coalition like 2003 where Kuwait was on the forefront of the party of the willing.

And this, we have a model today that's going to be, hopefully, to be – you know, materialized – and that is an action of the willing represented by the state of Israel. And I believe that the choice for us today is that we cannot sit still because this is going to have a long-term impact on the balance of power in the region. And we cannot accept a change of the balance of the power in the region – of Persia because we never accepted that for two millennia. So what makes us today accept the change of balance of power in the region, you know, forced upon us by Iran?

We would rather face up to Iran with whoever is ready to face up to Iran. And the choice here is, as I said, it's either international coalition or it's coalition of the willing. I myself as a person and observing events in this region, believe that a coalition of the willing is actually under development and it's going to be the only measure that's going to either stop Iran in its tracks by its own volition or bring Iran to the confrontation with the coalition of the willing.

OPERATOR: Our next question comes from Bruce Conover (ph).

Q: Do you think the WikiLeaks publication will result in a willingness on the part of Gulf and Arab states to openly express their policy and their concerns towards Iran? Obviously, public expression of what has been said behind closed doors would have a real effective unifying policy towards Iran.

MR. ALFARAJ: I think, you know, what you have suggested is what I believe personal to become true, to be happening because the public mood in the Gulf was amazed of the lack of really concerted action vis-à-vis the statements of Iran and the actions of the Iran, the conduct of maneuvers, the revelations about sleeping cells, the subversive cells on the GCC soil.

I believe the public today is kind of more content with the revelation that their governments have been actually taking, you know, positions on serious and serious stance vis-à-vis Iran, including the entry into war – to tell the Gulf Arabs that, you know, we may get involved in a war and we may get actually bitten by this action, you know, in one form or another.

It's not just our strategic locations like the oil facilities and the harbor but also the population centers. And in general, what I have – as I've been canvassing views and polling people in, you know, different quarters in the Gulf in the past few months, I could hear the change of mood – of mood by the Gulf Arabs.

These ordinary people think, well, we've already been in two – in two major wars, and if it's – if it's – if the situation requires that we really enter into another one in order to really finish this instability caused by the current Iranian regime and we reach another way of, you know, addressing the security situation between us and Iran, so let's go for it.

And so this changes now – now, there is an open format for the governments of the Gulf and the public of the Gulf. The public of the Gulf used to be saying these things and nobody responding to them; or the response they could get was from a – you know, a diplomatic response saying, you know, we are actually dealing with these issues, but trust in us that we are going to really come to the right choice.

I think that statement is no longer there. Gulf officials can no longer play this statement to their public. They have to really come clean and talk about how to prepare them for any eventuality. What we have witnessed since 2006 – and I've been actually party in the planning to this – is that there have been preparation of the Gulf societies for a climate of war – one day, war breaking out in the Gulf in the form of, you know, emergency situation planning and the steps taken. You know, systems being bought, emergency situations being prepared, facilities being built – recruitment, training all over.

And the discussion all over is about preparation for a nuclear environmental disaster in the Gulf because of the operation of Bushehr. Today, you know, policymakers and officials cannot say we are just preparing for an environmental disaster. It has going to happen in three, four years in the Gulf. They can no longer say that. They have to come clean and say, we have to be ready for all situations.

I believe that they're going to camouflage their statements still. But I believe that this camouflage is not going to be – no war is going to take place in this region. I think it's going to say, we are preparing for all scenarios.

MS. GERBER: Is there any other question?

OPERATOR: At this time, we have no further audio questions.

MS. GERBER: Let me ask one that was submitted by email from Maxine Bovere (ph). Will the leaks and their revelations have any effect on the progress of peace and regional

cooperation in the Middle East? What is the best catalyst to progress a workable peace agreement among all the countries of the region?

MR. ALFARAJ: In Kuwait and in – and especially in United Arab Emirates, but most – and Qatar – but most notably in Kuwait – the strategic vision charted by the governments of these nations as late – as early as the late 1990s basically allocate a position of great importance to Iran, to Iraq and to the Yemen. We look at those three societies to be, you know, the biggest in population, the largest in size and the three most afflicted by war and the wars they have been through in the past two, three decades.

We still cannot pinpoint a point where we can see that reconstruction of Iran or Iraq or Yemen has started. These are – what is being conducted there is small projects here and there, but there is no move at reconstructing those societies.

We look at reconstructing Iran, Iraq and Yemen as the most important issues for the Gulf Arabs – for all the members of the Gulf community. And when I say Gulf community, I mean the GCC of six nations plus Iran, Iraq and Yemen, as well as the region surrounding us. And therefore, it is important to note that in all our strategic plans, we put as the grand strategic objective to get these nations to accept cooperation between us on this side of the Gulf as GCC, as nations that are building, you know, building a model for development for the region.

