

**REALITE-EU CONFERENCE CALL WITH
MARK FITZPATRICK
ON WEDNESDAY JUNE 16, 2010
AT 9:00 A.M. CENTRAL TIME**

GERLINDE GERBER: Hello and welcome, everybody. My name is Gerlinde Gerber and I am a Communication Associate at Realite-EU. I am very pleased that such a prominent group of journalists from across the world could join us in a conversation with Mark Fitzpatrick.

Realite-EU is a website and e-newsletter for journalists, leaders, and key analysts that focuses on developments in and around the Middle East which both affect Europe and beyond. Realite-EU is a non-profit organization not connected to any government. It is supported by individuals concerned with the growing threat that Iran poses to Europe and the Middle East. The information on our website is in 10 languages, such as English, French, German, Russian, Spanish, Arabic, Portuguese, Turkish, and Chinese, and Japanese. Please see www.realite-eu.org for more information about Iran, its nuclear weapons program and peaceful ways to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

Today's briefing with Mark Fitzpatrick is on the record.

Now it is my pleasure to introduce you to the speaker. Mark Fitzpatrick is a Senior Fellow for Non-proliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. His research focus includes proliferation concerns and preventing nuclear danger in the emerging nuclear renaissance. Fitzpatrick came to IISF in 2005, after a distinguished 26-year career in the US Department of State, where the previous 10 years he focused on non-proliferation issues. In that last—in his last posting, he served as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Non-Proliferation, responsible for policies to address the proliferation problem posed by Iran, North Korea, Libya, Iraq, South Asia, and other regions of concern. Among his duties, he also oversaw the implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative, advanced conventional arms and technology controls, proliferation sanctions, and export control cooperation programs. He is the author of a book called, "The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding the Worst Case Outcome" and has also written articles on non-proliferation in *The Financial Times*, *International Herald Tribune*, *The Survivor*, and other publications.

Mr. Fitzpatrick will give some open remarks and then answer questions by our listeners. Mark Fitzpatrick, you have the floor.

MARK FITZPATRICK: Thank you. As those dialing in will know, the EU Foreign Affairs Council on Monday approved a draft declaration outlining new EU sanctions on Iran, and Thursday, tomorrow, the European Council is expected to approve these sanctions, giving the unanimous political endorsement of the leaders of the EU states. In the next weeks, EU working groups will then flesh out the actual sanctions, which would presumably come to the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU on their next meeting, scheduled on July 26th, for approval. The formal regulations will then follow, putting those sanctions into place.

The EU sanctions give teeth to the UN sanctions adopted earlier this month. The UN sanctions were not toothless; they in important ways extended the sanctions on Iran, particularly the ban on offensive arms. The EU sanctions, however, make—will make mandatory for EU states many of the financial sanctions which the UN sanctions only pose as a request to member states. When it calls on states to do such and such, the EU will make many of those mandatory, although the specifics are to be determined. The big question is will these sanctions have any impact? And I don't think there's anyone who is involved in this process who believes that suddenly the leadership in Tehran will change its policies and suspend enrichment and provide full cooperation to the IAEA. But there is a hope, and I think it is a possibility, if not a probability, that this will give Tehran leadership a greater reason to return to the negotiating table that they had left in October.

There are other purposes to the sanctions that I think are valid, and I'm happy to discuss those with the callers. One of the other key purposes is to strengthen the means of limiting Iran's nuclear and now its missile programs. Already, export controls adopted by all of the nuclear suppliers have prevented Iran from acquiring additional components and materials that it would like to have in order to expand its nuclear program. We've seen that Iran's nuclear program is limited in what it can do. The centrifuges are based on the T1 model are breaking, have not been able to work to the numbers Iran has installed. And the sanctions applied by the UN and now heightened by the EU will further restrict Iran's ability to produce an unlimited supply of low enriched uranium, which cannot be used right now for civil energy purposes in Iran but could be re-enriched and applied for use in nuclear materials as (inaudible) material.

I'll stop there and be happy to take questions.

