



## **REALITE-EU**

**CONFERENCE CALL: IRAN'S ROLE IN SOUTH AMERICA: WHAT  
DOES IT MEAN FOR LATIN AMERICA AND SECURITY?**

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OPERATOR: The following is a recording of the Realite-EU teleconference scheduled for Thursday, March 17<sup>th</sup>, 2011 at 9 a.m. Eastern time. Excuse me, everyone, we now have our speakers in conference. Please be aware that each of your lines is in a listen-only mode. At the conclusion of the presentation, we will open the floor for questions. At that time, instructions will be given if you would like to ask a question. I would now like to turn the conference over to Gerlinde Gerber. Ms. Gerber, please begin.

GERLINDE GERBER: Hello and welcome. I am the communications associate at Realite-EU and I thank everybody to join us in today's conversation with Mr. Roman Ortiz. Realite-EU is a website and e-newsletter for journalists, leaders and key analysts that focus on developments in and around the Middle East.

The information on our website is in 10 languages and I invite you to come to [www.realite-eu.org](http://www.realite-eu.org) for more information about Iran, its nuclear weapons program and peaceful ways to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

Now it is my pleasure to introduce you to our speaker today. Mr. Roman Ortiz is the director of Decisive Point, a consulting company specializing in security and defense. He is also a professor at the Department of Economics at the Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, where he focuses on the analysis of political violence and terrorism in Latin America.

Ortiz has worked as an external advisor on counter-narcotics strategy and counterterrorism for the Colombian navy commander and the commander-in-chief of the Colombian military forces. He has taught and researched topics related to political and criminal violence at Spanish academic institutions such as the – (inaudible) – Institute and the Ortega y Gasset Institute – sorry for my – (chuckles).

Ortiz is a member of the editorial board on the Journal of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, published by Taylor & Francis in Philadelphia and frequently publishes articles in El Comercio de Lima, El Tiempo and semana.com.

This briefing with Mr. Roman Ortiz is on the record. Now Mr. Ortiz will say a few opening remarks and then answer questions by our listeners. Mr. Ortiz, you have the floor.

ROMAN ORTIZ: Thank you, thank you very much. Good morning to everybody. I would like to start this discussion just trying to (teach ?) to the attendancy (ph) some ideas about which is the rationale for the Iranian behavior in the region, in Latin America first, and second, to try to explain how they are trying to get their goals, okay?

First, I would like to explain that Iran is looking for key critical goals: First, the expansion of Iran is connected with the goal of, break the tensions which the country is suffering after the decision of the United Nations to press Iran in order to get they abandon their illegal nuclear program.

In this sense, the Iranians have been trying to use Venezuela – particularly Venezuela, but also other countries in the region – to try to break these tensions. This goal has been tried to get through isolated strategies.

One of them has been to use some of the – some Latin American countries as intermediaries to continue selling Iranian weapons to said countries. This was the case, for instance, in an operation which was rebuilt just three years ago when Venezuela was trying to sell a package of assault rifles to the Uruguayan government and the Uruguayans thought that the assault rifles were Venezuela-made. In fact, they were Iranian made. This is a typical example of some of the strategies which have been used by Iran in order to use some of their Latin American allies to break the UN tensions.

The second goal is to develop an infrastructure in the region in order to be able to respond, to retaliate to a potential U.S. or Israeli attack against the Iranian nuclear infrastructure in order to stop the development of nuclear weapons by Iran.

In this sense, the Iranian government has tried to increase its infrastructure all along the region and increase the presence of not just diplomatic personnel but also personnel connected to the al-Quds Force, which is, as you know, the international branch of the Iranian revolutionary guard – also, personnel connected with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, which is the intelligence branch of the Iranian government, and finally to support the building and the deployment of Hezbollah cells all along the region.

The newest step in this strategy is the Iranian government apparently has reached an agreement with the Venezuelan government in order to build a base to deploy some (face-to-face ?) missiles on Venezuelan territory. There is no clarity in this moment now regarding where this base could be located in Venezuela, but it's clear that there are conversations in this sense.

This would be a newest step in order to develop capability for retaliation in order to allow the Tehran government to respond with attacks against U.S. interest or even U.S. soil in the case of a crisis regarding the Iranian nuclear program.