And as host to more than 200 nationalities from all over the world that have – that already live in the Gulf and travel in the Gulf to the extent that as Gulf Arabs, we are a minority in our own countries. But this community of development we'd like to enlarge not only to include Iran, Iraq and Yemen, but also to include the Horn of Africa, the Sudan, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinians, the Syrians, Lebanese and the Jordanians – and hopefully, also, the Turks.

We have relations and we have – given with the nation that we do not have diplomatic relations like Israel, we have commercial relations and we want to build on that. And not to have Iran, Iraq and Yemen as prime objective of our strategic development plans will be the greatest mistake of this junction of history because if we miss that, we are actually preparing the ground for another war over, you know, economic resources.

Let's not forget that we are not doing that as a charity work. We are doing that because it is in our interests. It is – our interest is to create the economic and social hub in this part of the world, and to have the right environment and the right technological tools. And here we have invited all our neighbors of the world. And this space is all neighbors of the Gulf. We don't have to have geographic boundaries, you know, common geographic boundaries.

Now, we are all neighbors in this, you know, global village. And as I said, more than 200 nations work with us either on the – on the GCC soil or in the form of, you know, companies and their own – in those specific countries or in the companies that are in the form of their governments, the type of relations we have.

Now we have – we have a skeleton of corporations between us and Iran, Iraq and Yemen. But we need to really consolidate this skeleton of work and really continue to build because the

other option, if we do not create the environment for the youth of this era, people in their, you know, teens, prepare the jobs for them, for the future, to be part of the international community and to be part of this Gulf community. They are – they going to be, in three years' time, in the right – in the right age for military service.

And we have enough of military services and armies. We cannot really grasp their attention through the projects we can create from now for them. They will be left with no other recourse but to go to the military service or to work in the armed forces. And you know what this is going to create. That's what really going to foil this climate of animosity and difference over regional issues. We'd rather them have discourse today about all such issues in their spare time over, you know, the chat – the chat rooms. They ought to discuss all what divides us in this civilized way.

We do not want them to fight over what divides us in this uncivilized way which we have been used to for centuries. We need to change this mode of action. And this mode of action cannot be really reached or charted except by a course to the common sense of the ordinary man, no matter where this ordinary man or woman exists in this – in this planet. Every person would love to have – to have, you know, clean water, would have the shelter, would have clean food, would have security, the services that, that person needs whether in the medical, educational, environmental protection, the right to acquire knowledge.

These are the elements that exist in the mind of every Gulf Arab, every Iraqi, every Yemeni, every Iranian, every Israeli, every Palestinian and therefore I just continue as a person who drafted the strategic region for Kuwait in 1998, continue with this logic because the only other logic that is available here as a substitute for this humanistically, logically, you know, to really purge the opposite member is to go into war against that opposite member.

And as a person, I would not want the party of war in this region to really triumph. I want the party of the peace to triumph and the party of peace must triumph only by basically executing as such that I have already enumerated that we really have to look at each other as members and of the same region, as members of the same hub, as the members of the same destiny.

We are obviously divided over – you know, men and women, over Arabs and non-Arabs, over, you know, Muslims and non-Muslims, but it should not be that the divide. The divide should be over how to pursue this development problem, how to reach it.

And if we look at one problem that is going to be our concern, it is going to be from 2011, it's going to be water. And if you look at two regions of the Middle East that are strewn by war and conflict and you look at the Arab-Israeli conflict region and the Gulf conflict region, you would see that both regions are really in dire need for water.

So here this is something that should bind us on how to create, you know, better water resources and enough water resources for the generations to come. I think this – if we identify that as just one problem this is going to actually occupy our minds for the next two decades.

MS. GERBER: Thank you, Sami. Are there other questions?

OPERATOR: No, ma'am. No other questions at this time.

MS. GERBER: I have a personal one, also. Sami, if you think yourself into the position of a Saudi or other Gulf leader, how did this WikiLeaks change your position that your people have towards you – I mean, Gulf people have towards the Gulf leaders? Is it embarrassing? Do you have to save your face now? Are the people going to push the government to go into war or to avoid war? How did it change the relationship between the people and their governments?

MR. ALFARAJ: Now, as I said, I just alluded to the fact that, you know, in discussions being done between – you know, in a haphazard discussion between me and – (inaudible). And the – (inaudible) – I don't mean just Kuwaitis in Kuwait that I meet in public places. But people stop me after TV interview or after statement in the press and they ask me the usual question: What do you think is the end of the Iranian nuclear program? What solutions do you see and insights? What do you think the attitude of our government vis-à-vis opinion like yours and others?