GERLINDE GERBER: Sure. I've reviewed some questions that journalists sent to me by e-mail. The first one is the Swedish Foreign Minister has said its government is against Iran's sanctions. How much say and how much impact does Sweden have?

MARK FITZPATRICK: Well, the Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, had made it known that he had reservations about indiscriminate application of sanctions, and Sweden played an important role in the deliberations. But the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU that met on Monday, including Sweden, did agree without dissent to the application of sanctions by the EU. So the concerns that Sweden had were discussed fully, my understanding is, and met, and Sweden is going along with the application of sanctions.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right. Our next question: German industry has been strongly involved in the energy sector and Berlin, very often posing sanctions, argued that it is simply—it would simply forfeit the business which could go to China instead. Can you comment on that?

MARK FITZPATRICK: That's a legitimate concern for many German businesses, particularly the small businesses that rely on business with Iran. But overall, Germany's exposure in Iran is only a small percentage of Germany's overall exports and its trade. So, as an impact overall on the German economy, I don't think that these sanctions will be that detrimental to the German economy. It is true that some Chinese and other firms located in

other countries have tried to step in when European companies have deserted the field, but many of the kinds of investments and technologically directed trade in which European companies are involved don't have natural competitors in China. The Chinese firms cannot compete on technology—on a technological basis with European firms. So while Iran might seek investment or technology elsewhere, they won't be able to replace the Europeans, and particularly in cases where the Europeans provide—have already provided investments and technologies where Iran is seeking replacement parts and so forth only Europeans can provide them.

GERLINDE GERBER: Staying with the European businesses, one more question and then we go to the broader framework. One more question: There are many reports about Dubai and other third countries or shell companies that do business with Iran on behalf of European countries or European businesses. Can EU sanctions end those business ties that go around shell companies and third places?

MARK FITZPATRICK: The propensity of Iran to rely on shell companies and other essentially black market operations to get around sanctions is an ongoing problem that won't necessarily be solved by the application of EU sanctions. It will be helped by the UN sanctions themselves, which have called for the establishment of a monitoring committee, which will have the power to investigate cases where Iran has set up shell companies in Dubai and places like that. The EU does have its own monitoring capabilities. Member states can provide information that would expose such cases where there are shell companies involved. And this is, you know these—it's one of the reasons why when the EU working groups sit down to discuss the actual details of the EU sanctions, there will be some states calling for bans not on just specific companies, but bans across an entire sector, so that would include cases where Iranian companies that might otherwise be targeted by name would simply switch names and set up a business under other auspices.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right. And talking about more international things, the G8 will meet soon in Canada, and Iran's nuclear issue will remain on its agenda. Has it been effective in curbing Iran's ambitions to develop nuclear weapons or programs that would lead to the production of nuclear weapons? Should Iran's nuclear issue be handled by the P5 rather than the G8 because the UN Security Council has more authority over nuclear proliferation?

MARK FITZPATRICK: I think it's clear that no groupings of states and no forms of diplomacy, whether sanctions or engagement or other strategies, have stopped Iran's desire to attain a capability to produce nuclear weapons should they so decide. The engagement strategy of Obama, the sanctions strategy of the P5, the outreach strategy of the E3+3, they're all striving to give Iran a clear choice of either international isolation or integration. The question about which grouping of nations might be most effective in clarifying this choice to Iran is—it's not easy to say, "Well, it should be the P5 or the G8." I think all of these groupings have a role to play in helping to clarify that choice for Iran. The P5 is important because through the United Nations, the universalization of sanctions provides the strongest legitimacy. But the G8, with its economic reach, also has important leverage.

GERLINDE GERBER: Okay. If sanctions are imposed and do not persuade Iran to stop its drive for nuclear power, Israel may be forced to act in its self defense. If that should happen, what would be the aftermath in terms of reaction from the EU, America, and the UN?

MARK FITZPATRICK: If Israel believes it must take military action, the form of that military action is not exactly clear. It's just widely assumed that it would take the form of bombing and destructive use of military power, but it could also take other forms of, you know, quarantines for example.