The third goal is connected to the attempt – the Iranian attempt to delocalize – I mean, to move its strategic assets from Iranian territory to other countries. The idea behind this strategy is to try to get safe locations for assets which could be attacked by the U.S. or by Israel in the case there is a crisis regarding the Iranian nuclear program.

Then, what they are trying to do is to, for instance, to find uranium mines or even to build refineries in other countries. But this infrastructure could be under the control of the Iranian government in order to be able to continue using this infrastructure in the case of a crisis or in the case of even an aerial campaign against the Iranian strategic infrastructure inside Iran.

And finally, the third goal is connected with the permanent interest of Iran of isolate Israel and to promote anti-Israeli positions all over the world. In this case, in the case of Latin America, there are a couple of particularly interesting developments in the last year. One of them is Bolivia, for instance, and their – I mean, after a suggestion coming from the Iranian

government, the Bolivian government broke relations – diplomatic relations with Israel after the Israeli operations – the Israeli campaign in Gaza in 2009.

And also, the Tehran government has been an intermediary between the Venezuelan government and Hamas in order to increase the recognitions – the acceptancy (ph) of Hamas in Latin America. In fact, there was a meeting between the Venezuelan government and Hamas representatives in Tehran in 2007. This is particularly relevant basically because Hamas, as you know, is an organization which has been – I mean, has been included in the least of terrorist organizations, not just of the U.S. but also of the European Union, in the sense that what Iran is trying to do is to strengthen and to strengthen the international reach of Hamas going over the international tensions against their organization.

Just to talk a little bit about which could be the consequence of these Iranian policies, not just for the Latin American countries but also for the U.S., regarding the consequence for the U.S., I think we can talk about four key potential consequences. One is, it's clear Iran is getting a way to break the international tensions through Latin America and particularly through Venezuela, which means the effectiveness of these tensions is going to be reduced because of the efforts of Iran to get more influence in Latin America.

The second consequence is connected with an increase in the risks of attacks against the U.S. interests in Latin America and also against – the possibility, of course, of an increase of the risk of an attack against Israeli interests in Latin America. If this happen, it would not be the first time. As you know, there were two dramatic attacks against Israeli interests in Argentina in 2000 – excuse me, 2000, no, in 1994 and 1996, 1994 against the Israeli embassy and 1996 against the AMIA, the Argentinian Israeli social center in Buenos Aires.

The third consequence this Iranian penetration in Latin America could have is the creation of safe havens for Islamist terrorism in Latin America. We have had the experience with the Triple Frontier, the region between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, where there has been an increase in the presence of dissident Islamist and Arab terrorist organizations. And we could have a similar development in other parts of the region.

In fact, the cooperation between the Venezuelan government and the Iranian government has created a very, very easy environment for Islamists and radical Middle East organizations in Venezuela. There has been different cases in the last years when people involved in a terrorist operation have been captured with Venezuelan passports in their hands.

And finally, the fourth and last consequence is, in general terms, the presence of Iran in Latin America is reducing the influence of the U.S. in the region. Basically, there are some governments, for instance the Nicaraguan government, which had a tremendous dependency on the U.S. because they needed and they need them, even now, the U.S. aid in order to have – I mean, to support the national budget.

And they are looking – and they are looking for other sources of economic aid in order to cut their dependency with the U.S. One of the key – or, if you want, it's two key examples in this sense is the Nicaraguan government I mentioned but also the case of the Bolivian

government, which is trying to find other potential allies in order to reduce the dependency on the Western aid, in particular the U.S. economic support.

Regarding – but also, I think it's important, and I am talking to you from Latin America, that it's very important to understand, the Iranian penetration in the region is not just a problem for the U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere, but also it's a problem for the Latin American countries. And I would like to finish my remarks with mentioning to you which are, in my view, the consequences of these – of the increase of the Iranian presence in Latin America for the Latin American countries.

And I would like to mention four key consequences. One is an increase in the reach of terrorist attacks in some countries of the region, okay? I mentioned before the case of the AMIA, the attack against the Jewish center in Buenos Aires. We could see in the future similar cases in other countries of the region, basically because the infrastructure, which Islamist terrorist organizations could use in the region, is now much stronger than before.

The second problem, the second challenge, in my understanding, regarding the increase of the Iranian penetration in the region is the radicalization of the Latin American Muslim communities. In this sense, I think in Latin America, we have seen a development not so different from the situation in places such as Europe. I mean, we have a small, not so big Muslim communities in most of the countries of the region.