I'll find myself and other, you know, intellectuals speaking on talk shows and to the press as closer to the public more than what the statements of governments. I think one – what I see is a positive relationship now that, you know, people in the past kind of underestimated the comprehension of their governments of the real issues surrounding the – surrounding the resolution of the Iranian leadership with regard to what it wants as regional objectives.

The question posed to me was – in the forum – don't they understand what the end result for this game? Don't they understand that one day we will wake up and we will see Iran overrunning us in different – you know, in different layers of this confrontation. Don't they understand that if we do not move now we are not going to be able to do that?

Don't they understand that, for instance, Israel is actually promoting the only solution that's going to stop those warmongering, you know, cliques in Iran. Don't they understand that we have to fail this war party in Iran in order for the reasonable ones in Iran for triumph and to bring Iran to the same level of development that we are enjoying in this part of the world? Don't they understand that the delay by their inaction, meaning the Gulf policymakers, their inaction, they actually allow Iran to meddle in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in the Lebanese case, in the Iraqis situation, in the Yemenis situation and therefore they fail our policies in this region.

And now I think the Gulf Arabs – I mean, the public in the Gulf and the GCC – understand that if they were in line with their policymakers, this would bring them closer to their policymaker. This would make them actually more confident that their policymakers have already been seeing the issues the same way they were seeing them; that have been identifying the right responses through them; that they have already been planning in a long-term pace to prepare the society.

Now they can understand why this society has been actually in a war or not. Does it mean, you know, building bunkers and establishing hospitals and training security forces and

buying arms and shoring up defenses and preparing for a nuclear, environmental disaster in the area? And doing lots of things but without mentioning that, you know, taboo word, which is, perhaps, war. And now it has kind of an open ticket. Now all of this is understandable. What they have been doing as our government, they have been preparing us on a – on a slow pace to be ready for that scenario if that scenario were to come.

I must admit that, basically, I would have preferred WikiLeaks to take place, perhaps, after two more years because, hopefully, in two more years we will be have – we will have basically shored up our defenses in a better way, in a better fashion than we have it today.

But the positive side of the leaks is that, you know, it gives – it puts the Iranians on notice. That what you are seeing there is actually – you ought to believe what you see on the Gulf shore, that these people on the other side are preparing for the eventuality of war, for war to break in the region. And if war were to break in the region they understand now there are two scenarios and they have been dealing with – in preparation, as the Iranians, for two scenarios. That is, a scenario of war conducted by the United States and its coalition partners and the other one is conducted by Israel and whoever is going to join Israel, and perhaps the United States joining the – joining the flock in a later stage to defend Israel and the GCC soil once they become overwhelmed by, you know, for instance, if it ever happens, by Iranian missiles or Iranian terrorist acts.

Here, the Iranians are put on notice three years earlier for that eventuality because in three years, everybody would believe in academia and intelligence services – believe that in two years, we would have something quite concrete about the result for the Iranian and nuclear pursuit.

Perhaps the Iranians would be, in two years' time, 2012, would have – definitely have a device that they could toy with just like the North Koreans. North Koreans today are not with the capabilities – the delivery capabilities that could put their nuclear devices, to give their nuclear devices the menacing posture that they would like to have vis-à-vis in Japan, vis-à-vis South Korea, vis-à-vis the United States. But it's a question of time for them to develop, you know, delivery systems – I mean missiles.

With regards to the Iranians, perhaps, in 2012 we will be in the same Korean – North Korean position of today, of 2010. And again, it is going to be a scary posture, you know, coming from a state that has not been on, you know – conducts its business in the normal way. It conducts its business by, you know, a blend of, you know, rhetoric: diplomatic rhetoric, macho rhetoric, asymmetric warfare, you know, fueling of espionage circles, drugs and arms smuggling. It spans all over as far as Nigeria in Africa.

Here, when you have such a – such posture which is a nuclear device without a delivery system in the hands of such a government presented by the government of Ahmadinejad and his Revolutionary Guard it is going to be enough menace for Middle East and, therefore, I believe that today in light of, you know, the wake of the grandest arms purchases from the United States by the Gulf Arabs, by Israel, Jordan and Egypt, they ought to understand that the other course of action open to them as Iranians would be war.

This realization would put them in the same realization of the Gulf Arabs in the GCC soil and the other people living on the GCC soil, as well as in Egypt; as well as in Egypt and Jordan and Israeli – that there is, today, uniformity of opinion among all these nations. They are not divided by any other conflict; they are not divided by any other problem. They are united by one problem and that is the rise of the Iran, of a nuclear Iran, and the new Middle East as a negative development, not as a positive development – balancing Turkey or balancing Israel – no, as a negative development that is actually delaying the resolution of, you know, history-old problems like the Arab-Israeli conflict, like the divide between Sunnis and Shiites. Iran is not helping solving these problems.