The reaction of other countries to any unilateral application of force by Israel or by any other country, but let's face it would be most likely to be Israel, would depend upon the circumstances of what triggered the action. If an Israeli military action were triggered by an explicit Iranian transgression of international norms such as the expulsion of IEA inspectors, the declaration of an intention to produce nuclear weapons, the testing of a nuclear device, the withdrawal from the NPT, these would all be very obvious tripwires. And I think under these circumstances, action by Israel would be more supported by other countries.

The countries outside Israel would have different degrees of what they would regard as what would justify military use. I think Washington would have a standard that would not be as high as many of the states of the European Union. And within the European Union, some states would have higher standards still. I think given the concerns that Sweden, for example, had expressed about indiscriminate sanctions, they might have a higher standard of what would trigger legitimate use of force than, say, France, although this question is purely hypothetical at this point. If, however, there was not a clear tripwire of a form that it was obvious that Iran's intentions were to produce nuclear weapons, then it would be probably harder for an Israeli military action to get support from other nations.

And one could imagine circumstances in which there was intelligence information about an Iranian—a clear-cut Iranian attempt to produce nuclear weapons, but the intelligence was less clear-cut than would be ideal. And let's face it, intelligence is always less clear-cut than would be ideal. So, you know, I think in these cases European Union countries would probably demand a higher degree of clarity in such intelligence than Israel might determine was necessary before it launched an attack, and Washington would probably be somewhere in between.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right. One question from the Netherlands: As you know, the Arab nations along the Gulf are also against a nuclear Iran. Not only because of the water issue, desalination—this is (inaudible)—but also, the flow of the oil supply is in danger. They do not trust Iran with nuclear weapon. Israel has been voicing the danger and her opposition to these developments in Iran. Is it not necessary for the voice of the Gulf states to be taken into account, and also to be heard more in unison with that of Israel?

MARK FITZPATRICK: My personal view is that, yes, the voices and the concerns of Iran's neighbors in the Gulf needs to be taken into account. They're worried not just that Iran will acquire a nuclear weapons capability that will diminish their own sense of security; they're worried as well that a deal might be struck with Iran in a back room in which their interests

were not taken into account. So I think they have a very legitimate reason to say that they should be involved in any international or multinational negotiations over the Iranian nuclear question. How one does that is difficult.

We saw that when one of Iran's other regional neighbors, Turkey, became involved in its own private negotiations, the outcome was not so universally welcomed. I'm talking about the deal brokered by Turkey and Brazil with Iran that left many questions unresolved.

I think that the interests and the concerns of Gulf states about Iran's nuclear program don't necessarily have to be expressed or taken into account in conjunction with Israel, as was expressed in the last part of the question. Their concerns are legitimate in and of themselves and don't necessarily have to be done in conjunction with Israel; it makes it harder if it has to be done in conjunction with Israel because of their real, additional concerns about the Palestine question that complicates any common front with Israel vis-à-vis Iran.

GERLINDE GERBER: Since you talked about the Palestine question, one question from a reporter: Do you think the sanctions will be really effective, or are they just giving more time to Iran to develop their system? And then in parenthesis, thoughts on Gaza blockade..

MARK FITZPATRICK: Say—what's the Gaza? Can you say that again? I didn't understand that part of the question.

GERLINDE GERBER: He just said in parenthesis, "thoughts on Gaza blockade?"

MARK FITZPATRICK: Oh, thoughts on the Gaza blockade. Well, first of all, the question will sanctions be effective? As I stated in my introductory remarks, nobody thinks that they're going to cause Iran to change its policy overnight. The hope is that they would bring Iran back to the negotiating table. It should be noted that when Iran met with the then EU Foreign Policy Chief, Solana, and representatives from the E3+3 in Geneva on the first of October, there was to have been a follow-on discussion about the nuclear issue with those states, and Iran has refused since then to have that follow-on discussion. So that's the negotiating table that Iran is being asked to rejoin, and the application of sanctions to clarify the costs to Iran of its policies, I think, could have an effect in bringing it back to that negotiating table. I'm not terribly optimistic about that; I think there's a possibility. I think, though, even if Iran were not to come back to the negotiating table, sanctions can be effective in other ways. They can be effective in strengthening the controls on Iran's ability to acquire additional materials and components from overseas sources for its nuclear missile program. Those controls have been effective in limiting Iran's program, and strict application can continue to limit Iran's program. Tighter controls will be necessary, however, particularly in the missile area, which has seen some very important, significant strides forward by Iran.