But however, we have seen an increase in the radicalization of these communities, of some of them. Even if these communities are not so big in demographic terms, I think it's important to have into account, this could become a challenge for the security of the Latin American countries, basically because they don't have the tradition to deal with this type of problems in the region, okay? In the case of Europe, for instance, countries such as the U.K., for instance, has a clear view about which is the problem they are trying to develop measures in order to deal with this process of radicalization.

But in the case of Latin America, this is a really very new problem and the governments are – there is not the political awareness necessary to deal with this problem. And even more, most of the governments don't have the proper tools in terms of intelligence and also in terms of promotion of democratic values in this type of closed communities to deal with this problem.

Just to mention a couple of examples of this, we have had cases of indigenous communities which have been converted to Islam in places such as the Southern Mexico or the Colombian-Venezuelan border.

The third problem is the introduction in the region of very destabilizing weapon systems. Okay? I mentioned before the case of the Iranian-Venezuelan conversations regarding the creation of – the building of a base where Iranian missiles could be deployed. This is just an example of the type of development which could have a dramatic impact in the strategic stability of the region.

And finally, just to finish, I think that the fourth consequence is of course the involvement of some Latin American countries, in some case with they're aware, without – I mean, the involvement of these governments, of Latin American governments in networks which are connected with the smuggling of military technology at global levels.

I would – example of that is how the Iranians are trying to – excuse me – to develop joint ventures to build joint military equipment with some Latin American governments, particularly Venezuela and also Ecuador. This idea, from the Iranian point of view, is an attempt to try to keep the arms exports of the Islamic Republic breaching the international sanctions.

In this way, of course, the Latin American countries which develop this type of ties with the Islamic Republic, which, of course – excuse me – could become involved in international networks which are moving illegally weapons systems and weapon technology all around the globe. That's all and I am open to your questions. Thank you.

MS. GERBER: Thank you very much. Operator, we will open the floor at this moment.

OPERATOR: Thank you very much. At this time, we will open the floor for questions. (Gives queuing instructions.) Our first question comes from J. Scott Brown (ph).

Q: Yes, Dr. Thank you very much for a very interesting presentation. I wonder if you could address, please, the issue of the secret flight – or not-so-secret flight – that operates on Conviasa airlines or Conviasa did operate it – between Caracas and Tehran and with stops in Damascus, whether that has indeed fully stopped or whether it's being replaced and whether you have any further intelligence about what exactly was going on with that flight.

MR. ORTIZ: Well, the flight is working in this moment. It is a flight which is developed under (specific political ?) conditions and in fact, in the case of Venezuela, the flight lands in the military side of the Maiquetia airport, which means people who are traveling in this flight don't cross the normal customs and passport control procedures.

But they come into Venezuela and get out from Venezuela without the official control of the – I mean without the ordinary control of the Venezuelan government. And the cargo plane transports not just people, but also materials. I mean there are not clear – there are no clear information. There is no clear information regarding what type of materials the plane transport.

Now, apparently, what is clear is these – these flight is use not so much to move things from Iran – from Iran to other countries, but to introduce people and also materials – I mean physical cargo in the cargo in Iran. I think it's important to put these flights in the context of the cooperation – of the technological cooperation between Iran and Venezuela and also in the role – in the context of the role played by Venezuela, that kind of huge breach to break the U.N. sanctions against Iran.

Look, the Venezuelans and the Iranians – Iran has developed cooperation with Venezuela in order – in terms of weapons manufacturing during the last years in some significant arenas. For instance, the Iranians have transferred UAVs – I mean drones – to Venezuela. Also, there is

agreements between the Venezuelan government and the Iranian government in order to send military officers to the Sharif University in Tehran, which is, as you know, the most important technological center under – in the Islamic Republic.

And finally, as you know, there was a recent – there was recently an agreement signed by the Venezuelan and the Iranian government which was focused on the development of something called a “nuclear village” in Venezuela territory. Basically, Venezuela the help of the Iranian government to develop its own nuclear technology.

I mean after the Japan earthquake, just yesterday, President Hugo Chavez made a statement saying he understood nuclear technology is too dangerous and he’s going to cancel the Venezuelan nuclear program because he thinks it is too dangerous to go along this path. But really, if you want my opinion, I don’t believe at all they are going to cancel, really, the program.