And, here, when we go back to the – (audio break – in that sense of the question I think, you know, the divide among, between the Gulf populace in general and their leaders is narrowing. There is more trust that, you know, they can see eye to eye to the same problem; they can see the context in which they find themselves; they can see that the solutions are getting fewer and fewer by the passage of time; that the solutions, the window of opportunity is getting narrower and that there has to be an urgency, a greater urgency. Today, they can see that there is that type of urgency in the minds of their government and their policymakers.

And I believe in the final analysis it will be an opportunity for all for a better – actually exchange views in public today on talk shows, in open forums, in the press, in discussion. Perhaps, you know, the question – that taboo, the question of war with Iran, is no longer a taboo; that it has to be addressed positively in order for us to either pass the right message to the Iranian people or to really, you know, decide on a course that we, a person like myself, and many, find that it is the only solution if all other solutions like diplomacy and sanctions fail.

MS. GERBER: Now, are there any other questions?

OPERATOR: Yes ma'am. We have a question from Michael Snyder.

Q: Do you believe that this will result in a realignment between the Arab states and Israel?

MR. ALFARAJ: In short, yes. In short, I have talked for 14 years about affinitive interest. In short, I can say that, you know, I believe that in Israel they will feel that, you know, they are not alone in assessing the threat to themselves as being, you know, an existential threat. We look at here in the Gulf; it is obviously here that Gulf governments have looked at it in the same manner.

I think when – the way we ought to read that – the minutes of a meeting of the Saudi monarch that he encouraged the United States to cut, you know, the head of the serpent before it's too late and that he, as the head of the state, head of the biggest state in the GCC, was willing to contemplate to be a subject of retaliation by Iran if war were to be declared against it, against Iran.

I think the question of Gulf Arabs today with regards to the issue on the table which is if a war scenario developed, not being contemplated by the United States, for obvious reasons – for the United States' involvement in three regions of the world already – for the United States being in the midst of an international crisis.

Do you we wait for this international crisis to evaporate? Do we wait until the situation in Afghanistan or Iraq or North Korea is going to be settled? Nobody in the Gulf in his right mind feels that we ought to wait. So we have, kind of, a synergy and we have the same way we think about the urgency of the situation and how we ought to look at it. We have, always, a person like myself have always advocated a regional look at this situation, not an international look.

And today, I can see that there has been – what has been exposed in the document is a regional look at the situation; a regional look that goes as far as, you know, to invite war if war was the only solution we have. And here, we have the uniformity of, you know, conclusion between us and Israel. And therefore, would we see more dynamics in this relationship that is going to put the Arab-Israeli settlement in the back burner? My answer is yes. Would the issues that have been actually discussed in secrecy be more open today? I guess, yes.

What form this is going to take place? It's going to take place in the public debate; the debates will not today be limited to talking about Palestinians and Israelis. I think we'll be talking about – all of us, including Israel and the Iranians – it's going to be a shift. I think people would be much freer today to talk about the scenario of war against Iran and that it is going to involve all of us; not just us, the Arabs of the Gulf, but also the other Arabs like, you know, Jordanians and Egyptians and as well as Israelis that we feel the same way they feel.

I think the public in Israel will also see with this energy that there are people who understand their grievances; that they understand what is – what is – they understand the situation when, you know, you have Katyusha rockets, you know, falling on your head. At least here in Kuwait we understand what is the – what it means to have, you know, Scud missiles falling over your head; we experienced that in 2003; the Saudis in 1991.

And therefore, here, you have an experience, an experience among the ordinary people; an experience in that they all are basically looking at the same problem, an experience and they really are going to be more energetic to push their governments to have more resolute action vis-à-vis Iran, not to put Iran on notice.

It's either you really cooperate with the international, you know, approach to negotiations and really come clean with regards to the real objectives of your program or else we are all ready to really contemplate, you know, the issue of war, the solution through military means.

The Iranians understand that they cannot face up to the whole region. They understand. But we ought to say today, since we have reached this stage of openness, to give it as one warning coming from one bloc not from different blocs – not to be wishy-washy over that.

Now we have to be more resolute and we have to repeat the same statement – that our security, the security of our population is similar to the security of the state of Israel and to the Israel public, themselves. So we share a lot, and I hope that we will be discussing that over the Internet between, you know, Gulf Arabs and the Israelis more today than yesterday.

MS. GERBER: All right. At that point of the time, I want to thank for Mr. Alfaraj for joining us today and briefing us about the WikiLeaks and Iran, and also, thanks, to all of our listeners who joined the call. Please don't forget to check out our website at [www.realite-eu.org](http://www.realite-eu.org) for more information about Iran. Thank you very much and have a great day.

(END)