The questioner asked about thoughts about the Gaza issue, and as I said in response to the previous question, this enormously complicates any efforts to try to form a regional front vis-à-vis Iran. It's very difficult any Arab state to make common cause officially or publicly with Israel when the misery of the people living in the Gaza Strip has been so exposed and when

the efforts to supply relief, you know, outside the bounds of the blockade, and the questions about why the ships were sent in that fashion and the response to that makes it very difficult. I am not in a position right now to be exploring too deeply this question. It's not my area of expertise other than the complications it presents to trying to martial a collective response to the nuclear problem.

GERLINDE GERBER: Let me throw in a personal question on the Iranian sanctions. And the most common heard argument is that they will hurt—sanctions will hurt the ordinary Iranians who have nothing to do with the nuclear program. What is your response?

MARK FITZPATRICK: This is a legitimate concern that is always raised with regard to sanctions. I think, though, that anyone looking at the nature of the sanctions that have been applied by the Security Council and now the sanctions being considered by the European Union will notice that they have been very strictly targeted at entities that have a relationship with the nuclear or missile programs. There are no across the board sanctions imposed in ways designed to undermine the Iranian economy or to impose hardships on the people. Now, it's impossible to target sanctions so precisely that they hurt only the leadership and not the people, but over the last decade and more, sanctions policy has evolved to a point where smart sanctions—the word smart sanctions really does have a meaning—and I think that what we see so far is smart sanctions that are targeted.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right. And one more question from a consultant group: Why can't we get more countries to give material and moral support to the Iranian dissidents and youth of Iran?

MARK FITZPATRICK: Providing material support in particular to groups in Iran that oppose the regime can be very counterproductive in reinforcing the claims that the leadership makes that such groups are pawns of the West. Most of these groups don't want any aid precisely because they don't want to be seen as anything other than a legitimate, indigenous, independent, unbiased—well, unattached group opposing the—promoting democratic reforms. There are ways for outsiders to provide moral support, to provide support, for example, in enabling Iranian reformist groups to overcome the technological controls that the leadership has imposed on their means to communicate. I'm talking about the kinds of cutouts that Google and other Internet companies can make available that would enable Iranian citizens to be able to get around blocks on Internet and other electronic communications.

I think it's very—getting back to the main question. Outside provision of materials to support to groups in Iran can be counterproductive, and it's very tricky to—for outsiders to be able to know how best to affect developments internally in Iran. You know, outsiders have gotten it wrong in other countries, including in Iraq, and they've gotten it wrong in Iran as well. Outside interference that led to the toppling of the Mossadegh government in 1953 has created a lingering suspicion and distrust in the Gulf for 50 years on now. I think outside groups have to have an element of humility and modesty in what they really can achieve by interfering domestically.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right, thank you. As a German, I want to ask you another question: The German government is undergoing a crisis. In case of a political change, do you think this could have any implication on the Iran sanctions?

MARK FITZPATRICK: I don't see it myself. It looks to me as though the German political parties are fairly united in their policy vis-à-vis Iran. So far, at least, Germany has continued to be a stalwart member of the so-called E3 in concert with Paris and London, and I myself, from my vantage point, don't see that changing.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right. I think we touched a lot of issues, and I will open up the lines now to all the listeners. I think the Operator will explain how that would work.

OPERATOR: Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, at this time the floor is open for your questions. If you would like to ask a question, you may do so by pressing star, one now. We will take all questions in the order that they are received, and if at any time you would like to remove yourself from the questioning queue, you may do so by pressing star, two. Again, if you'd like to make a question or comment, press star, one now.