I think this is just kind of reaction for the public, but the Venezuelans are committed to cooperate with the Iranians in order to develop this program. Even more, the Iranians have got a critical control on assets which could be connected with – not with nuclear developments in Venezuela as well as in Iran.

There have been – in 2005, an Iranian company called – (inaudible) – received a contract from Venezuela, was contracted by the Venezuelan government in order to develop a complete mineral census of the mineral resources of Venezuela, which means all the minerals in Venezuelan territory are going to be known – all the mineral resources are going to be located and known by the Iranian government. This includes, of course, uranium.

Q: Of course, yes.

MS. GERBER: Operator, further questions?

OPERATOR: (Gives queuing instructions.) We are holding for questions.

MS. GERBER: Okay, then let me pose a few questions that came in from our listeners from before. So Cheryl Hoover (ph) is asking – she’s American and she’s asking about the U.S. president and the American media. I’ll just read her – what she sent to me by e-mail.

“Thus far, the American media has done little coverage regarding Iran’s frequent visits to South America. In fact, I believe I’ve only seen a single segment on CNN and another one on Fox News regarding the trip to Venezuela. Can you make a guess why the American media is not more concerned about the relationship of Iran’s leaders with America’s South American neighbors and the danger it presents to us here in the U.S.?” So the question is about the media presence in America.

Should I – I will pose the second question and so you can answer both. “Since President Obama hasn’t raised the issue either, do you have any idea why the president doesn’t seem concerned about this?”

MR. ORTIZ: Okay, okay. You're asking – I come into – I mean in a way that the U.S. internal politics and I am going to do it. First, I think there is a problem – there are two problems, if you want, in order to understand why this type of developments have not been mentioned by the U.S. president.

First, everything is very new and the information is very fragmented, okay? I mean if you look at the – at the evolution of the relations and the presence of the – the Iranian presence in Latin America during the last years. It's so huge and so quick and it's so new that it is very difficult for a common observer to take into account the relevance of these – of these events.

In fact, I think that the natural tendency of a lot of people is to think – look, this is just a curious event without real strategic meaning. Of course, it is not, but this is a tendency in a lot of – in a lot of sectors of the public opinion and also in the media. This is the context.

But also, I think we have to take into account, particularly from the U.S. government point of view, it is – for Obama administration, probably it's much more comfortable not to increase the level of awareness regarding this problem basically because if this could be the case, they would have to do something.

Basically, if you don't mention a problem in political terms, this problem doesn't exist, you know? This is the case, for instance, with Venezuela. Look at the – look at the evolution of the Chavez government. First, they have – it has been critical in order to open the region, in order to open Latin America to the – to the Iranian influence.

If you look at how the Iranians come into the – into the Latin American countries, you see how first Chavez travels and then a few months after this, the Iranian delegation comes into the country. And also, you know, we have heard these developments in terms of the – of the creation of how Venezuelan nuclear program and (the partner ?) the Venezuelan government has looked for in order to develop this program.

I mean I am talking about basically the Iranians, which are under U.N. sanctions because of – because of – their nuclear program is illegal and the Russians, which have been supporting a (nuclear legal ?) programs all over the world for very long. Just think about the involvement in their own Iranian nuclear program of the Russian Federation, okay? As you know very well, the official Iranian nuclear reactor is a reactor – is a Russian-made reactor.

Now, the problem is if you – if you could pay more attention on these issues, the problem is you have to give a response to these issues, okay? And then you have to do something. Then the only – the only possibility and really, in my opinion, Obama administration doesn't want to increase the awareness of these type of problems, basically because they are more focused on the internal – on the U.S. internal politics, first and also because they want to reduce the international commitments of the U.S.

Basically, what they want to do is to reduce the involvement of the U.S. in places such as the Middle East or Afghanistan. And they don't want to open a new front, even if this front is so

close to home that it could be very (very urgent ?) to increase the level of awareness and to put pressure on Venezuela, particularly in order to reduce its commitment with Iran.

Then, I think this is the reason, basically you have one hand – on the one hand, a problem with the phenomena in the sense this phenomena – the Iranian presence in the region is very – is very new and is – and the information is not so open, of course and then it's much more difficult to get relevant information for the media about this problem.

But also, you have this political interest coming from the U.S. administration in order to reduce the relevance of the problem in order to – in order not to have to do something regarding the – regarding Venezuela and Iran in Latin America.

Of course, the real problem is this policy – in my understanding – is a huge mistake and sooner or later, the U.S. is going to have to cope with the – with the Iranian presence in the region, basically because their most important strategic interests are going to be affected by the increase of the influence of Tehran in Latin America.

But in the present moment, I think President Obama prefers to reduce the relevance – the relevance of this issue. In general terms, if you look at the behavior – in my opinion – the behavior of the Obama administration in global terms, you can see how they are ready to suffer long-term losses in order not to have to make difficult decisions in this moment.

And I don't want to change the focus of my presentation, but if you see how this administration has behaved in the case of the – of Libya, it's a good example of how they have preferred not to take risks, now, in political terms and to be more effective in order to stop the violence provoked by Moammar Gadhafi and then probably to suffer in terms of political prestige, not just in the Middle East, but all over the world.

MS. GERBER: Okay. Do we have more questions?

OPERATOR: I'm showing no questions in the queue at this time.

MS. GERBER: Okay, let me give you another question that was submitted before. It's also about the U.S. They are currently looking into the case of Venezuela as breaking international sanctions or U.S. sanctions? Now, my question is: Do you have more details on – results from this or consequences? What would be the consequence for Venezuela if the U.S. finds them breaking U.S. sanctions?

MR. ORTIZ: Well, the fascinating thing is the consequence for Venezuela till now has been nothing. And it's very clear they are – they are breaking – they are breaking the U.N. sanctions. Just I am going to give – and also the U.N. – the U.N. sanctions – excuse me the U.N. sanctions and also the U.S. sanctions against Iran.

Let me give you an example. In 2008, the Department of State sanctioned an Iranian bank which had presence in Venezuela. The name of the bank was Export Development Bank of

Iran. And it was involved in financial operations to support the – to support the smuggling of technology, to support the Iranian weapons of mass destruction program.

And just one year after this, Venezuela and Iran signed an agreement to create another bank, which now is called the Iran-Venezuela Joint Bank. And of course, it's involved exactly in the same type of mismanagement and illegal – illegal activities as the previous bank. Then if you see this case, the point is Venezuela is not suffering any cost for this cooperation with Iran.

And then they are continuing with this behavior, passing over the sanctions and the condemnments of the U.S. and of the international community in general terms. I mentioned before the case of the – of the – of the case of the – of the – their attempt to sell Iranian assault rifles to the Uruguayan government, saying to the Uruguayans the rifles were Venezuelan rifles. And we have – we have other similar cases.

Now, the point is, in general terms, not just the U.S., but also the United Nations and of course, the Latin American countries surrounding Venezuela are doing nothing to express – to send a message to President Chavez that this behavior is very, very, very dangerous for the region and they are not going to tolerate this behavior.

The consequence of this is Chavez has all the room to continue doing this type of things with its Venezuelan allies, you know? Then on one hand, the answer is we have a lot of evidence of the Venezuelans breaching the United Nations sanctions against Iran and on the other hand, the answer is the consequences for this behavior is nothing till this moment.

The problem is if we could do something in order to increase the awareness, to increase the political pressure on these issues and then to get an increase in the pressure on Venezuela in order to get the Venezuelans change their policy on this problem.

MS. GERBER: Very interesting. Do we have more questions?

OPERATOR: I'm showing no more questions. (Gives queuing instructions.)

MS. GERBER: I will read a question submitted by Jonathan Shick (ph). It's a slightly different topic. "Do you see the recent unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state by various Latin American countries as a part of the Iranian influence on the continent? And if so, what is your opinion on that matter?"

MR. ORTIZ: Well, I think – I think the Iranian influence on this issue – or the Iranian activities are more connected to try to get recognitions for Hamas, for the radical – the Islamist radicals – the Palestinian Islamist radicals. Now, I think that of course, the Iranians are trying to promote the recognition of the Palestinian state by the Latin American countries. But they – I think the forces which are promoting these recognitions – this recognition are much more complex than Iran.

I think there are two types of questions here. One is, which is the narrative – the narrative which are dominating, which are, in a way, yeah, dominating the understanding of the

Latin American government and mass media about the Middle East conflict. And the narrative which is dominant in Latin America is a pro-Arab, pro-Palestinian narrative.