Ms. Gerber, at this time we have no questions.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right. Then let me ask another question that is slightly not focused on Iran, but it came sent in by a journalist to you, Mr. Patrick—Fitzpatrick. It is: Should North Korea's nuclear issue be on the G8 agenda, or should it be dealt with by the Six-Party Talks under Chinese mediation? Do you think the P5 and the G8 have been relying too much on China to solve the North Korean problem? China is not even one of the G8.

MARK FITZPATRICK: I think that the North Korean nuclear issue is an example of a problem that has really proven beyond the ability of outside states to solve. And to date, the solutions have centered on China and others involving China, trying to persuade Iran. They've done so outside the UN system because China has not wanted the UN to take a role. China has wanted it to be done through the Six-Party Talks. The Six-Party Talks have been ineffective and are a possible vehicle solution. But the process is not the question, it's really how to get to a solution. I think the G8 group of countries and the G20 group of countries who will be meeting in Seoul later this year certainly have a role in expressing condemnation for North Korea's unprovoked attack on the South Korean vessel and condemnation as well of North Korea's nuclear testing and nuclear and missile programs.

The G20, the G8, and other groups of nations can apply their economic leverage to strengthen the enforcement efforts vis-à-vis North Korea. I don't think the Six-Party Talks need to be the exclusive vehicle for multilateral diplomacy in this regard.

GERLINDE GERBER: Do we have any questions from our listeners?

OPERATOR: Yes, Ma'am, we have a question from Allen Kieswetter from C and O (sp?) Resources.

ALLEN KIESWETTER: My question is: What about stricter sanctions by other countries than the EU? For example, US—the Congress is now considering a bill to be put out probably by the end of the month. What do you think the impact will be? And similarly, what do you think about Russia and China to the degree that they comply with sanctions or perhaps that they will enact their own, more stringent measures?

MARK FITZPATRICK: There's three good—there's two good questions in there, not three. Let me do the last one first because it's a very interesting piece of information that just came to me today.

The question is: Will Russia and China implement the sanctions adopted by the Security Council or—and will they go beyond it in any way? Today, you know, there are many examples of where Russia and China, and other nations, let's be fair, have not implemented in full measure sanctions adopted by the Security Council. In the case of North Korea, this is readily apparent, China being unwilling, and it even said so, that it was unwilling to fully implement the interdiction requirements of sanctions on North Korea. But in this case on Iran, it's interesting that one of the measures that the Security Council adopted that was not voluntary, it was mandatory, was the ban on heavy offensive equipment, military arms sales to—with this sanctions measure. And it's not the kind of sanction that is easily avoided by setting up front companies; large offensive arms are not so easy to hide. So I think Russia and China will be following the strict requirements of the Security Council resolution. The question is will they be going beyond that?

And it's interesting that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization recently met and adopted a new rule about membership. And the rule is that countries are under UN sanctions are not eligible for membership. It's very interesting. This applies directly to Iran, which has been applying for membership in the SCO for several years now. It has been an observer; it wants to be a member. This is a group of nations, Russia, China, and Central Asian nations. Iran is now excluded from this. Now, was this in reaction to the Security Council call on states to, you know, adopt a vigilance and so forth in dealing with Iran? Not explicitly, but a coincidence of timing was notable, so I think many people are skeptical about how far Iran and China—Russia and China will go; but here's an example of where they've done something.

I think other nations besides the European Union are likely to adopt measures on their own, now that they have a Security Council legal basis for doing so. This is one reason why countries like Japan and South Korea are always reluctant to adopt sanctions unless they have a legal basis, and the UN gave them that. Australia, for example, was, I think, the first out of the gate to adopt unilateral sanctions.

Now, the United States application of unilateral sanctions is a trickier matter, because the United States, having no trade to speak of with Iran, no investments there, has nothing really that it can sanction other than the application of US law in an extraterritorial fashion. That provides grave difficulties for the Europeans, who don't think it's fair or legal for the United States to be sanctioning their firms, who violate laws imposed not by Europeans, but by the Americans. And this is—this effort to avoid the extraterritorial application of US law

was one of the driving forces for the Europeans to back both the UN sanctions and now their own additional sanctions, to show that they are willing and able to take tough measures.