Then the problem is, there has not been, in my understanding, an effort – enough effective effort in order to explain the Israeli point of view to the Latin American government and also to the Latin American public opinion.

Even more, I think Israel has developed good relationships and very important esoteric cooperation with some Latin American governments. But for some reason, recent Israel has not been able to translate this level of cooperation into a more effective and more – a closer support from its Latin American allies in the case of the conflict with the Palestinians.

Just, I want to give you an example: One of the key providers of weapon systems to the Colombian government, and not just to the Colombian government but also to the Chilean government and other governments in the region, is Israel. Israel is a very attractive weapon supplier to the Latin American countries, basically because it is very reliable. And of course, the systems are high-quality systems.

Now, even when Israel has developed these relationships, and these relations of course, as you know, to transfer weapons is not as any other trade. It involves, of course, a level of political cooperation and political understanding. Well, but even if Israel has developed this close strategic relationship with some Latin American countries, the Israeli governments have not been able to translate this cooperation into a more supportive political position from its – excuse me, from their Latin American allies.

Then I think we have on the one hand the problem of public relations, a problem of public information; on the other hand we have a problem of how to translate the cooperation between Israel and Latin America in some areas into political support when the Palestinian question comes to full (face ?) in the international arena.

I think these are the two key factors which are in a way reducing or damaging the relationship – I mean, in a way which are weakening the political position of Israel in Latin America regarding the approval – I mean, the recognition of the Palestinian state.

I think this recognition is not – I mean, this tendency could reverse, could be reversed, but it is going to be necessary a strategic effort in the region by Israel – I mean, in the sectors, the political and social sectors which support Israel.

MS. GERBER: Very well. Do we have more questions?

OPERATOR: There are no questions in the queue.

MS. GERBER: Okay, so for the end, I wanted to ask you – I understand you live in Bogota, so I wanted to ask you about the country Colombia. As far as I know, Colombia is right now a nonpermanent member of the Security Council and it chairs the Iranian Sanction Committee. And what I also see is that when Obama travels to the region, he doesn't necessarily

go to Colombia while the Iranian deputy foreign minister, Behrouz Kamalvandi, he is going to Colombia. How do you see the role of Colombia in all this?

MR. ORTIZ: Okay, I think the reason because Obama doesn't come to Colombia is more connected with – I mean, with the view of this administration of the role of Colombia in the region. Colombia was a close ally of the Bush administration and the new Democrat – and the new Democrat administration, the Obama administration, has tried to change the way of dealing with Latin America.

And in this change, one of the losers has been Colombia, in the sense that the Obama administration, just because we were quite close to the Bush administration, decided – if you want my personal opinion – decided to punish us and to talk to other countries which they think they were less connected with the previous U.S. administration.

On the other hand, we are very attractive To the Iranians. In this moment, we are very attractive basically because it's clear – and I suppose the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry has a clear idea about this – the relationship between Colombia and the new – between Colombia and the Obama administration is not so close as it was with the Bush administration, which means there is a kind of a strategic – there is a kind of a strategic vacuum which the Iranians could try to profit from in order to get more influence in this country.

Then, I think both events – I mean, the Iranian visit to Colombia and the no visit of President Obama to Colombia, are connected, but not so much from the U.S. point of view but from the Iranian point of view. President Obama decided not to come to Colombia just because of a kind of decision of, make clear Colombia is no longer the clear ally of the U.S., as it was when Bush administration was in the White House.

But the Iranians have taken this evolution as an opportunity to increase the influence of – on Colombia, and particularly, of course, when, as you said, Colombia is in the UN Security Council in this moment and is going to have a relevant influence on the process regarding the tensions against Iran.

Then I think again, in this particular point, the U.S. administration is not taking into account, the Iranians are now a global player and they are going to take any opportunity they can find in order to increase the influence on relevant issues regarding the evolution of its nuclear program, you know?

MS. GERBER: All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Ortiz, for these extremely interesting and informative comments about Iran's role in South America. I want to recommend again the website [www.realite-eu.org](http://www.realite-eu.org) for background information, analysis and breaking news. On the website, we also provide a list of experts that are available for interviews on Iran, security in the Middle East, nonproliferation and human rights issues. Thank you very much for everybody on the call. Have a great day. Bye-bye.

(END)