There is probably one area of US sanctions that is, you know, that is being considered by Congress that does not fall into this category of extraterritorial application of laws. It's the divestment campaign, providing a legal backing for US states to divest state pension funds from companies that are investing in Iran. And I expect that will go forward, and that is one way that United States, you know, individuals and politicians and states can exercise American financial muscle.

GERLINDE GERBER: Do we have any more questions?

OPERATOR: Our next question comes from Jonathan Schick with the University of Brussels.

JONATHAN SCHICK: Mr. Fitzpatrick, you spoke about the caution outsiders need to take about supplying resistant groups within Iran. And I'd like to ask: What is your opinion on these groups? Do you believe they could form an eventual change or maybe overthrow the Iranian regime? And if so, will it make place for an eventual democracy?

MARK FITZPATRICK: In the long term, I have no doubt that demographics will eventually kick in. The overwhelming demographic youth bulge in Iran and the, you know, the apolitical nature of this youthful demographic, their desire to be integrated with the international community, their lack of interest in the Islamic fundamentalist nature of the regime, you know, will eventually see Iran with a different government leadership that is more reflective of the will of the Iranian people. But I don't see that happening in the near future.

The short-lived strength of the Green Movement, I think, is important to take into account. The expectations and anticipation that prevailed in the second half of last year petered out this year. And that doesn't mean the Green Movement is dead, but anticipation that the Green Movement or other reformist-minded groups will be able to topple the government, that really is not in the cards today. Iran is led by a very powerful group of well-connected Iranian Revolutionary Guard core veterans and clerics, and they have all—they exercise all the levers of power in the regime, of total control over communications, and the judiciary, and the military, and the police, and so forth and so on. I don't see any prospect for an uprising to overthrow them. But eventually, I think they will be challenged because Iran does have a very imperfect, but still a democratic system, and people eventually can become into power. And we saw Katani there; he was not able to do much, but it was reflective of the desire for reforms in Iran. And I am hopeful that eventually we'll see that happen.

JONATHAN SCHICK: Okay. Thank you.

OPERATOR: At this time, we have no further audio questions.

GERLINDE GERBER: Okay. I actually got two more questions by e-mail. One is: Do you think military actions will be the only way to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon?

MARK FITZPATRICK: No, I don't think military actions are the only way. I think Iran will actually be dissuaded from actually acquiring nuclear weapons by the threat of military force. The threat of military force expressed in the form of deterrents I think is already causing Iran to exercise caution in not crossing the line from capability to weapons production. And I think this line, invisible though it may be, can be strengthened if Iran knows that if it crosses the line, it will face military action. I don't think this means states need to make threatening noises. I think Iran knows the situation. And I think that there can be other ways to make it clear to them, through informal, quiet channels, that deterrence is a fundamental policy. Combined with containment of their ability to expand their military missile program, I think this is probably the best way—well, it's not the best way; the best way would be a negotiated solution in which Iran stops producing these technologies of concern. But the more likely way is going to be deterrence and containment policies.

I think we're in for a kind of a long Cold War-type situation in which there's not a negotiation solution, there's not military action to stop the program, but there is a containment and deterrence policy so that will keep it from crossing the line to actual weapons production.

GERLINDE GERBER: And the second one is: If sanctions are not preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, will other Gulf states try to get their own? And will we see a nuclear arms race in the region, and what are the consequences of those?

MARK FITZPATRICK: It certainly is not axiomatic that Iranian acquisition of nuclear arms will lead to a proliferation cascade in the region, in which other countries develop their own nuclear weapons capabilities. But I think it is likely that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons capability that other countries will reconsider their security options, and some of them will give greater weight in these internal deliberations to keeping their nuclear weapons options open for the future. You already see today some states keeping their options open. Egypt is a prime example. I'm not saying that Egypt is seeking nuclear weapons; no, it's not, but it's keeping its options open for the future. And certainly if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Egypt will all—be all the more determined to keep its option open and maybe start to pursue some dual use technologies that will make it easier to go the weapons route. I think the same could be the case for Turkey, which has had a very good track record in maintaining its obligations to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty; it's been transparent. But it feels in a power balance with Iran, and if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Turkey's relative power in the region will decrease and it, I think, will give at least some consideration to pursuing this path.

In the Gulf region, most of the Gulf countries have no basis in technology or facilities to embark on a nuclear weapons program, except possibly for Saudi Arabia, which has some missiles sitting in the desert. Saudi Arabia is one of the countries, though, that will feel exposed and vulnerable if Iran acquires nuclear weapons. I think there are much better choices for Saudi and other countries who feel so exposed. They would be better off strengthening their alliance, their defense cooperation with the United States, and in fact, that's what they're doing today. So they won't have any need to seek nuclear weapons of

their own. They'll be well-protected by the United States, by Great Britain, by their own conventional capabilities, which in most cases are better than Iran's.

So I don't—just to reiterate, a proliferation cascade is not at all inevitable. But it is likely that states will at least give some consideration to other options if Iran continues on this path and is not unchecked.

GERLINDE GERBER: One more question: How do you evaluate the Turkey-Brazil fuel swap deal? And in that do you see, like, a possible solution or, like, a breakthrough to Iran come back to the negotiation table? And how do you see the role of Turkey in all this?

MARK FITZPATRICK: The joint declaration that was agreed to by Turkey, Brazil and Iran is not a breakthrough to a solution. It deals only with one issue of the supply of the Tehran research reactor. Dealing with that issue, it had some positive elements, the positive elements being Iran's expressed willingness to ship out of its country a sizable amount of its low enriched uranium. That could be an important confidence building measure if it led to an agreement in which Iran continues to ship out significant portions of an LEU stockpile so that it didn't have a stockpile that could be quickly turned to weapons purposes. Iran had also agreed in that deal to allow for a lag between the export of its stockpile of low enriched uranium and the receipt of fuel for the Tehran research reactor.

So there were positive elements in that agreement, and I don't think it should be quickly cast aside. But there are some real problematic elements to it, including that Iran was not willing to go back to the negotiating table. One of—paragraph nine of that agreement explicitly said that there would only be negotiations on areas of common agreement, and Iran has not agreed to talk about the nuclear issue with the E3+3. So that's one of the reasons why there was skepticism in much of the rest of the world, at least in the Western world, about this agreement. And of course, Iran's continued production of 20% enriched uranium was not dealt with in the agreement at all. That's probably, you know, it was the biggest gap in the agreement that led to it not being received well at all in Western capitals. Is there any future to the deal? Possibly. It hasn't been declared dead by either side. But what really needs to happen is Iran needs to negotiate with E3+3, which has a proposal on the table and, I think, can be the basis for a solution. Iran shows no interest in that solution, unfortunately.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right. Operator, do we have any other questions?

OPERATOR: No, ma'am. No audio questions at this time.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right. Then I will give Mr. Fitzpatrick the opportunity to give us some final remarks on sanctions and why we should enforce sanctions or not and if they could be effective. And yes, you have [talk over].

MARK FITZPATRICK: Okay. Just saying in final that I'm not speaking as—it may sound like I'm speaking as an advocate of sanctions. I am trying to speak more as an analyst

assessing the purpose and the utility of sanctions. And from my perspective as an analyst, I think there is a—several useful purposes and a possible good that could come out of it, and that's my position. I'm speaking to those journalists on the line as an independent resource, and I hope that I've been clear in my questions and my answers to questions.

GERLINDE GERBER: All right. Thank you so much, Mr. Fitzpatrick, for joining us today and briefing us about the threat of the nuclear Iran just prior to the EU Foreign Ministers' debate on Iran sanctions.

Realite-EU will provide the latest thinking on breaking news and long-term trends on these and other issues, as well as give reporters lists of experts to interview. Please visit our website at www.realite-eu.org and thank you very much for listening. Good bye.